740.5/12–1250: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort 1

secret
priority

4222. Eyes only McCloy from Byroade. Re Deptel 4183 Dec 9.2

1.
Kind of settlement with Ger which we now believe necessary to plan as “contractual arrangement” shapes up roughly as foils.
2.
Basic assumption is that Ger gives evidence of desire for continued cooperation with West and is willing to enter defense arrangements with West, either through an integrated Eur defense structure or directly through NATO. Further assumption is that Schuman Plan is agreed and put in operation and that there is continued progress with Ger membership in international organizations, including GATT and IMF.
3.
Agreement, contract, treaty or whatever we choose to call it, will be entered into by US-UK-Fr and Ger whereby 3 powers wld agree to relinquish supreme authority (except for Ber), abolish HICOM, terminate Occ Stat and appoint Ambassadors. Ger wld undertake limited number of commitments, concerning inter alia war criminals, human rights, Danish minority, internatl agreements and orgs, restitution, waiver of claims, perhaps deconcentration, and recognition of status of Austria. Ger wld also accept long range security limitations along lines of those presently embodied in MC 303 (in lieu of PLI). Question of enforcement of continued purely negative controls such as above (and of type that wld normally be included in peace treaty) is major problem. We wld regret the continuation of a formal tripartite board such as MSB under conditions of Ger military alliance with West unforeseen at time of creation that board. Fortunately, a form of positive control of this situation presents itself through normal functions of production and supply side of NATO in that major decisions as to production in Ger will be made in that forum on which occupying powers already sit. The Schuman Plan, if successful, is itself a big factor in question of continuation of tripartite control agency over Ger industry. Under conditions we anticipate, it seems that MSB could be little more than an intelligence agency and that this function cld be adequately handled by the Allied Embassies and the presence of their forces in Ger. We therefore conclude that we shld solve this problem by insuring that Ger accepts by contractual arrangement those limitations which we wld wish imposed in a normal peace treaty and that formal control machinery on the ground in Ger [Page 798] shld be given up. Inasmuch as Govts will in any event have info of major violations and counter action thereto will depend entirely upon will of Govts it seems we may as well adopt normal peace treaty procedures on this point.
4.
NATO countries and Ger wld conclude agreement whereby Ger assumes same relationship to NATO as other Eur countries, wld assume appropriate military and economic contributions, wld enter into Civil Affairs agreement providing for NATO troops.
5.
Multilateral treaty or treaties between Ger and countries at war with her (and perhaps “neutrals”) wld include claims settlement or pledge thereto, waiver of claims, commitments as to foreign interests and civil aviation.
6.
Bi-lateral treaties (at least in US case) wld deal with radio frequencies, ECA, foreign interests and perhaps cultural affairs.
7.
At such time as 3, 4, 5 and 6 are prepared, they wld be finalized concurrently, always providing no major hitch had invalidated assumptions 2.
8.
It is obvious that agreements of foregoing type will in fact amount to final settlement with Ger except for one or two presently insoluble questions such as boundaries. Even here it may be necessary to face squarely Saar problem as Schumacher has already served notice this must be settled before military participation by Ger.
9.
Pending conclusion these arrangements it is our thought that we will have succeeded in diverting some attention from Ger problem through a Brussels communiqué and that major efforts will be underway to develop the rest of the integrated defense plan. Our thought is that in Brussels communiqué we cld include para on Ger (this in addition to major theme of communiqué along lines para A(1)a of 41834) as folls:

“The Council accepted the report from the Deps concerning possible Ger participation in integrated defense force. It noted that there is agreement that such participation is possible and that many of military and technical details can be appropriately arranged. It will be task of the Occupation Powers to formulate political proposals which, together with the technical plans, can be discussed with Fed Govt of Ger. It was agreed that early success in negots to be held in Paris at initiative of Fr Govt on creation of integrated Eur military and political institutions will greatly facilitate development of political proposals by Occ Powers.”

10.
Request your comments urgently on above as general framework of “contractual arrangements” that might be used if required in discussions in Brussels. [Byroade.]

Acheson
  1. Repeated to London as 2994 for information eyes only for Holmes to be passed to Reinstein and Gerhardt.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Regarding MC 30, see Depto 228, November 27, vol. iii, p. 488.
  4. This paragraph reads as follows:

    “(A) In NATO:

    (1) Insure that communiqué on NATO Deliberations:

    (a) Clearly states the reasons for and nature of the integrated force for the defense of freedom in Europe. This should be a carefully drawn declaration of the twelve powers designed to set a sound moral basis for the defense effort. Such a statement by its nature would tend, at least by implication, to present the reasons for German participation, and place this issue in proper context.”