396.1NE/10–650: Telegram
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG ( Page ) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort 1
secret
Berlin
, October 6,
1950—2 p. m.
589. PEPCO from Morgan. Probable effects New York Foreign Ministers’ communiqué2 on USSR/GDR German policy difficult distinguish from those of Communist reversal Korea, Secretary State’s UN proposals and other factors recently strengthening free world position. Believe more useful attempt join [joint?] appraisal, for which following considerations offered as possible ingredients, though aware topic unusually risky until Korean outcome settled.
- 1.
- Communist comment concerning Germany so far apparently restricted to SED–GDR level; e.g. GDR communiqué on Foreign Ministers (our 511, September 23, repeated Department 448, Moscow 51, pouched London, Paris, Rome3) merely reprinted in Pravda. Assume it has Kremlin clearance but believe Kremlin will make top level review its strategy and assets with reference to Germany as well as other areas, results of which should be at least partially indicated when Kremlin breaks official silence (November 6 Politburo speech at latest), as well as by Soviet actions next few weeks.
- 2.
- Apart from immediate necessity such review, probable anyway that Soviets would assess year’s progress of GDR at time of October elections as basis decision whether ready for another step forward and, if so, how much. This may explain relative absence communist events publicly scheduled for Germany after October 15 (nothing except “all-German” Berlin Peace Congress November 4–5).
- 3.
- Meanwhile GDR communiqué is
most explicit Communist pronouncement on New York Foreign
Ministers re Germany and seems to make completion of “legal”
build-up for whatever move Soviets may decide. Basic impressions
from it:
- (a)
- SED-national front drive to unify Germany from East to continue along established lines with increasing vigor, seeking utilize free world challenge as stimulus. (This interpretation also supported by initial press comment on Korea—our 562, October 2, repeated Department 498.3
- (b)
- Stimulus depicted as increased danger: New York communiqué called link in chain of operations against “all peace-loving peoples”; after war in Korea etc., “now follows decisive grab at Western Germany”. This means “serious conclusions” for said peoples: Threat to “German national existence” and to world peace.
- (c)
- Communist stress on Potsdam makes probable that move to “meet” threat will be based on SED–GDR “fulfillment” and Western “violations” Potsdam (our D–162, September 144).
- (d)
- Foreign Ministers’ security guarantee was reported factually in SED Politburo declaration (our 501, September 22, repeated Department 4374), given peculiar twist by GDR communiqué: Foreign Ministers state “with provocative intent” “that even efforts within framework of principles of Potsdam Agreement for securing democracy and peace in Western Germany and Western Berlin shall be considered directly as attack on West occupying powers”. Though this implies Foreign Ministers guarantee crosses Communist plans, also suggests such “efforts” will nevertheless continue in “compliance” Potsdam; communiqué ends with call for national resistance which officially commits GDR. Gist of Communist line now is: West powers will “start” war (alleging German “peace” efforts as aggression) unless resistance movement succeeds.
- (e)
- Formal language of charges that West powers violated Potsdam and theaten peace, plus transmission of communiqué to all governments recognizing GDR, suggests preparation for some kind of concerted orbit diplomatic move. Similar impression given by recent joint declarations GDR, Rumania, Bulgaria, which declared unified Germany “vital interest” all peace powers, and by Dertinger Declaration on “Outline of Peaceful German Foreign Policy” made to GDR People’s Chamber September 27, stressing need for “guarantee” against threat from West (Frankfort’s D–1033, September 285). Rumanian and Bulgarian agreements and admission GDR to CEMA also seem to complete preliminary stage of inter-satellite organization.
- 4.
- The evolution of Soviet German policy has made plausible for some months expect [expected] important attempt strengthen position of GDR vs. West in connection with October elections. Communists have so far avoided open commitment (our 356, August 28, repeated Department 30 [306], Moscow 316). Assume Soviets in order keep their end up will at least pretend give GDR more than Foreign Ministers gave Federal Republic, including security guarantees. Recent references to peace treaty suggest it will continue be used for agitation to get Western powers out of Germany rather than unilaterally granted by USSR (our D–202, September 295). If so, Soviets may offer pact without that name, perhaps multilateral for orbit, including mutual defense, termination Control Commission, promise troop withdrawal (except such as requested remain), as proof their fulfillment of “claims” earned under Potsdam by GDR which after elections is “legitimate government of all Germany”. However, if USSR decides retain overt status as occupying power in face growing military forces of West, alternative course might be: Security guarantee, perhaps declared jointly by all satellite Foreign Ministers, assertion GDR sole [Page 974] legitimate German Government but Soviet occupation to continue in order protect Germany until Western powers ousted, Western powers forfeited status as occupants by violation Potsdam hence asked to leave, orbit powers to deal solely with GDR (not with Western powers) on all matters relating to Germany. This course more extreme, believed less likely. Many combinations of above or similar moves possible. In general they would add little in reality to orbit’s already monolithic structure, and would probably have slight effect even as propaganda; their interest would rather be as indications of further Soviet-GDR action. Any pronounced step of above types would confront West with serious inconvenience on basis non-recognition of GDR, and would set stage for possible new phase of USSR/GDR drive to unify Germany in which Communists compelled resort to ever more drastic measures as others fail, else accept major defeat.
- 5.
- If that phase entered, Soviets might precede more drastic of above moves with notes to Western Powers stating GDR legitimate government all Germany and proposing CFM to negotiate peace treaty. West’s refusal would then be cited as added excuse for next steps.
Department pass Moscow, sent Frankfort 589, repeated information Department 523, Moscow 58, London 53, Paris 108, Rome 8, Warsaw unnumbered, Praha unnumbered. [Morgan.]
Page