Office of the Historian

450.6031/5–1750: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France 1

secret   priority
Washington, May 20, 1950—5 p. m.

2316. Excon. We are disturbed by report urtel 2367 May 17.2 Suggest you approach Brit and Fr colleagues and refer to Secy’s conversations Bevin and Schuman3 and agreement reached tripartite Paris mtgs May 8 and 9.4

In those mtgs agreement reached to go through 1–B list ad seriatim and place items on Internatl Lists I, II or III. But Brit position in CoCom appears contravene specific agreement tripartite mtgs and position established by Secy in talk with Bevin (Secto 217, May 105). Believe Emb on this basis can press Brit strongly. Emb London at its discretion may wish approach FonOff indicating US views and concerns. Urtel indicates somewhat better performance by Fr than by Brit.

While we agree necessity technical discussions, believe important for record in view Secy’s discussion to have CoCom go through 1–B list and make specific disposition each item even though this means putting all items List III for consideration by technical Comites.

Believe these tactics may soften opposition and result some items being placed on Lists I or II. Strong case shld be made each item particularly those for which there is little Eur production. On such cases other Reps might be pressed for explanation their objections inclusion [Page 133] Lists I or II when US and only one or two other countries might be affected.

In spite dark picture painted urtel we believe Brit in vulnerable position on procedural aspects and that time has come press vigorously at all levels serious consideration these items. Brit have already stated (London tel 2332 Apr 28 rpt Paris 6816) they able add “few” 1B items to List I and “limited number” to List II.

Webb
  1. Repeated to London as telegram 2438.↩
  2. Ante, p. 128.↩
  3. Regarding Secretary Acheson’s conversations with Schuman on May 8 and with Bevin on May 10 regarding East-West trade, see Martin’s undated memorandum, p. 123.↩
  4. Regarding the meetings under reference here, see Armstrong’s undated memorandum, p. 116.↩
  5. Not printed.↩
  6. Not printed.↩