Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: Germany

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State ( Webb ) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council ( Lay )

top secret

Washington , May 3, 1950.

Subject: Second Progress Report on NSC 24/3, “Possible U.S. Courses of Action in the Event the USSR Reimposes the Berlin Blockade”, June 14, 1949, and NSC 24/4, “Phase-Out of the Berlin Airlift”, July 25, 1949.¹

NSC 24/3, in which certain courses of action are recommended if the USSR should reimpose the Berlin blockade, was approved as Governmental policy by the President on June 15, 1949. NSC 24/4, in which the phase-out of the Berlin airlift was recommended upon certain conditions, was similarly approved on July 28, 1949. It is requested that this Progress Report (dated April 29, 1950) be circulated to the members of the Council for their information.

The action contemplated by NSC 24/4 has been completed, as indicated in the Progress Report of January 27, 1950,² and periodic Progress Reports on this paper are therefore being discontinued.

With respect to the action contemplated in NSC 24/3, the basic planning for re-institution of the airlift is continuing by the Department of the Air Force in collaboration with the Department of the Navy in consonance with the provisions of JCS 1907/38 (Plans for reestablishment of the Berlin Airlift),³ as amended and approved 11 October 1949. The Commanding General, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, has prepared a detailed EUCOM plan which incorporates the basic concept of the plan prepared by the Department of the Air Force. This plan has been accepted by the Departments of the Air Force and Navy at the working level and is now being coordinated with subordinate Air Force commands. Certain minor revisions pertaining to administrative matters are being resolved.

The plan envisages an operation basically the same as the past Berlin Airlift, utilizing the same air bases, surface supply routes, air operations, and troop bases, and it reflects an increased naval participation, so that the Navy and Air Force contributions will be in direct proportion to their respective transport resources. The plan has not been formally approved, but, according to the Air Force, it could be implemented with minimum delay if such a necessity should arise.

With respect to paragraph 4c of NSC 24/3, in which it is recommended that “all measures requisite for the re-institution of the counter-blockade be kept in readiness,” a joint tripartite Frankfort-Berlin trade and transport technical committee has been formed, the purpose of which is to “maintain liaison with the German Economic Ministry on east/west trade and to coordinate information from this source with that obtained from the Berlin (tripartite) technical committee”. This committee has recommended that German border controls be supervised by Allied authorities with the view to obtaining and expediting information available at border crossing points to provide a flexible means of exerting retaliatory measures to ensure that regulations are being implemented.

In addition, elements of the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany will endeavor to:

a. Effect over-all coordination to collect such intelligence data as may be needed to implement and enforce prohibited restrictions.

b. Initiate the drafting of new German customs procedures whereby punitive measures, customs clearance in the interior of Federal territory, and customs investigation and enforcement service actions may be initiated without creating the political difficulty of naming the territory of the Soviet Zone a foreign customs territory.

c. Establish greater control over postal consignments.

German customs authorities have promised, effective May 1, 1950, to furnish the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany with copies of monthly operational reports from the seven border customs inspectorates established along the border of the German Federal Republic and the Soviet Zone. These reports are to include the number of freight cars, trucks, barges and persons moved, type of commodities, percentage of inspections carried out, list of confiscated goods and any unusual incidents.

The total strength at present of the German border control service, at the border along the Soviet Zone, is:

a. Along the British Zone-Soviet Zone border 3,589 (proposed strength 5,000).

b. Along the US Zone-Soviet Zone border 1,538 (proposed strength 2,000).⁴

James E. Webb

1. Regarding NSC 24/3, see NSC 24/4, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 839.
2. Not printed; it reported the phasing-out of the airlift, Air Force dispositions in Germany for its speedy resumption if needed, and the status of food and coal stockpiles in Berlin at the end of 1949; and it noted that various contingency plans were being initiated to deal with a resumption of the blockade. (PPS Files: Lot 64 D 563: Germany)
3. Not found in Department of State files.
4. The substance of the activities reported in the last four paragraphs was transmitted in telegram 3390, April 21, from Frankfort, not printed, which was a reply to a request by Washington for detailed information on action taken to implement NSC 24/3. (Telegram 2506, April 12, to Frankfort, not printed, 962.50/4–1250 and 4–2150)