Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

661:00/8–1150: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

Moscow, August 11, 1950—4 p. m.

386. Despite the Korean conflict, plethora of subsequent rumors and an obvious increase in intensity of the war of nerves, none of the developments since April of this year seems to us to alter the Embassy’s basic opinion² that, although they are prepared to assume grave risks in the pursuit of their objectives, the Soviet leaders do not desire to engage themselves in global conflict in the near future. Their actions appear to indicate that they hope to make most effective use of their existing strength through championing world peace movements on the one hand and inflating a war scare on the other with a view to establishing a revolutionary situation on a world scale in which the military might of the USSR and its satellites could be either the critical element in a violent clash (war between the imperialist and anti-imperialist camps), or the power behind the throne for a grand coup d’éat.

For victory by either method this dual policy of blandishment and threat must increase in intensity in order to achieve its purpose of isolating the US as much as possible from other capitalist governments and of isolating those capitalist governments that do cooperate with the US from their people. This process reached a certain crescendo with the outbreak of hostilities in Korea and the spurt in concentration on the Stockholm appeal signature campaign³ which accompanied it. Korea fits on what might be termed the left hand of this policy—demonstration of strength. The Berlin blockade, the Soviet walkout of UN, Soviet actions in the Baltic, the Soviet attitude on the Austrian treaty, and the Whitsunday demonstration⁴ are all part of this picture. These previous steps all created much tension and apprehension without entailing for the Soviets direct risk of military reaction such as might have developed over an attempt to seize Berlin forcibly or dispose of Tito through overt military action. Korea was only a short step forward. It was a place where Soviet might could be impressively demonstrated and where the Soviet rulers had good reason to suppose that ho effective military counteraction would be taken. At little risk they were playing for tremendous stakes in power-conscious Asia and in apprehensive Europe. Even so its repercussions were felt in India, Egypt and other sensitive spots that entertain doubts about the strength and unity of the western world vis-à-vis the USSR. Looking hack it might have paid the Soviets to have made a greater expenditure to assist the Chinese in taking Formosa. This would have impressed Asia and have struck a heavy blow at the unity of the free world. This project cannot be undertaken now without large risk of involving themselves as well as China in a war with the US.

It is clear that the Soviets were prepared to follow up a quick complete victory in Korea with either another attack where there were adequate prospects for localizing the conflict or for a great display of saber rattling at sensitive points. Even though the latter can he conducted chiefly through the circulation of alarmist rumors, some shifting of troops along frontiers is helpful for both purposes. A decision as to whether to attack or rattle the saber indeed need not to have been made until world reaction to the developments in Korea became known.

It is unlikely the Soviets expected their action in Korea to meet with the united condemnation of 53 UK member states or to provoke a sharp speeding up of defense preparations on a scale calculated to cope with a major crisis rather than with the Korean situation alone. Thus instead of enjoying an increase in its relative politico-military position through this step the USSR has precipitated a reverse trend which, will result in time working against it for the next few years. It must certainly now make some fresh calculations. The following appear prominent among the possible alternatives:

1. To undertake an immediate speed up in their own military mobilization and launch a broad attack in Europe in order to reap maximum advantage of their present military position. Aside from rumors circulating throughout the world and reported to us there is nothing discernible here to indicate they have taken this decision. Soviet propaganda continues to stress the defense aspect of the USSR’s military might to the Soviet people and what military dispositions are known are largely of a defensive character. No urgent cause has been developed to pull the people into full support of an offensive move, which even such a dictatorship as this must consider essential. It is interesting that auger over Korea was allowed to subside in favor of work harder for defense. Major changes are taking place in the organization of agricultural production which may be sources of future strength, but are causing some weakness and uncertainty at present. The same is true of the shake-ups in the fields of scientific theorization and research.

2. To touch off an outbreak of hostilities through a satellite on another scene, China or the Balkans, which might be localized, for a time at least, and cause a drain on the free world’s resources and increase the strain on its solidarity. This course would entail great risk of Soviet involvement at a tempo unfavorable to the USSR. It would seem that slow but direct progress to a major clash which would allow the west to marshal preponderant military economic strength and guarantee security of all western Europe as now occurring temporarily, would be highly detrimental to attainment of long-term Soviet objectives.

3. To play down the military aspect of this policy and while continuing to champion the North Koreans and to clamor for peace, allow a settlement to work itself out in Korea over their protests perhaps and an atmosphere of relaxation to set in giving the huge military preparations in the west no place to go. This would offer the possibility of a return by the west to the uncertain position of quandary between expenditure of effort for defense or for economic progress while the USSR continues a steady growth of industrial military potential. This is a hard choice to make because it means an immediate if perhaps temporary loss of prestige among the people who respect power and success. However, this policy would permit the Soviets to consolidate their present empire further and to utilize their rather effective political and social weapons abroad even though they could not count on major political victories where power played the dominating role.

4. To continue to exploit the mystery of Soviet strength and keep the west heavily and uneconomically mobilized in the hopes that the economic burden will cause disaffection among the masses and make them defeatist and more receptive to Soviet peace blandishments. All economic and political controls in the direction of increasing western defense preparedness would be labelled as suppressive Fascist measures and as deterioration of individual welfare grew the appeal of Communism as well as peace would increase. Continuance of or intensification of the war of nerves as well as the peace movement, along with continuous experimentation with organizational methods for controlling the attitudes of the masses would be features of such a program. The magnitude of defense allocations made since the end of June as compared with that of Marshall Plan aid could lead the Soviet rulers to the belief that this course has promise.

Kirk

1. This telegram was relayed to London, Paris, and Frankfort at 7:20 p. m. on August 11.
2. See despatch 514 from Moscow on April 25, p. 1164.
3. A worldwide drive was soon spurred on to obtain signatures in behalf of peace and the appeal for the prohibition of atomic weapons adopted at the March meeting in Stockholm of the Partisans of Peace. By summer many millions of signatures were claimed to have been acquired. See the statement by Secretary of State Acheson of July 12 wherein he warned against the deceptive nature of the peace movement, Department of State Bulletin, July 24, 1950, p. 131.
4. For documentation on the Whitsunday demonstration (Deutschlandtreffen) in Berlin on May 28, 1950, see pp. 818 ff.