Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762A.022/3–750: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort¹

secret
priority

Washington, March 7, 1950—9 p. m.

1494. Ref urtel 1963 March 7.² Dept does not agree with you that U.S. influence was not effective in modifying Fr plans. Mines convention as drafted remains in force only until peace settlement and if, but only if, Saar ownership is confirmed at that time, lease is extended to fifty years from date of ratification of present agreement. This retains an important principle: an agreement subject to review at peace settlement and settlement of ownership question at that time likewise. We cannot understand your view that further representations FedRep wld permit Adenauer to charge us with bad faith in expressing views set forth ourtel 626, Jan 30. In Dept’s opinion, conventions as announced fit precisely into context of views expressed in reftel. (See esp. antepenultimate para thereof.)

Therefore Dept in general agreement with Allen’s comments re Fr-Saar agreement and Ger reaction thereto (Lon’s tel 1264 Mar 6, rptd Frankfort 94, Paris 356³). You are authorized join with your Brit colleague in joint informal approach to Adenauer along lines indicated reftel. Agree such approach shld be made promptly in view prospective Bundestag debate Fri, Mar 10 on subject, and consideration in Bundestag Fon Relations Comite and in interfactional discussions Mar 9. We have noted press account of Adenauer’s press conference statements of March 4 and are of opinion that they are not in accord with his statement in mtg with HICOM Mar 2 “that he wld do his best to present the issue in such a way as to prevent most heated debate”. (Para 5 Bonn’s tel 60 Mar 3, rptd Frankfort 78, Lon 20, Paris 25.⁴)

Acheson

1. Repeated to London as 1045 and to Paris as 992.
2. Not printed; in it Hays indicated that he felt United States influence was not effective in eliminating from the Franco-Saar agreements those items such as the ownership of the mines which would prejudge a peace settlement. He considered that Adenauer might accuse him of acting in bad faith unless the United States stated publicly that the major Saar issues would await determination in a peace treaty. (451.62A31/3–750)
3. Not printed; it reported that William D. Allen, Head of the German Political Department of the British Foreign Office, had indicated that he deplored the timing of the agreements but “did not consider them to be inconsistent with assurances given US by French and hence British have no intention of reopening question with latter.” (762A.022/3–650)
4. Not printed.