Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762.00/3–1350: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Barbour ) to the Secretary of State

secret

Moscow , March 13, 1950—1 p. m.

827. Frankfurt’s 1969 to Department, March 7.¹ Though Dertinger’s February 22 speech,² demanding all-German Peace Treaty, received only routine publicity here and Soviet press has not otherwise plugged this theme more than usual of late, Embassy agrees HICOG’s estimate that Western Powers must seriously reckon with possible Soviet move phoney separate treaty and also pursue active role, in coordination with Bonn Government, on general theme German unity and Peace Treaty requirements. Since establishment GDR last October, Embassy believes it has become increasingly clear Soviets uninterested any quadripartite settlement Germany except on their own terms, based their apparent over-estimation prospects further advances non-Communist Europe next few years including Germany, and determination avoid any impairment regime established Soviet Zone. As result they have revealed more frankly than before their terms for German unification. This connection, recallable that Malenkov’s November 6 speech emphasized: “German question cannot be correctly solved if German democracy does not take country’s fate into their own hands, does not deprive Ruhr magnates of their economic and political base, if does not effect radical democratic reforms.” Similarly Molotov’s election speech made (Embtel 820, March 11¹) after referring Stalin’s October message Pieck and Grotewohl,³ included statement: “Sooner German people understand actual historic meaning formation GDR, the sooner they will achieve national unity.” Likewise, Ulbricht, addressing SED Executive Committee January 11, stated that “democratization” Western Germany is prerequisite to unification (Berlin’s A 31, January 20¹), (same time implying fairly clearly Soviet-Communist election terms).

National Front Program and “Taeg. Rund.” article both appearing mid February revealed further details National Front aims, including requirement “under leadership of working class” (Berlin’s 253 to Frankfurt, February 17 and A–45, February 18⁴). Latter implies “under KPD–SED leadership,” and “democratization” of course means “Communization” in standard Communist double talk.

Kremlin’s present hopes Germany evidently based largely on steady deterioration economic situation (unemployed, refugees, expellees) Western Zones on [and?] Berlin sectors, which Soviets hope will provide increasingly fertile base for development National Front Movement (and at same time undermine Western efforts apply restrictive trade policies Germany). Secondary factors such as continuing dismantling (Embtel 2790, November 7⁴) and Franco-Saar agreement⁵ should provide good material for appeals nationalist sentiment uniting both extreme Eight and Left elements and thus undercutting democratic parties on success of which Western Powers’ whole programs depend. Dertinger’s attack on “legitimacy” Anglo-American occupation (Berlin’s Despatch 34, February 27⁴) obviously intended provide further basis for “National Liberation Movement” aimed Western Powers and their German “lackeys.”

Against this background, Dertinger’s speech suggests likely next move on Soviet time table may be some sort phoney Peace Treaty (Embtel 2575, October 13⁴), presumably following further “legitimation” claim of GDR and National Front to speak in name all Germany as result expected National Congress or possible plebiscite. Embassy agrees HICOG’s view that such Treaty move near future seems unlikely be accompanied by any real Red Army withdrawal, particularly as long as Western position Berlin unliquidated and until GDR’s part-military “police” better developed. Dertinger’s use Warsaw declaration⁶ formula undoubtedly significant this connection. However, seems clear propaganda for withdrawal Western troops would be redoubled and in much more specific form than heretofore, together with covertly-disseminated hints of eventual possible rectification Oder-Neisse line, which ace-in-hole Embassy still feels Kremlin may play or likely achieve really decisive results for National Front Movement (Embtels 2763, November 4 and 2860, November 17⁷).

We believe these possibilities require careful and coordinated planning by Western Powers which for obvious reasons unable move with Moscow’s typical swiftness.

Embassy also concurs HICOG’s recommendation Western Powers should more actively espouse unity theme, including specific conditions for unity and Peace Treaty, and would welcome proposal for policy speech by McCloy, for which Berlin seems admirably suited, supported British and French High Commissioners and Bonn leaders. Suggest such speech should be comprehensive and basic, including not only Western terms, but attacking and unmasking Soviet conditions for unity outlined above and Kremlin’s policies and aims Germany, including economic exploitation (reparations deliveries and SOVAG’s), obvious minority SED dictatorship afraid face free voters, latest drive eliminate even remaining feeble independence part LDP and CDU Soviet Zone, constant violations individual human rights, repressive labor conditions including Uranina mines, failure keep promises regarding PW repatriation, attempts present fait accompli regarding Eastern frontier, and fate in store for National Front Germany as revealed evolution People’s Democracies including now-admitted goal collectivized agriculture. Speech might well even mention possibility Soviet-imposed bogus Peace Treaty, emphasizing its main aim and effect would be permanent imposition of above and other aspects Moscow-dominated Communism on Eastern Germany, for which reason Western Powers and majority German people could never accept it.

Sent Department 827; repeated Frankfurt 57; Berlin 23; London 98; Rome 30; Paris 101. Rome for Ambassador Kirk upon arrival.⁸

Barbour

1. Not printed.
2. For the text of the speech by Georg Dertinger, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the “German Democratic Republic,” see Dokumente zur Aussenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Ruetten & Loening, Berlin, 1954), Band I, pp. 141–152.
1. Not printed.
3. Regarding Stalin’s message to Wilhelm Pieck, President, and Otto Grotewohl, Premier of the “German Democratic Republic,” dated October 13, 1949, see editorial note, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 532.
1. Not printed.
4. Not printed.
4. Not printed.
5. Regarding the Franco-Saar agreements, signed by Foreign Minister Schuman and Premier Hoffmann in Paris on March 3, see the editorial note, p. 938.
4. Not printed.
4. Not printed.
6. For the text of the statement by the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary, adopted on June 24, 1948 at Warsaw, see Beate Ruhm von Oppen (ed.), Documents on Germany Under Occupation, 1945–1954 (London, Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 300–307.
7. Neither printed.
8. Ambassador Kirk was in Rome to attend a meeting of United States Ambassadors with George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, March 22–24. For documentation on this meeting, see vol. iii, pp. 795 ff.