Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

611.61/10–450

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)

top secret

[Washington,] October 4, 1950.

Participants:	Yakov A. Malik1—Soviet Delegation to the United Nations
	W. W. Lancaster—National City Bank of New York
	Dean Rusk—Assistant Secretary of State

I had a two and a half hour conversation on Sunday night, October 1, with Mr. Malik at the home of Mr. W. W. Lancaster of the National City Bank in Manhasset, Long Island. Mr. Lancaster had invited the two of us and certain others to dinner but, as it actually turned out, neither Mr. Malik nor I was able to arrive for dinner. Both of us came at about eight o’clock. Mr. Lancaster’s other guests had been two members of the American Friends Service Committee who, under the circumstances, withdrew immediately after dinner and left the conversation to Mr. Malik, Mr. Lancaster and myself.

Throughout the evening Mr. Malik appeared relaxed, even tempered, and ready to exchange views on highly controversial matters without affecting his affability or informality.

After a considerable amount of casual conversation, I asked Mr. Malik what two or three elements in the United States policy or conduct seemed to create most concern among the Russian people. I suggested he leave aside such details as might be developed by the Politburo and address himself to the points which were generally in the minds of people in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Malik opened by stating that in the early years of the Soviet revolution the United States had been accepted by the Russian people us providing examples in many fields which the Russians should attempt to emulate. They had a high regard for our technical competence, industrial organization and techniques in a wide variety of fields. They looked upon us as a new nation which had developed a continent and had shown ability and energy in doing so. In the 30’s President Roosevelt’s attempt to establish relations between the two countries² on a normal basis had made a deep impression in the Soviet Union and a considerable amount of friendliness toward America had developed. He said that the joint effort in the war had further raised the reputation of the United States in Russia and that there had been the expectation at the end of the war that US-Soviet relations could be placed on a sound and friendly basis. He said that had been the “good part”. Since the war was over, he said, US-Soviet relations had “soured”.

He attributed this to three factors on the United States side: (1) The encirclement of the Soviet Union with American military bases; (2) widespread talks in the United States about bombing Russia; and (3) “the assumption by the United States of the role of world leadership”.

On the first point he said that we do not seem to understand what a century of brutal and devastating military occupation has done to the psychology of the Russian people. He said that every generation has seen a violent attack upon Russia, an occupation of a considerable part of the country, the slaughter of millions of its people, and the devastation of important parts of its territory. He said that the Americans are “spoiled children” because we have never been hurt by war, we do not know what occupation is, and we cannot understand what that experience does to a people. Consequently, he said, when the Russian people began to see at the close of World War II the establishment of American military bases at strategic points around the frontiers of Russia, it was inevitable that they should believe that these bases were for use and that the United States in fact planned to attack the Soviet Union.

On the second point, he said that the Russian people get from the American press and statements by prominent Americans, including the Secretary of the Navy,³ a barrage of threats to bomb Soviet cities and to initiate a war against the Soviet Union. He said this kind of talk from American sources made a tremendous impression in Russia and that I could observe that Russians did not go around urging that Russia drop bombs on American cities or declare war on the United States.

On the third point, he said that throughout most of our national life the American people had been “isolationalist” and that we were trying to develop our own country and to live at peace in our own hemisphere and to live behind the protection of two vast oceans. He said that that had changed after World War II and that we were now expanding our influence and power without any apparent limitation on our appetites, and that the “role of world leadership” which we were assuming was the expression of imperialist and expansionist urges which Russians considered constituted a direct threat to themselves. He said that when we spoke of “strengthening the United Nations” what we meant by it was organizing the United Nations against the minority and that this itself was a further expression of our present imperialist policy.

During Mr. Malik’s presentation of the above, I did not attempt to interject replies at every point, since I wished him to develop his views without too much interruption. I did, however, point out to him that the war talk in this country was unofficial and that the policy of the country had been repeatedly reaffirmed by responsible officers of government; that anyone who selected out expressions of U.S. public opinion could find support for any of a great diversity of views, and that much of the war talk was a natural outcome of the exasperation and disappointment which many Americans feel at the failure to establish a peaceful world after World War II. Since most Americans hold the Soviet Union responsible for this failure, such exasperation is naturally directed to them.

Mr. Malik then turned to me to ask me what were my “points” against the Soviet Union.

I began, as had Mr. Malik, with “the good side”, and spoke of the deep impression made on the American people by the Russian performance in the war against Hitler. I said that the Battle of Stalingrad and the comeback of Soviet forces in the second half of the war had enormously raised Russian prestige and had greatly [facilitated?] a friendly atmosphere out of which had come high hopes that it would be possible for the great powers to organize peace on the basis of the United Nations. I stated that this potentially friendly development had also “soured” as far as Americans are concerned. I cited Soviet refusal to carry out their agreements concerning the Balkan states, their threats against such states as Turkey and Iran, their difficult attitude toward occupation problems in Austria, Germany and Japan, their refusal to try to move ahead on atomic energy control and a wide range of problems of which Mr. Malik was aware.

