Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

862A.511/11–750: Telegram

The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Frankfort, November 7, 1950—4 p. m.

3810. For Byroade. I had lengthy conversation with Chancellor.¹ Adenauer was somewhat disturbed by his reception in Stuttgart November 4 where for ½ hour he had been prevented from speaking by Communist hecklers. He attributed blame to ineffectiveness of police, and expressed belief police and mayor of Stuttgart having been influenced by resurgence Communist efforts were inclined not to take strong measures as form of re-insurance. This later trend is again reappearing.

In response to my query concerning Soviet note,² Chancellor was non-committal but said we should not give it too much importance as this would serve only to strengthen its propaganda impact which should be countered. He said that as a counter to Soviet propaganda he had used in Stuttgart to good effect a list showing territories annexed by the Soviets since 1939. He has promised to furnish me promptly a memo giving his further considered views on the Soviet note.

Although he was critical of Schumacher and SPD stand concerning German defense possibilities, Adenauer said he had been reassured by a meeting with Protestant bishops of south Germany who reported that the church was emphatically opposed to Niemoeller. Chancellor is meeting with Government coalition leaders prior to Bundestag debate and expects them individually on behalf of each of the coalition parties and in the name of federal government to make a declaration setting forth Germany’s willingness to contribute to European defense. Chancellor explained that such declaration without awaiting any approach by the Allies seemed necessary at this time in order to clarify confused German thinking. He believed, if debate took this turn, it would be difficult for the SPD to take opposite stand.

In discussing Pleven plan,³ Chancellor stated that French had erred in insisting that this plan, which however had long-range possibilities, be adopted as present solution for defense requirements. When he asked what he might do to bring about greater understanding with French, I asked in turn whether he had considered possibility of meeting with Schuman and Pleven. Chancellor did not reply directly to my question but indicated that the signature of Schuman plan⁴ was urgent and that this would make possible solution of other problems. In his opinion there were only two questions which remain open and which are delaying prompt agreement upon the plan. The first relates to “transitional period” during which Germany will be required to make certain payments but which he did not feel raised great difficulties. The second, which is more important, relates to future of Ruhr statute. Although Adenauer said that Monnet had originally agreed there would be no need for Ruhr statute after conclusion of Schuman plan, French were now unwilling to do more than give assurances, once Schuman plan has been initialled, to use good offices to eliminate Ruhr authority when Schuman plan ratified. Adenauer explained it was politically impossible for him to sign or initial Schuman plan unless he can have a definite undertaking that Ruhr authority would disappear when Schuman plan enters into force. We suggested that in agreeing to Schuman plan, he might do so with reservation to take care of future of Ruhr authority thus enabling French Government to obtain consent of other signatories to this step as soon as Schuman plan comes into effect.

Chancellor regretted recent outbursts concerning occupation costs, necessity for increase of which he recognized, and undertook tone down future discussions on this subject.

In conclusion he expressed concern lest new developments in Korea might delay arrival of additional US forces and urged that no public statement be issued which might indicate any delay in their arrival or reduction in their number.

My conversation with Schumacher followed.⁵ I took occasion throughout our lengthy talk to review US position and to explain our objectives in creating European defense capable of acting as deterrent to Soviet aggression, stressing the importance of including Germany in this force in such a way as to avoid creation of national army or revive General Staff. I said I had been somewhat confused by the present SPD policy which seemed entirely negative and pointed out we could not accept their constant insistence upon new conditions for German contribution. Moreover it was intolerable for them to suggest that the US was trying to exploit Germany rather than to create a defense force adequate to protect the freedom of all. I said US had given evidence of its sincerity in the past and asked for clarification of SPD policy.

Schumacher said he had fully explained his position and that of his party in our conversation on August 17 (see mytel reporting that conversation⁶) when he had insisted upon the creation of a force sufficiently strong to take offensive in event of war as a condition for any German participation. Although I pointed out that if German contribution could only be made to a force strong enough to insure defeat of Soviet Union such contribution would not then be needed, Schumacher insisted that Germany should not be called upon to cover Allied retreat or to court sure disaster by participating in a weak force. We discussed this point at length and Schumacher continued to maintain his rigid insistence that Germany could only contribute when the European force had been made strong enough. I pointed out that it was unreal for him to insist upon this prior condition and to refuse to make any contribution until Germany’s position was secure.

Schumacher then insisted that Germany’s capacity to carry burden of increased occupation costs should be reviewed since severe charges imposed upon its economy by social burdens imposed on account of war damages, by necessity rebuilding bombed destroyed cities, by excessive refugee costs were heavier in proportion to similar burdens of other states and should be calculated when estimating Germany’s possible defense contribution. Although other countries might be able to support defense expenditures amounting to 10% of their national income, Germany, particularly in view of its present government’s reckless economic policy, could not meet any such requirement. He developed this theme at considerable length, arguing for special treatment for Germany but also suggesting a study should be made of additional charges which Germany will be expected to meet so that sum total of increases could be considered in relation to their impact on German economy.

Schumacher was particularly critical of Moch, Pleven and the Schuman plan, insisting that the primary objective of Pleven’s proposal was not the creation of a true international army but to give French control over any European force.

When I asked for his views re Soviet note he replied that from point of view of Germany Soviet proposal and Prague declaration⁷ were completely unacceptable basis for discussions of Germany. On other hand from point of view of world situation he thought it would be a mistake to refuse to talk particularly if issues other than those involving Germany alone could be included. He did not expect any such conversations would procure relaxation on intention [of tensions?] but that they would demonstrate continued western readiness to reach peaceful settlement.

I gained impression at end of our 2½ hour conversation Schumacher was less rigid in his approach to question of German contribution to European defense but gave no assurance he would modify position of party particularly in forthcoming debate. On other hand presence of Ollenhauer⁸ during talk may have been helpful in providing another channel for explanation US views to party members.

Sent Department 3810, repeated info London 269, Paris 326, Bonn 71.

McCloy

1. The conversation took place in Bonn during lunch on November 6.
2. For documentation on the Soviet note of November 3, proposing a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, see pp. 902 ff.
3. For documentation on the Pleven plan, see vol. iii, pp. 403 ff.
4. For documentation on the Schuman plan, see ibid., pp. 691 ff.
5. At 4:30 p. m.
6. Regarding McCloy’s conversation with Schumacher on August 17, see telegram 1479, August 18, p. 706.
7. For the principal provisions of the statement issued at Prague, October 21, see the editorial note, p. 665.
8. Erich Ollenhauer, SPD Bundestag member.