Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

862A.501/1–651: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Frankfort

confidential

Washington, January 6, 1951—4 p. m.

4706. For McCloy from Byroade. Urtels 5314, Dec. 29 and 5092, Dec. 19 and Deptel 4511, Dec. 22.¹ Have been giving much thought to police question. On one hand Gers appear to be attempting flout NY FonMins decision re police by amending Basic Law to enable creation of Fed mobile police, using as excuse fact Fed Govt and Laender cannot agree on administrative arrangements to put into effect terms of NY agreement.

On other hand, NY terms may be so impracticable that we shld never have expected Gers would be able work out details. If so, we wld appear to be faced with decision whether to (1) allow creation Fed force contrary to NY agreement (with safeguards such as you mention urtel 5092) in order provide Fed Govt with protection it wants or (2) limit authorization to terms NY agreement, thereby perhaps making impossible formation of any unified mobile force other than Laender forces.

Adenauer’s attitude as described urtel 5382² indicates he is set on Fed force under exclusive Fed control. Not clear whether he is thinking of it as nucleus of future German army, for increasing own hold on Gers, or for protecting self and govt. Neither reason by itself appears adequate justification for reconsidering NY decision. However, fact that not only Fed Govt but also SPD and some Laender govts seem to want Fed police creates difficult problem.

Furthermore, Brit definitely favor formation Fed Police and Fr may well be prepared buy it. Thus, if US remains adamant against such action we wld be alone in sticking by NY decisions.

Am not sure that Gers have made all possible efforts reach agreement on basis NY decisions although you, of course, wld be better judge of this than we. Also, does not appear that conditions have so changed since Sept. as to warrant reconsideration NY decision. Therefore, wld be very reluctant agree to constitutional amendment quoted Bonn 363² which wld permit Fed Eep exceed authorization granted NY decision (Doc. 37³). No objection to Gers attempting clarify legal status police by constitutional amendment which does not give Fed Rep more authority than contemplated Doc. 37.

In view of above, shld you not in concert with Fr and Brit, advise Adenauer that we do not object to constitutional amendment so long as it does not give Fed Rep more authority than contemplated NY decisions and tell him and Laender Presidents once more that they shld make earnest efforts work out administrative problems. He could also be told that we have no objection to constitutional amendment permitting creation of limited special Federal force (say not to exceed 2000) for use solely to maintain order in Bonn enclave (or any other seat of Fed Govt.). In addition, cld be suggested that Fed legis defining more precisely “emergency” referred to in Art 91 of Basic Law, add procedures for acting thereunder, wld be useful advance measure. Further, we wld not object to increases in Land police as such, if additional numbers are felt necessary. We note too that Fed Rep plans border control force of 25,000, which would increase security factors.

If Adenauer still insists that despite all these possibilities and plans. Fed Rep must have authority to establish force under its exclusive control, it seems to me we shld agree only (1) if we are all convinced that N.Y. decisions were in fact unworkable and (2) that immediate establishment mobile police regardless of basis of authority so urgent that we must agree to Ger demands for Fed police in order to end delay. Your 5092 indicates need for special internal security forces may now be less urgent now than in Sept. All in all it seems to us Adenauer’s arguments are becoming less convincing than earlier since all efforts should now be devoted to bringing Gers into defense effort which wld provide much greater security than any police force.

Wld greatly appreciate ur reaction to above.⁴

Acheson

1. Telegram 5092, supra; telegrams 4511 and 5314, not printed; the former stated that the factors given in telegram 5092 were not sufficient to justify reconsideration of the Foreign Ministers decision against the establishment of a Federal police force; in the latter McCloy asked whether the Department of State wanted more information or had decided to have HICOG reject the constitutional amendment. (862A.501/12–1450 and 2950)
2. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. For the text of Document 37 Final, see vol. iii, p. 1286.
4. In telegram 5743, January 12, from Frankfort, not printed, McCloy expressed his general agreement with these views and stated that he would “seek British and French approval to advise Adenauer that we believe presently proposed constitutional amendment undesirable but that no objection would be made to constitutional amendment which would give Federal Republic as much authority as that contemplated in New York Document 37.” (862A.501/1–1251)