I told him that I did not expect him to agree, but that if he wants to understand us Americans he must know that we hold the Soviet Union directly responsible for the Berlin Blockade, the guerrilla attack against Greece and the aggression in Korea. I said that the fact that we had not made formal public charges on the Korean matter should not lead him to the conclusion that we had any doubt as to the real responsibility. (He did not comment.)

As to his worries about our assumption of a role of world leadership, I told him that we had been forced to take an interest in matters beyond our historical horizons because free countries turned to us for assistance to meet what they thought was a threat from the Soviet Union, and I cited Greece, Turkey and Iran as cases in point.

I said that I doubted that we and the Soviet Union agreed on the most elementary concepts of the international system—that it should be founded upon independent states, that these independent states should be those generally recognized by the community of nations at the present time, and that the general rules applicable to the relations of these states with each other are those set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. I said that, as we see it, a general agreement between us and the Soviet Union would have to be an agreement of the sort we had already made with them when we both signed the Charter.

Mr. Malik then turned to certain economic factors. He criticized American business as seeking excessive profits today and as willing to let tomorrow take care of itself. This resulted in voracious policy and stimulated an imperialist foreign policy. I let Mr. Lancaster (National City Bank) deal with this one, which he did with the usual line that although there were excesses, American business is vitally interested in peace. Mr. Lancaster also stated that American business was in fact very timid in the international field and not inclined to invest large sums abroad in the present world situation.

Mr. Malik then said that, in the modern world, “power is money” and that the United States had put vast sums of money around the world in order to bring the policies of other governments under our control. I replied that there was another form of power which was far more efficient, and comparatively inexpensive, namely, subversive activity by highly disciplined minority bands under Cominform direction. I said that the influence of the United States through its aid and assistance programs was trifling compared to the controls exercised by the Soviet Union through such communist penetration. Mr. Malik seemed to enjoy the respect which I expressed for the effectiveness of such methods, but passed it off by saying that it is impossible for any country to send emissaries and cadres into another country to do the kind of thing I was talking about and that these resistance efforts were native to their own countries.

Mr. Lancaster, in a burst of eagerness, then said that he was disturbed about the Korean matter⁴ and that he was certain that if two intelligent men like Mr. Malik and Mr. Rusk would get together, they could find a formula to bring the affair to an end. Realizing that Mr. Malik would look upon this as a planted remark, I replied that I thought Mr. Lancaster was very flattering if he thought the two of us could suddenly produce a formula which would solve Korea. Mr. Malik then asked how I thought the debate in the Assembly on Korea would go. I told him that I thought there would be a general desire to bring about a unified, independent and democratic Korea along the lines set forth by the Assembly for the past three years.

I said that, leaving aside the immediate problems connected with Korea, it seemed to me that we and the Soviet Union should look toward a future in which Korea was neutralized as an issue between us. I said that I thought it was important for the Soviet Union to believe what we have been saying about desiring no bases and having no U.S. military interest in that country. I assured him that that was, in fact, our attitude and that we did not see how a unified and independent Korea could be a threat to any of its neighbors. Mr. Malik only replied that with the recent invasion of Korea by American business, he did not see how it could be neutralized. Mr. Lancaster then commented that he knew of no private American business of any Substance in Korea and that Mr. Malik must be referring to the temporary ECA programs.

I suggested to Mr. Malik that he and Ambassador Gross ought to talk occasionally. He replied, “What about?” I laughed and suggested general matters. For example, Mr. Malik has indicated in the Security Council that he had some reservations on the speech made by Mr. Gross on the attempted Chinese double veto of the invitation to bring Peiping representatives to the Security Council. I said a discussion of this problem might be very helpful. He said that he would be glad to talk with Mr. Gross and had a high regard for him.

In reply to a question from me as to whether the Soviet Delegation intended to develop in Assembly debate a detailed exposition of what they meant by “international control” on such matters as atomic energy, he said that they probably would. He said the Russian word “control” was quite different from the English word, and was much more like the French. He said the point that bothered them was the idea of ownership. He said they had no problem about observing atomic materials, feeling them, smelling them, but when it came to ownership, their system could not accommodate itself to ownership.

The conversation was amiable throughout. Mr. Malik took me to the railroad station and then drove Mr. Lancaster, who rode to the station as a guide, back to his home. I was informed later that Malik told Mr. Lancaster that he had appreciated the chance to have an informal talk of that nature, that he thought it was useful, and that such off-the-record unpublicized meetings should occur more often.

1. Yakov Alexandrovich Malik was the Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations, 1948–1952.
2. On the recognition, by the United States of the Soviet Union on November 16, 1933, see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 1–62.
3. Francis P. Matthews was Secretary of the Navy.
4. For documentation on the events in Korea during this year, see volume vii .