Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

450.6031/5–1950: Telegram

The Ambassador in Belgium (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

secret

Brussels, May 19, 1950—7 p. m.

811. Excon. Deptel 562, April 28.¹ Following assessment based on US Embassy and ECA Mission observations in Brussels with limited knowledge Belgium role in Paris consultations. See also Foreign Office note Embdesp 645 May 12.²

1. Belgian Government is committed to full cooperation EW controls and personalities principally responsible for compliance are believed convinced of necessity and determined fulfill engagements, and have taken lead in consolidation of lists (Embtel 174, February 3³). Only official who has indicated questionable earnestness is no longer directly responsible this function. Transfer ECA to Foreign Office has probably strengthened cooperation.

2. Embassy knows no instance of indifferent compliance with express EW control agreements. Therefore believes Belgian Government can be relied on for cooperation and reasonably efficient administration of all present and future controls adopted multilaterally.

3. Enforcement machinery believed relatively efficient and reliable when on solid legal ground. Embassy knows no instance of connivance or evasion by public servant. Since risk of leakage considerable, due experience and ingenuity international merchants and complexity of [transit?] trade, individual violations not precluded but will not necessarily reflect official indifference.

4. There have been instances voluntary control action outside multilateral agreements (viz. copper, tin). Although no assurance special US suggestions will be applied, Embassy believes they will at least receive serious consideration. In actions not based on express agreement, Belgian Government appears relatively timid coping with legalistic hurdles and traditional concepts commercial liberties (viz—transit trade in bond).

5. Government reluctant deprive Belgium of exports or increase governmental interference with commerce while alternative channel remains open, particularly if through other “cooperating country”. Therefore not likely take lead voluntarily in extension of control but not expected to obstruct an extension when all other cooperating countries ready to adopt it.

6. Belgian Government also expected to examine proposals for extension of controls with possibly exaggerated concern for economic interest in export, established channels of trade and opportunity opening new ones (viz—tin). Such attitude, undoubtedly shared other cooperating countries, will contribute to delay but not expected constitute obstruction except when loss of trade would directly benefit competing country without effectively depriving East of commodity.

Summarizing, Belgian Government believed to deserve confidence in sincerity of effort to enforce controls adopted multilaterally and expected to fall in line with extensions when convinced objective of limiting availability to East will be accomplished. Embassy doubts consultation UK Mission would materially alter foregoing impressions.

Murphy

1. Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 105.
2. In speeches to the Senate on January 24 and April 19, respectively, Senators George W. Malone of Nevada and James P. Kem of Missouri declared that member countries of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation were exporting items of war potential to the Soviet bloc and proposed the suspension of all financial aid to countries making such exports. The statements by Senators Malone and Kem were widely publicized. The despatch under reference here, not printed, transmitted the text of a note of May 4 from the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, not printed, which declared that the Malone and Kem statements as they applied to Belgium were completely unfounded. The note stated that the Belgian Government scrupulously fulfilled commitments under the Consultative Group–Coordinating Committee system (450.6031/5–1250).
3. Not printed.