Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

611.48/5–2450: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

secret

Warsaw, May 24, 1950—7 p. m.

721. Ambassador Winiewicz¹ called on me today at the Chancery. We had a rather long frank talk. As the Department knows, I have known him since the days when we were both in London.²

Very early in our talk we got on the subject of US-Polish relations. We agreed that relations between the US and Poland had changed considerably since our last talk in Warsaw about a year ago. Winiewicz observed that he had always hoped that Polish-American relations could at least in a measure be kept apart from the broader and ever-sharpening relations between Moscow and Washington. The trend, however, was discouraging and he saw no hope of any real improvement in Polish-American relations until there was a relaxation of tension between Moscow and Washington.

I said I agreed that in the last analysis the nature of official relations between the US and Poland depended on the status of relations between Moscow and Washington and the west in general. I wanted, however, to make some observations solely on US-Polish relations. Since I had seen him last in Warsaw about a year ago, it was true these relations had unfortunately deteriorated. Two matters immediately came to mind which during the past ten months or so had added considerably to the strain on these relations, the Hermann Field case³ and the State Secrets Act.⁴ Field disappeared in Poland last August. In spite of repeated inquiries we were still being told at the FonOff that no information about him could be given us. The State Secrets Act frightened Poles, even officials, from contact with us and placed visiting businessmen seeking ordinary economic information in danger. The Field case and the State Secrets Act frightened people from coming to Poland and made any kind of normal easy relationship between Americans living here and Poles practically impossible. I had always hoped that at least some economic contact between Poland and the US could be maintained but even that seemed out the question now. Furthermore, over the past twelve months, the highest Polish Government officials in their public statements had become steadily more violent in their attacks on the US and the same tendency applied to the Polish press. In spite of all this, I was nevertheless even today somewhat encouraged by two things: there still remains a large measure of good will among the people of Poland for the US, and Polish officials continue to receive and treat me in a courteous and even friendly way. This latter gave me grounds for hoping that relations between the Embassy and his government might at least be kept on a correct basis.

In reply Winiewicz first took up the Hermann Field case. He said that before leaving Washington, he had promised Thompson to try to get some information on Hermann Field. He had tried. He was very sorry he had not been able to get any information to pass on to us. Winiewicz then turned to the State Secrets Act. His comment, as was to be expected, was quite beside the point. The Polish Government, he said, was a “new and young government” and the present civil service “inexperienced”. Discipline and guidance were necessary, and that, the State Secrets Act was designed to give.

As for Poles being frightened away from the Embassy, that was no different from what was happening to his Embassy in Washington. Americans calling on him were frequently stopped on leaving his Embassy and questioned on what they had been doing there. He then branched off on the wider field of international relations.

Russia and Poland, he said, were now engaged in a genuine peace campaign. It was unfair to call it a propaganda stunt. While striving for peace it was, however, most disturbing to keep reading the US press about how many divisions were needed, how many bombers, and how many new weapons. Why was that?

Here I reminded Winiewicz of how quickly we had disarmed after the fighting ended in 1945 and that even today we continued opposing rearming Western Germany. That certainly was willing proof that we had no aggressive designs. Russia on the other hand had as large a military force today as in 1945, if not larger. Russia had repeatedly blocked efforts in the United Nations toward establishing stabler conditions in the world. Russian conduct during the long drawn out talks on the Austrian treaty was typical. It was that state of affairs that was causing deep concern in the west and what was being done by the US and the west was building up of strength to meet that situation and not preparation to launch war.

If only something would develop, Winiewicz then said, that would relieve international tension even a little, perhaps then the world trend could be arrested and, slowly reversed. Something might in time come from Trygve Lie’s recent talks in Moscow.⁵ He sincerely hoped so.

We parted agreeing that patience and calmness were called for until international tensions had relaxed and there was again hope that something could be done to improve relations between Poland and the US.⁶

Department pass Moscow; sent Department 721, repeated information Moscow 38.

Gallman

1. Jozef Winiewicz, Polish Ambassador to the United States, who was in Warsaw on consultation.
2. Gallman served as Counselor of Embassy in London, 1944–1948; Winiewicz was Polish Counselor of Embassy in London, 1945–1947.
3. For documentation on the Field case, see pp. 20 ff.
4. October 26, 1949.
5. United Nations Secretary-General Trygve Lie visited the Soviet Union in mid-May 1950 to discuss with Soviet leaders his “Twenty Year Program for Achieving Peace Through the United Nations.” Documentation on the United States attitude toward the Lie plan is printed in vol. ii, pp. 371 ff.
6. In early June 1950 Ambassador Gallman submitted his resignation in order to return to Washington and take up an assignment as Deputy for Foreign Affairs at the National War College. President Truman accepted Ambassador Gallman’s resignation on July 3, and on August 16 it was announced that the President had appointed Joseph Flack, then serving as Ambassador in Costa Rica, to succeed Gallman. Flack arrived in Warsaw in late November 1950 and presented his credentials on November 30 to the Polish President.