762A.0221/2–250: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort1

top secret   niact

722. With modifications suggested below, Dept approves your proceeding with measures proposed Bonn’s Tel 22 Feb 2, rptd Fr 30, Berlin 7. Although these measures seem urgently called for by East-West trade balance situation, we agree that they probably will not be [Page 823] sufficient to achieve purposes outlined Deptel 668 Jan 31. We are willing, however to attempt them as a first step but feel that if Sov transport restrictions are not lifted, we will be forced to consider stronger measures. We assume that first step will be to have outstanding 10 million DM charged to clearing account so that action by West Germans will be fully justified.

In proceeding with measures proposed urtel 22, believe it most important to put them into effect without delay. We believe this question is of sufficient importance and urgency also to request Adenauer to be present at meeting.

You will doubtless make it clear that your asking for action on these matters is in fact an order. You might well give written orders if Germans request them. It wld seem better not to ask for German proposals, since this wld only delay matters.

We do not believe control points should be set up in Berlin at this time unless Magistrat concurs.

Pls keep Dept informed constantly of all developments.2

McCloy has not seen this reply but expressed his approval your niact 22 just prior to his departure.3

Acheson
  1. Repeated to Berlin as 31, Paris for Bruce as 454, London for Holmes as 504, and Bonn niact as 3.
  2. Before the receipt of this telegram Hays had further discussed the question with his French and British colleagues who were not authorized to take all the measures outlined in Bonn’s 22, February 2. However, they were instructed to send a message to Blankenhorn for Adenauer stating inter alia that the High Commission had become “increasingly disturbed” over the trade imbalance with the eastern zone and requesting the Chancellor to issue instructions to the appropriate German authorities for the cessation of steel deliveries. This course of action was approved on February 3 by Washington which believed it was “better to take partial action now rather than delay action of any type as broader issues of blockade would apparently require governmental approach to London and Paris.” (Telegrams 26 from Bonn, and 4 to Bonn, February 3, neither printed, 762A.0221/2–350).
  3. The source text was initialed by Secretary Acheson.