Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

862A.511/10–750: Telegram

The United States Commander, Berlin (Taylor) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort¹

secret

Berlin, October 7, 1950—11 a. m.

592. Bonn’s telegram 175 to Department, repeated Berlin 79, Frankfort 197.²

1. In accordance decisions taken at Commandants meeting with HICOMs September 28, Commandants met October 5 with Reuter and Suhr re strengthening of police.

2. British Commandant, as chairman, opened discussion by referring to Foreign Ministers communiqué³ and saying that Berliners undoubtedly wish participate in Berlin’s defense if attack comes; that commandants authorized re-arm city police up to prewar level; and that Reuter-Suhr views desired re possible further strengthening security police. I added we are not disturbed by present situation, but that, in past, military situation had been viewed under two aspects: (a) Civil disturbances arising out of such events as Deutschland Treffen, which allied troops and city police are competent to handle, and (b) Attack by Red Army which obviously could not be repulsed by Berlin garrisons in any case. Now, however, in light creation Soviet Zone Bereitschaften⁴ and example Korea, another degree of preparedness required, calling for stiffening of allied garrisons and of Berlin police.

3. Reuter expressed satisfaction that Commandants not disturbed by present situation. He agreed measures should be taken in Berlin parallel to and in connection with those in Federal Republic. On military side too considered important that quality as well as quantity of allied strength be reinforced so that any surprise attack would not mean city could be conquered within 24 hours. Re Berlin police, he said they should have carbines, machine pistols, and small number light machine guns; also armored personnel carriers. As to financing, he assumed HICOM would consider Berlin’s requirements in framework overall German rearmament question.

4. Reuter then said there was strong tendency among West Berliners toward some sort of “citizens guard” and he felt tendency could not be ignored. He thought this might be developed in connection with police increase by creation voluntary reserves; e.g. for each regular policeman, one or two men in reserve in case emergency. Such men would be given some weapons training and would be volunteers, although perhaps paid for training period of possibly one week. Reuter emphasized such volunteer corps should not consist of any political party groups.

5. Suhr reiterated latter point, saying he was skeptical re such organizations as he himself had been active in them after World War I. He expressed agreement in general with Reuter’s comments. He felt leadership of volunteer reserves should be in hands of regular police.

6. Summary of Germans views indicated they envisaged three steps:

(a) Re-arming present police to prewar level.

(b) Creation of volunteer reserve.

(c) Creation police reserve.

7. Following specific suggestions developed by Germans during discussion:

(a) All measures re police increase should be coordinated with that of Federal Republic and number of police reserve should be based on Federal Republic police increase: e.g. if Federal Republic police increased by 30,000, Berlin police reserve should be 10% this number or 3,000.

(b) Two police forces undesirable, hence police reserve should be part of regular police force.

(c) Certain number of police should be formed into Bereitschaften type units and quartered in barracks. Presumably the 3,000 men reserve include (c) above.

8. Reuter said that, although definite answers impossible until after consultation with Police President Stumm, he believed certain number present police officers qualified to start training reserves immediately. Increase in number of police officers and NCO’s would be necessary, however. Re recruitment, he foresaw no difficulties, especially in view 120,000 unemployed males.

9. It was obvious from tenor and detail of Germans comments that they had already discussed matter at length between selves and had been awaiting Commandants’ approach. It was interesting that Suhr, who several months ago had expressed himself strongly against any German re-arming, particularly in Berlin, now appears fully recognize necessity of project and prepared proceed with it despite innate disdain.

10. Agreement reached was that Commandants will meet again October 10 with Reuter, Suhr and Stumm to discuss details, including whether plan of procedure should be joint Allied-German project or worked out first by Germans alone and then submitted to allies. Meanwhile Reuter and Suhr will inform party leaders of project, cautioning re secrecy. They feel essential inform party leaders in view already widespread discussion of subject.⁵

Sent Frankfort 592, repeated info Department 526, Bonn 112.

Taylor

1. The source text was sent as 526 to Department of State.
2. Not printed; it reported on an Executive Session of the High Commissioners with the Berlin Commandants at which Berlin security, the arming and training of the Berlin police, stockpiling in the city, and transportation problems were discussed. The High Commissioners agreed that the Commandants should inform the Magistrat that the Allies would reinforce their garrisons and discuss the size and financing of Berlin auxiliary and reserve police. (762A.00/9–2850)
3. For the text of the Foreign Ministers communiqué on Germany, released to the press on September 19, see vol. iii, p. 1296 or Department of State Bulletin, October 2, 1950, pp. 530–531.
4. For documentation on the creation of the Soviet Zone Bereitschaften, see pp. 942 ff.
5. At the meeting on October 10 it was agreed to rearm the regular police, increase their number by approximately 3000 men, create a volunteer reserve, and establish a joint Allied-German expert committee to consider all aspects of the Berlin police and security question. (Telegram 550, October 13, from Berlin, not printed, 862A.511/10–1350.)