611.64/12–2050
The Minister in Hungary (Davis) to the Secretary of State
No. 456
I have read with much interest Despatch No. 109, October 30, 1950,1 from the American Embassy at Praha surveying United States-Czechoslovak relations during Mr. Briggs’ first year as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.
My own incumbency as Minister to Hungary covers an almost identical period; the pattern of relations between the United States and Hungary has been similar to that of relations between the United States and Czechoslovakia, differing in degree but scarcely at all in substance; my conclusions as to the utility of maintaining a mission at this capital are the same as Mr. Briggs’ with reference to his mission at Prague.
When I arrived in Budapest in October 1949 the mission had been conducted by a Chargé d’Affaires for a period of approximately nine months following the departure of Mr. Chapin who had been declared persona non grata. That action, taken by the Hungarian Government following the Mindszenty trial for transparent domestic and foreign propaganda purposes, had certainly done nothing to rebuild friendly relations of long standing between the two governments which had been interrupted by the war. And it soon became apparent that the decision of the United States Government to let by-gones be by-gones to the extent of accrediting a new Minister, and the willingness of the Hungarian Government to receive one, did not signify a turn for the better.
In the period immediately following the cessation of hostilities, at first while the Allied Control Commission was in Hungary and later, after the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace and the establishment of a Legation, contacts between American representatives and Hungarians, both in and out of the Government, were wide spread and friendly. It was not long, however, before pressures from the Hungarian side, implemented particularly by the Security Police, rendered unofficial contacts increasingly difficult to maintain while at the same time officials of the Government gradually withdrew from even the most casual of social contacts with Western, and particularly American and British, representatives, while official exchanges on matters of business were gradually restricted to a few officials of the Foreign Office.
On my arrival I made an unsuccessful effort to reverse this trend. On the occasion of my protocol calls on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister and the President of Parliament as well as on the occasion of presenting my credentials to the President of the Presidium, [Page 1023] I emphasized my desire to contribute what I could to the improvement of our relations. After consultation with the Chief of Protocol, I asked for appointments to call upon each member of the Cabinet, he having assured me that such calls would be in order. But although I repeated the request on a number of occasions, no appointments were ever made except with Mr. Rakosi, the real boss of Hungary, despite his title of “Deputy Prime Minister”, and that only after more than two months of insistence and persistence on my part in connection with the Vogeler case. The disinclination or fear on the part of Hungarian officials to be seen even casually in my company was dramatically illustrated within a few weeks after my arrival. At a cocktail party offered by the Swedish Minister to meet the members of a Swedish Trade Delegation I was introduced by a Foreign Office acquaintance to the then Under Secretary and real power in the Ministry of Finance. As soon as this gentleman learned my identity he not only withdrew his proffered hand but withdrew from my presence, went straight to the lobby, retrieved his hat and coat and departed.
Within less than a month of my assumption of charge of this mission came the arrest of Robert Vogeler on charges of espionage. As is known Mr. Vogeler was convicted on fantastic and demonstrably false charges and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. This case has colored and embittered relations between the two Governments as well as personal relations between myself and the Foreign Office, and still remains unresolved.
As in Mr. Briggs’ case my personal relations within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are of the most tenuous character. I have been in the office of the Foreign Minister, who in fact is no more than a figurehead, on only three occasions—these being on my first arrival and twice within my first two months here in connection with the Vogeler case. In addition to this I have laid eyes on him on perhaps four occasions, all being large public functions, and on none of which have we progressed beyond passing the time of day. I have seen the Under Secretary, Mr. Berei, who is the real power in the Foreign Office, on an average of about once a month, sometimes on his initiative and sometimes on mine—on each occasion to argue, mostly in circles, about the Vogeler case or matters subsidiary thereto. I have once been in the office of the Chief of Protocol when I insisted in the face of manifest lack of enthusiasm on his part in learning at least where his office is in the rabbit warren Foreign Office Building and learning my way to it. I have never been in any other room in the Foreign Office and know no more than a handful of its functionaries even by sight. I have never been inside any other Ministry. I have had two long and, as an intellectual exercise, interesting if quite unsatisfactory interviews with Mr. Rakosi in his office in the Communist Party Headquarters.2 He is [Page 1024] in fact the only Hungarian official with whom I have conversed who speaks frankly, will listen attentively to what I have to say, and is willing to argue or discuss. Mr. Berei and the others confine themselves for the most part to repeating prepared or preconceived statements.
Except for servants, policemen, postmen, shopkeepers and officials I have met and talked with very few Hungarians. I must say that those few, and most of the others, have been friendly and quite obviously unsympathetic with the regime, while friendly disposed towards the United States.
The Anti-American campaign in the local press, which began even before the Mindszenty trial, has continued unabated during my entire stay here. It waxes and wanes in shrillness and intensity but the curve of vituperation and insult has been steadily upward. Since shortly after the Vogeler trial there has been relatively little direct attack on, or slander of the Legation itself as compared with the immediately preceding period, the emphasis having shifted to denunciation of prominent personages in the United States and the warmongering, imperialistic, aggressive, underhanded policy of the United States Government. The low point (so far) was reached a few weeks ago in a probably fictitious interview reported in the local press between a people’s educator and a skilled worker. The educator was portrayed as remonstrating with the skilled worker for not attending party lectures with greater regularity. The worker is quoted as replying that he does his work to the best of his ability, contributes to peace causes and hates Truman and this ought to be enough but the people’s educator explains that merely to hate Truman passively comes very close to treason towards the cause of the People’s Democracy unless that hatred is expressed in more assiduous attendance to party duties.
