Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

962.50/7–2750: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

top secret
priority

Frankfort, July 27, 1950—1 p. m.

725. Subject implementation of paragraph 4c of NSC 24/3 following is action taken since our telegram 3390, April 21:¹

1. A Berlin Joint Committee (tripartite) has been formed to assist HICOM in implementation of Foreign Ministers’ decision MIN/TRI/P/14 final.² On its recommendation HICOM council agreed on 15 June:

(A) That Berlin commandants immediately:

(1) Establish check points in Berlin at western approaches.

(2) Establish internal checkpoints on sector boundaries plus roving patrols.

(3) Establish German authority in Berlin equivalent to Oberbehoerde (screening agency) (in zone to implement export control program.

(4) Establish communications net from check points in West zone to Berlin.

(Draft order from Allied Kommandatura to Berlin Magistrat requiring implementation above program approved by BJC in meeting 21 July.)

(B) That measures be taken to counter Russian interference with allied and German traffic on the waterways, with the understanding that such measures would not be applied to Czech barges for the time being. (British element in Berlin which controls canal locks is prepared to stop Eastern German barges if situation requires.)

(C) That steel embargo be maintained for the time being. (HICOM on July 20 agreed to extend Frankfort trade agreement until 30 September and permit resumption of iron and steel shipments, provided (a) that shipments of rolling mill products proportionately limited, and (b) that if the Soviet zone failed to lift existing restrictions on trade and traffic or re-imposed restrictions, agreement would be considered null and void. As of this date, agreement has not been extended by the Germans representing the two areas and steel embargo remains in effect.)

(D) To consider following measures as occasion may require:

(1) Selective restriction on exports from West Germany to Soviet zone of key commodities most likely to cause bottlenecks in East German industry. (No action taken except continuation steel embargo.)

(2) Measures to restrict or stop barter deals between East and West Germany outside the inter-zonal trade agreement. (Federal Republic advised that all transactions with East zone must clear through central account. Since 1 July, payments agreement has been inoperative and limited barter transactions have been permitted in absence of other means of payment.)

(3) Interference with East-bound traffic and shipments originating in West after establishment of control machinery. (No action taken.)

(4) Measures to restrict or stop West German exports to eastern Communist-controlled countries. (No action taken except for continuing program of 1–A and 1–B controls.)

(5) Measures to restrict or stop shipments from West Germany to western countries destined for Soviet-controlled countries including the satellite states. (Spot checks being made as widely as limited personnel permit.)

(6) Measures to restrict or stop shipments from Western countries via Western Germany to Soviet zone or satellite states. (See (5) above.)

(7) The Federal Government to insist on validating documents covering exports of East zone goods to or through Western Germany. (No action taken.)

(8) Measures to ensure that shipments of given commodities from West zone approved for West Berlin are not diverted en route or transshipped to East sector or East zone after arrival. (See 1(A) above.)

(9) Restriction on use of ports in the Federal Republic of Germany. (No action taken.)

(10) Full-scale counter-blockade plan to be brought into effect under the occupation forces. Strengthening East-West border controls in West Germany cannot be adequately enforced before Council approval of implementing regulations under MG law 53 (revised) authorizing German authorities to prosecute violations of law 53 (revised). Such regulations are now under consideration by Law Committee.

Berlin Commandants are hampered by absence in Berlin of legislation similar to MG law 53 (revised). Promulgation of appropriate legislation expected shortly.

2. The total strength at present of the German Border Control Service, at the border along the Soviet zone, is:

(A) Along the British zone–Soviet border 3,700—proposed strength 5,000.

(B) Along the US zone-Soviet border 1,700—proposed strength 2,000.

3. In summary, some progress has been made since April in the improvement of the existing machinery for retaliatory measures. Additional personnel are being recruited and trained continuously. The legal basis for full control is not yet completely formalized, but will be shortly. The plan for retaliation has been prepared in general outline, but the details, which must be known before imposing the program, have not yet been worked out. Further action in preparing a step-by-step program of retaliation would be desirable. Meantime, difficulties continue to be encountered in enforcing the limited control program now in effect. These difficulties arise from the basic reluctance of the West Germans to separate themselves psychologically or economically from Eastern Germany. The idea of a united Germany is potent medicine, and in absence extraordinary circumstances, any measures which appear to split Germany wider are bound to encounter reluctant acceptance if not covert sabotage. Although officially the government has given the appearance of cooperation in the control program, we would make a serious mistake by failing to recognize the depths of feeling on the question of unity and by underestimating the probable resistance to any really effective control over inter-zonal trade.

EuCom and HICOG have jointly worked out plan for regulating, curtailing or terminating traffic crossing US zonal border in phased operation. Plan also provides for full military control over border and German border officials if necessary. British and French have been notified of US plan and requested to prepare similar plans for their borders.

US counter-blockade plan over and above present planning for retaliatory measures being introduced for consideration of Berlin Joint Committee to obtain tripartite agreement.

McCloy

1. Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 852.
2. For text of MIN/TRI/P/14 Final, see vol. iii, p. 1091.