762A.00/8–250: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany ( McCloy ) to the Secretary of State
921. Following report gives Berlin’s preliminary appraisal SED congress.1 There is no doubt that character of Berlin congress reflects new phase and intensification of Soviet pressure. It also seems intended to create sense of uneasiness in West Germany. A full evaluation of Soviet determination to translate program into action depends, however, upon further indications and acts. Subsequent telegram gives [Page 965] further details re poster campaign which is first and to date only action which seems to have developed in pursuance of program.
(Following is Berlin’s 157 to Frankfort.)
“PEPCO and McCloy. Preliminary appraisal SED congress Berlin July 20–24, based chiefly on major policy speeches Pieck, Grotewohl, Ulbricht, which “manifesto to German people” and closing “resolution” (east press July 25, 26) merely echo:
Central emphasis is drive for “democratic unification” of Germany (i.e. Communist conquest of Berlin and West Germany): all other issues focused on this. Main effort hitherto said to have been building foundation in East Germany; now job is all Germany.
In keeping with this SED speaks for German people as whole, claims be its “vanguard”. The KPD still nominally separate, it sent 1,200 “guest delegates”, received criticism for past and instructions on future activities from Pieck, which Hermann acknowledged (Neues Deutschland July 21, 22 and July 25 puts total from west 1,213). Since state follows party in Communist world, this suggests eventual announcement of government claiming all-German status.
“Objective conditions” for Communist success declared all present; sole problem therefore is mobilizing “subjective conditions”, i.e., human forces, around SED and front organized.
Conditions described specially “favorable” in Berlin, notably due economic deterioration and “panic” over Korea, plus increasing strength of GDR. Insufficient “attention” said hitherto given Berlin by east Communist leadership. Berlin called “imperialist bridgehead”, center of espionage and provocation. Thus Berlin probably slated for conquest before West Germany. Election Jendretzky2 as Politburo candidate also suggests emphasis on Berlin. Central line of offensive in West Germany is open summons for German “resistance movement” versus Federal Republic and occupation powers. Legal basis according Grotewohl (Neues Deutschland July 22): Western Allies no longer act as part of Control Council, therefore violate Potsdam. So nobody in West Germany is legally subject to directions of occupation powers any longer. Therein lies our right to national resistance.…”
Twin vehicles for “enflaming” resistance are Peace Front and National Front. Peace line is: Remember World War II, look at ruins around you, think of Korea, consider strength of “imperialist camp” which waning and of “peace camp” which waxing:
If you follow SED, peace assured; if not, destruction certain. This threat made with frequent reminder of Soviet Army, statement repeated by nearly all speakers including West Europe guests to effect will assist Soviet Army in event “aggression”.
National Front line remains unified democratic Germany, peace treaty, withdrawal occupation troops, national liberation from “Anglo-American colonizers”. Frequent reiteration of German right to peace treaty, based on Potsdam, suggest Soviet may offer one and claim Potsdam justifies. Pieck explicitly rejects peace by “declaration”, allegedly planned by Western Allies, as contrary to Potsdam and international law, which requires peace be made “by treaty with vanquished”.
[Page 966]No further details given on October 15 election, but stressed that they will have “all-German significance”, via National Front, which “based” on GDR but operates throughout Germany.
Economic aspects obviously painted to appeal to non-Communist Germans. Ulbricht presents five-year plan primarily as contribution to unification of Germany, showing GDR has sole answer to future prosperity. Inclusion of plans for rebuilding German merchant marine, insistence on development interzonal and eastern trade despite obstacles imposed by Western Allies, recommended application by GDR for membership in CEMA are notable features. Reference to further socialization carefully avoided, though undoubtedly will continue. Absence of concrete foreign trade plans (though details of five year plan published July 26) suggests this part still undergoing revision in Moscow. Plan aims at 60 percent increase of national production; main emphasis on industries with high armament potential.
Alert police and sea police prominent in final parade, latter wearing uniform of old German Navy.
No confirmation of Cominform meeting in formal sense, the delegates reportedly left for Praha where may occur. Anyhow presence leading Communist 25 countries dramatized intent of Kremlin to throw full weight of Communist world behind drive to “unify” Germany. “Solidarity” their keynote.
Speeches bristled with aggressive confidence. Ulbricht said decided not build seaport for new marine: time coming when “democratic Germany” will have Hamburg and Luebeck.
GDR internal consolidation, however, not yet fully accomplished to Communist satisfaction. Chief target Protestant Church. Violent attack on Dibelius3 by Grotewohl indicates time has come to catch up with other satellites in “solving church problem”, though perhaps worst postponed until after elections and attack on Catholic Church expected after Protestants. Other “deficiencies” noted in FDGB, National Front and SED.
Failure West Berlin and West German Communists so far win masses noted and west leaders called on carpet, but SED and GDR also blamed for insufficient attention to west and both Reimann4 and Jendretzky evidently still in favor. Great difficulty of Communist task in west repeately emphasized, especially fear of occupation powers felt by Germans. Implication is that fear must be countered by rendering Western Powers less dreadful or Communist more so, probably both. Whole trend of speeches thus indicates that while West German Communists will be goaded into greater activity, Kremlin really counts on outside aid to make main contribution in battle for West Germany. Korean action already figuring prominently as one such aid. Confident tenor of speeches, with absence of novel tactical announcement, suggests further moves coming soon.
Though aid expected from entire Communist world, central vehicle still said to be GDR, “at this time the most effective instrument” for liberation of Germany (Grotewohl). This leaves open possible shift to other instrument later, but such not otherwise hinted, unless by references to Soviet Army in case of “aggression”.
Timing: In addition to cited difficulties in west, Pieck rebukes hot-heads who call for immediate uprising, indicates West German [Page 967] rebellion not expected right away; also predicts “economic and political catastrophe” in West Germany within “one to two years” if no trade with east. Ackermann5 says “imperialists” can be eliminated in “few years”. However, speeches pervaded with sense of urgency, and timetable always subject to Kremlin revision if events move rapidly. Signed Morgan.”
- For documentation on the Third SED Congress, July 20–24 in Berlin, including the texts of the five-year plan, party statutes, manifesto to the German people, resolution, and Central Committee communiqué, see Dokumente der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1952), Band III, pp. 79 ff.↩
- Hans Jendretzky, First Secretary of the Berlin SED.↩
- Dr. Otto Dibelius, Evangelical Bishop of Berlin.↩
- Max Reimann, Leader of Communist Party in the Federal Republic.↩
- Anton Ackermann, member of the Central Committee, candidate member of the Politburo of the SED, and State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.↩