We may never know in full detail the exact motives actuating the Hungarian Government in the Vogeler case or to what extent it was acting on its own initiative or under instructions or guidance. From the propaganda treatment of the case, however, and from subsequent events it is safe to deduce that at least part of the motivation was to further the isolation and force a reduction in the size of this mission and possibly, to needle us into breaking relations. I must in all candor agree with Mr. Briggs’ analysis that given existing circumstances the mission was over-generously staffed at the time, particularly as regards the Service Attaches and their enlisted personnel. We had assigned here seven officers of the Army and Air Force—full Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels and Majors—with numerous enlisted assistants; a staff which it was extremely difficult to justify, and which naturally was an irritant to, and object of suspicion by, the Hungarians and their Soviet allies. Unlike the Czechoslovakian Government the Hungarians never demanded a specific reduction in force. That they were prepared to do so, is entirely possible but the breaks gave us the opportunity to [Page 1025] forestall such action by a voluntary reduction, possibly far less drastic than they might have insisted upon had we been intransigent, but also probably more drastic than they ever expected on our own initiative. The result is a compact and well-balanced staff of 34 Americans (including the Service Attaches) and 59 Hungarians, as compared with approximately twice these numbers a year ago. For present conditions this staff is adequate to the performance of essential functions and does permit a considerable amount of observation and the acquiring of information, not excluding some useful personal contacts. For while the Chief of Mission has been quite effectively isolated, some of the subordinate members of the staff are able to maintain a few unobtrusive contacts inherited from better days.
To our considerable surprise the USIS has been able to continue and even accelerate the volume, if not the scope, of its activity. Attendance at the Library has not only held up during the year but actually increased; attendance at film shows has sky-rocketed; both the Hungarian and the English versions of the Radio Bulletin are widely disseminated. In this connection it may be remarked that although some of the official addressees who heretofore received the British news bulletin have recently requested that it no longer be sent to them we have had almost no refusals for ours.
All American members of the staff are aware of a certain amount of surveillance by the Security police and Hungarian employees, including domestic servants in American homes, are occasionally questioned or called in to report on the activities of their employers. But, generally speaking, this official curiosity has been less persistent and less annoying during the past nine or ten months than during the immediately preceding period. Observation from the street, telephone calls at odd hours which turn out to be “wrong numbers” and questioning of servants seem for the time being to have dwindled to the category of routine checks to keep the dossiers up to date (there has been no repetition of all day observation of my house by a man with field glasses posted on the hillside across the way; nor has my car been followed, so far as I am aware, for months).
The VOA and the BBC are listened to avidly and the Legation is able to feed much useful material to IBD. While it is impossible to obtain anything approaching accurate figures we have good reason to believe that the listening audience for the once popular and most conveniently timed evening VOA program has been reduced very much due to effective jamming of reception, at least in the Budapest area, but we have equal reason to believe that the number of listeners to other programs has increased. Certainly what the VOA says one day seems to be well known throughout the city the next.
While negotiations for the release of Mr. Vogeler have reached an impasse with no break presently in sight; although no progress has [Page 1026] been made in the settlement of any other outstanding matter between us; despite the progressive isolation of the Legation; and although officially sanctioned and directed anti-Americanism proceeds apace, I agree with Mr. Briggs on the desirability of maintaining representation so long as that can be done with dignity. One is constantly aware of a feeling of frustration and at times cannot avoid wondering whether it is all worthwhile. But to surrender to any such feeling of despair would please the regime no end and that in itself is a reason to stick it out. We do feel that our presence here has its value. The flag, which we also fly daily at the office, at my residence, and on my car, is a reminder of our existence and we assume that our reports to the Department are of some value. Certainly our services to the VOA are used and appreciated.
As in Praha, the daily display of the flag is in itself worthwhile. The Chancery building faces Szabadsag Ter (Freedom Square) in which stands one of the several monuments to the Soviet war dead. This monument is the focal point of ceremonies on various Hungarian and Soviet holidays. The crowd at such ceremonies, usually assembled under direction, can watch the Stars and Stripes flying from the third floor, and thus above the Soviet and party flags with which the Square is profusely decorated on such occasions, and can contemplate its significance while listening, or seeming to listen, to the orators of the day. My residence is on a street much used by marching columns of workers’ organizations, youth groups and the like going to and from organized outings in the hills. The flag, prominently displayed, seldom fails to attract the glances of the marchers. The flag on my car naturally attracts attention as I drive about the city and more so in the country. On a few occasions it has elicited uncomplimentary shouts from passers-by, including I am sorry to say, school children marching in formation. But for every such incident I can say conservatively that there have been 50 others when passers-by have raised their hats or saluted, sometimes after a quick look around to see who may be watching.