Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

711.5622/4–1550: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret
priority

Moscow, April 15, 1950—2 p. m.

1143. Statements Admiral Sherman and General Vandenberg² plus weighing such press items and BBC broadcasts as are here available, lead, I fear, to presumption that Vishinsky’s note April 11 must be interpreted to mean the missing Navy B–24 was shot down last Saturday after April 8, by the Soviet fighters in general area of Libau, and lost. It seems unlikely Soviets would have asserted (1) US plane was over land some 21 kilometers deep; (2) plane refused to answer signals and “open fire on Soviet airplanes”; (3) plane “turned toward sea and disappeared”, unless they were virtually certain no survivors lived to refute such claims. However, it may be the Soviet note was decided upon after they learned our extensive search operations had been in progress, on the off chance some member of our plane had actually survived and might be rescued. On balance, I rather doubt this last hypothesis, as the former seems more probable and more in consonance with Soviet methods, practice and guile.

If our plane had crashed on land in USSR, I should still be surprised if Soviets would so admit and more so if anyone long survived such crash. (Nor do I discount entirely the idea planned attack in order to get possession of any special equipment in our plane.)

In other words, that Soviets have eliminated our plane, its crew, and destroyed the evidence, seems an almost inescapable conclusion.

We are consequently in difficult position in refuting what Soviets describe as “verified data”, unless by some means the track of our lost aircraft was plotted, or signals were received from it during last critical moments of its flight, or either wreckage or survivors are found.³ On the face of Soviets statements, our plane was in the wrong, it was over land, it opened fire first, and its intrusion was repelled as “turned toward sea and disappeared”. The note of April 11 is diabolically cleverly worded and designed to create an atmosphere of “outraged virtue”, now being exploited by streams of propaganda against US and Scandinavian neighbors.⁴

This Soviet note is further evidence of the determination of the Politburo to turn to their advantage on every occasion, whatever incident or accident may arise. It is indicative of their apprehension lest we learn openly or inadvertently anything whatever concerning their military establishment. It shows their concern over our technical advancement and our skills. It points, by their jealous safeguarding of certain areas, to significance and importance of those spots in their eyes. And it emphasizes their completely callous and ruthless disregard for human life, by their unconcern over the fate of our plane, which “disappeared”.

(It must, I supposed, be accepted privately that the fliers in our plane were on an operational mission, and their lives lost in doing their duty to their best ability. For them the “cold war” turned “hot”, and the long forgotten cry of “no quarter” was revived by these tartar fighter pilots, now apparently decorated for their job.)

After reflecting and reviewing what we here now know, I offer the following suggestions as to tenor and scope of our reply to Soviet protest:

1. Major premise these comments is that plane and crew have been completely lost with no trace; therefore:

(A) Soviet note April 11 seems difficult to contest on factual basis, except on

(1) Type of our plane, alleged as “B–29 (flying fortress)”, which is in error.

(2) Statement our plane “opened fire on Soviet airplanes” which Admiral Sherman’s statement in Wireless Bulletin April 12 refutes, and on which we should be adamant.

(3) Locality, “south of Libau—which went into territory of Soviet Union for 21 kilometers”, which same statement Admiral Sherman indicates against orders and improbable any such navigation error could exist, on Vishinsky’s admission visibility conditions. We should insist this Soviet location inadmissible.

(B) Our reply might further

(1) Reject all contentions of wanton violation Soviet-controlled territory.

(2) Suggest incident was unwarranted and unnecessary attack on unarmed US plane in international waters, by four Soviet fighters (evidenced by decorations awarded mytel 1132, April 14⁵).

(3) Comment no evidence any concern expressed by Soviets over further fate of our plane or its personnel, which between friendly powers in peacetime seems unusual lack of international courtesy.

(4) Comment on further exploitation incident by controlled Soviet press to increase tensions and alarms.

(5) State US Government cannot accept as sincere or frank Soviet exposition of this incident, but because of loss of plane and personnel, disproof not practicable.

(6) Close with statement denouncing callous action, but slanted so as to close incident and not invite prolonged recriminations, and intimate we cannot tolerate any repetitions.

(C) Suggest our reply be short, terse, and firm, definitely calculated to reassure our own people but avoiding fanning any hysterical tendencies.

2. Believe any suggestions Soviet indemnities or expressions condolences, et cetera, would be rejected out of hand.

3. From here, it would appear attitude to date our government and also American public is calm and poised and I believe this is having steadying effect. I suspect Soviets are less at ease, and feel harshness early comments controlled press (mytel 1119, April 13⁶) possibly sign uncertainty. However, we should not overlook fact that Kremlin is feeling very cocky, is flushed with Asian successes, and is generally adopting confident line. There is some evidence but meager and for low levels (servants) that people are apprehensive lest this incident lead to dire consequences. Our reply can augment or dispel such concerns, but should definitely not convey impression we are weakkneed and can be pushed around.

It should go without saying that any repetition of such an incident could only have most serious consequences, and I would hope nothing untoward might occur in areas under our control.

Kirk

1. Mr. Reinhardt was notified of the arrival of this telegram at 1:15 p. m. It was also passed to London at 10:05 a. m. and to Paris at 2:30 p. m.
2. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg was Chief of Staff, United States Air Force.
3. Some pieces of wreckage found in the Baltic Sea were believed to be from this airplane.
4. The comment had been reported in telegram 473 from Stockholm on April 12 that the newspaper Svenska Dagbladet had characterized the “pathetic rhetorics” in Vyshinsky’s note of April 11 as coming from a person whose veracity “cannot be said to enjoy established reputation.” (711.5622/4–1250)
5. Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1144.
6. Not printed.