762B.00/10–2150: Telegram
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Page) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort1
666. From Morgan. PEPCO. Political results in Soviet zone of October 19 election believed mixed.2 While voting further consolidated GDR control, general impression here that Communists dissatisfied with progress and that election played part.
Communists used year preceding election consolidate power in GDR. Formal opposition eliminated by bourgeois party purges, common [Page 976] election program, unity list. Election “victory” expected to end “provisional” status GDR Government.
Important questions in judging results election is effect of campaign intimidation on resistance to regime. Resentment and contempt probably increased as result of Communist efforts to “get out vote” and prevent demonstration opposition at polls. However, increased resentment probably accompanied by depressing recognition that regime can make people outwardly jump through hoop despite hostile convictions.
Joint effort among allies and Germans to agree on common line on election and advice to Soviet zone voter gratifying, despite minor backstage differences. Likely that East Germans sensed quickened western interest in their lot. Believe they sympathetic approach to their predicament and pressures upon them. Protestant Church leaders reported objections by pastors to advice to go to polls, after church leaders advised pastors to stay away.
Though effects of elections on opposition to regime difficult to gauge, observers and informants agree opposition strongly bolstered by Korea victories. Hence problem now is how capitalize on this together with heightened western, especially German, concern for and unity of action toward Soviet zone which elections stimulated. Net result of elections steam roller may be weakened will to resist unless ways of expressing opposition devised. Ideal methods would be those that would receive general support and minimize Communist retribution. Underlying question, depending on wider strategic estimates, how far militancy should be maintained or increased, how far opposition should be kept passive yet nurtured for later crescendo. Vital factor in either case would be awareness of common goal and grounds for hope.
Notable lack of indication in Soviet press since election of where we go from here, other than claim that it confirm support of Communist program and is only first step in implementation national front program. Press interest now shifted to peace movement, at least for moment.
Sent Frankfort 666, repeated info Department 590, Moscow 70, Paris 127, London 63. Department pass Moscow. [Morgan.]