Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

762A.00/5–1150: Telegram

The United States Commander, Berlin (Taylor) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort¹

secret
priority

Berlin, May 11, 1950—10 a. m.

680. Reference mytel 846 May 9 repeated Department 705, London for USDel 60, Paris 228, Moscow 47, Bonn 60.²

I met with Germans May 10 (British preferred I do so alone to avoid publicity re special commandants’ meeting) to ascertain their views re Yelisarov letter on Berlin elections.

Although they said they had not previously discussed it among themselves, Germans were unanimous in rejection of Yelisarov’s conditions, particularly points 2, 5, 6 and 7. None thought there was any urgency in replying to it. Reuter declared 7 “so ridiculous there is no need even discuss it”. He considered very fact Yelisarov answered it [at?] all indicated weakness and he thought Western commandants in replying should reiterate, but in more precise form, Western conditions as set forth in commandants letter of April 21 to city authorities. Schwennicke³ agreed and added suggestion that Western commandants reply to Yelisarov should also force him to explain his conditions.

Batzel, representing CDU (Schreiber was in Bonn), thought Yelisarov’s letter, although negative, indicated he was prepared discuss matter. Berlin unity vitally important to Berliners, said Batzel, but “we can’t commit suicide by withdrawal of troops.” Mattick (SPD), representing Neumann, also in Bonn, said he had no illusions that Yelisarov’s letter meant he seriously intended have elections. He pointed out City Assembly, in which SED theoretically still has 11 seats, was logical source for initiating elections; also that 1948 constitution was drafted with SED cooperation.

Re withdrawal of troops, Mattick suggested Yelisarov might be asked if Soviets intended withdraw troops from Soviet Zone before October 15 elections.

On Reuter’s suggestion, Germans agreed in recommending following course of action:

1. That I, as chairman commandant, forward to Reuter “for his information” copy of Yelisarov’s letter.

2. City Assembly will discuss and criticize letter and conditions in regular session May 16 (they had already planned do this in any case). No formal action will be taken at this session, however.

3. In next regular Assembly meeting June 1, another letter or resolution, reiterating specifically their views, will be proposed by magistrat and, after adoption by Assembly, will be forwarded to all four commandants.

4. In light this letter, Western commandants will then reply to Yelisarov setting forth their position in detail.

1. Object this program is to keep City Assembly, as legally elected body which initiated proposal, in picture.

The program appeared to me effective and well timed. British and French commandants subsequently agreed and are so informing their Foreign Offices.⁴ Yelisarov’s letter does not therefore appear necessitate any direct mention by Foreign Ministers although program would not seem conflict with some oblique reference to Berlin elections such as that suggested mytel 834, May 8 repeated London for McCloy 54.⁵

Commandants will meanwhile issue no further formal statements to press, but in reply to probable press questions after regular Kommandatura meeting May 12 will merely say, individually, that we have communicated Yelisarov’s letter to Assemby and that we are studying it further. Propaganda media will meanwhile follow lines recommended in Deptel 3246 to Frankfort May 10 [9], repeated Berlin 179.⁶

Sent Frankfort 680, repeated Department 716, London for USDel 62, Paris 230, Moscow 48, Bonn 62. Department please pass Moscow.

Taylor

1. The source text was sent as 716 to the Department of State.
2. Not printed; in it Taylor reported that West Berlin and Allied reaction was unanimous that Yelisarov’s letter was tantamount to a refusal. The question for determination, then, was how to handle it in order to retain the initiative, avoid lengthy negotiations on the elections that might delay approval of the constitution and the holding of elections, and avoid exposure to the charge of continuing to split the city. Taylor was arranging a meeting with the British, French, and West Berliners to ascertain their views on the letter and how to handle it. (762.00/5–950)
3. Carl-Hubert Schwennicke, leader of the Berlin FDP.
4. In telegram 185, May 12, to Berlin, not printed, the Department of State agreed to this program of action, but stated its preference for a City Assembly resolution or letter before the FDJ rally began on May 28. The Berlin Element replied that this was not feasible, but that Reuter would read Yelisarov’s letter to the Assembly at its May 16 meeting, and take a decision on it at the next meeting on June 1. Unnumbered telegram from Frankfort, May 16, not printed. (762A.00/5–1150 and 1650)
5. Not printed; it transmitted the text of a draft declaration on Berlin which, inter alia, welcomed the City Assembly proposal for elections. (London Embassy Files: Lot 59 F 59: 350 Germany)
6. Not printed; it stressed that Yelisarov’s letter was under study and no official reaction could be expected until the study was completed. A number of interim points for development by news media were then suggested. (762.00/5–950)