740.5/8–3150: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State 1
574. With respect to general question of prevention further Soviet aggression, our thinking has been that to attain maximum effectiveness, considerable degree of integration of free world is required along political, economic and military lines. As suggested Embtel 486, August 22,2 we think that in striving towards this end we should avoid over-organization, that duplicating and overlapping functional entities are self-defeating, and that a large degree of flexibility is required. It is within this general concept that we should like to see the Turkish application for NAT membership considered. (Department’s infotel August 25, 2 a. m.).3
In this regard we continue to be firmly of the opinion that the strengthening of the free world forces, instead of acting as an excitement to further Soviet aggression, rather will serve as a positive deterrent. For this reason, we conclude that our thinking on question [Page 1239] Turkish membership in NAT should not be colored by fear of Soviet reaction, but on contrary should be considered solely from viewpoint of whether it would strengthen free world defenses.
Turkish NAT membership clearly bears a predominantly military aspect. If the obligations entailed would serve to weaken our ability to repel Soviet aggression, then the application should be denied, while if the advantages of integrating Turkish forces with those of the western European powers according to a common plan would enhance our military potential, we would see a great advantage in accepting the Turkish application.
There are, however, certain political aspects to the application. In the first place, the question arises as to the geographical limits of the NAT area. As we understand it, the admission of Turkey would be a departure from the original concept of a unified grouping of countries belonging to the North Atlantic community. On the other hand, the admission of Italy at the outset was broadening of that concept, and the press of events within the past few months raises the question of whether a Western European (with North American grouping) satisfactorily meets our present needs. Certainly if the criteria outlined in the first paragraph of this telegram (and developed more fully in Embtel 486, August 22) are accepted, then we should be thinking in terms of a free world rather than a purely Western European grouping. On the other hand, these criteria inevitably must contain their own limitations, for it would be perhaps militarily and financially impracticable to attempt to include in NAT countries with entirely disparate traditions and political systems, geographically separated from each other so as to render their integrate defense extremely difficult.
The problem then arises of the outside geographical limits of NAT, with particular reference to the Turkish and Greek desire for membership. In this regard, we think it worth pointing out “that while Turkey and Greece are “European” countries in terms of orientation, other possible applicants in the Near Eastern area are not. Neither have these latter indicated a desire to accept the obligations of membership, nor the demonstrated means of fulfilling them. Thus we believe a good case could be made for admitting Turkey and Greece at this time, but not Iran, Egypt or other NE nations.
Consideration of Turkish membership NAT impels us to examine in sharper focus important question of military relationships between strong European and North American nucleus of free world community and relatively weaker free world countries of Near East and Asia. Embassy feels that ultimate objective our policy should be orderly military arrangement among all independent free world nations in both West and East who wish to participate in common defense against Soviet aggression. When Marshall Plan for WE first [Page 1240] enunciated, it was explained to dissatisfied Asians that world economic recovery best promoted by concentration on highly developed productive resources of WE, after which attention to NEA and FE areas would be forthcoming. It would seem that NAT situation analogous, i.e., WE must concentrate first on hard core defenses of free world in WE, after which other areas could by stages be integrated into over-all free world defense effort. In Embassy’s view, NAT progress now sufficiently consolidated to permit extension its collective security benefits and obligations to Turkey and Greece as next step towards linking North American and WE defenses with other free world communities. In making this move, consideration might be given to changing nomenclature for NAT to NA and Mediterranean Treaty.
In attempting to assess the effects of a refusal of the Turkish membership application, it is perhaps necessary to touch on Turkish motivations in making it. Clearly, Turkey in the military sphere already possesses sufficient guarantees from the West against Soviet aggression, and the Kremlin could be in no doubt as to the effects of a putsch against Turkey. Not only is there an operative US aid program but both the UK and French have treaties with Turkey guaranteeing her against aggression. In our view, Turkish motivations in making its application, and in giving that application general publicity, are compounded of the desire to be accepted as a full member of the European community, plus the realistic feeling that Turkey’s defense would better be safeguarded in the context of the NAT arrangements. In all probability, our refusal to accept Turkey in NAT would have a deleterious effect on Turkish amour propre and public morale, and this alone suggests the advisability of accepting her application, not to mention gratification of Kremlin at such excellent opportunity to exploit diplomatically and propaganda-wise any rift which might develop between US and Turkey over NAT question.
- This telegram was relayed to Ankara, London, and Paris at 7:07 p.m. on August 31.↩
- In this telegram, not printed, there was discussion of measures, with some French initiative, that could be taken in regard to an increase of European interest and possible organization to strengthen the security necessary for survival of the free world, and to guard against further Soviet moves. “Concerning basically important question of possible Soviet reaction to measures discussed above, while in present circumstances dogmatic prognosis would be unwise, we must reiterate our conviction that Soviets will march if and when it suits them; that they will not enter inadvertently into world wide conflagration; but that they will cold bloodedly bide their time until they judge circumstances are propitious. For free world and for US in particular counter is a consistent policy of strength in depth; policy conceived in calmness and based upon realization that in all probability we must remain in state of mobilization for many years to come, lest in moment of weakness we be overwhelmed by ever ready forces of Soviet imperialism.” (740.5/8–2250)↩
- The Department of State in this telegram summarized many of the reasons which high Turkish officials had urged on the worth of the inclusion of Turkey in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization because of the intensification of the world crisis. Turkish policy was characterized as being “today unequivocal, honest, realistic in desire [to] make positive contribution [to] international peace.” Some other nations, such as Norway, Canada, and Italy, were in favor of Turkish inclusion in principle. George Wadsworth, the Ambassador in Turkey, “emphasizes sound realism Turk position and warns of detriment Turk morale and US-Turk relations if Turks given reason believe US main obstacle to admission.” (700.00 (S)/8–2550) The complete text of this telegram is in vol. iii, p. 248.↩