762A.5/4–2550: Telegram
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the Secretary of State
no distribution
3485. Eyes only for Byroade from McCloy. In reply urtel 2450, 11 April.1 I have strong feeling that our present approach to problem of preventing Germany from “again becoming threat to peace of the world” is unrealistic. We are undertaking controls now which we are told would have prevented World War II had they been undertaken after World War I. Thus we have attempted to improve on Versailles by absolutely forbidding Germany to arm, with intention of preventing another Von Seeckt2 conspiracy; we have limited Germany’s industrial production and capacity and prohibited certain industries, have placed Ruhr to some extent under international control, and have made deconcentration an agreed occupation policy, all with view to preventing re-emergence in Germany of a predominant industrial potential under highly centralized control.
These restrictions seemed logical in a context of post-war international cooperation, when world-wide control of atomic energy and world-wide disarmament appeared to be possible. I question whether they make sense in present divided world, when both sides are struggling for atomic supremacy and both sides are rearming. While our political orientation has changed completely, our security complex as regards Germany remains unchanged.
I suggest that real security for Western Europe lies not in limiting Germany’s production, but in strengthening Western Europe by addition of Germany as willing participant and eventually as full partner in concert of democratic powers. The best guarantee that Germany herself will not endanger peace of Europe lies on her Eastern borders. Greatest danger to West—that Germany might be tempted to throw in her fortunes with those of East—is to be met not by imposing upon Germany restrictions which will make Germans resent Western interference [Page 634] and mistrust any German Government which cooperates with West, but by ensuring that legitimate aspirations of Germans are realized within Western concert. This means economic progress to the point of her capacity to supply her own and her neighbors’ needs. It means giving back to Germans ground for satisfaction with form of government to which they would owe their rehabilitation.
Germany must be brought into Western community (through a North Atlantic Union or by other means) as rapidly as possible. And it is folly to think of bringing her in as permanent second-class member. The real problem of US policy in Europe seems to me therefore to be that of finding way to foster right kind of Germany and to have that Germany accepted by other Western powers, and indeed by whole democratic world, as an equal partner.
If this is a correct analysis, we must review not only our security policy but indeed our entire approach to Germany. We have proceeded so far by establishing security controls, presented to German people as virtually absolute and not subject to modification, along side of which we have offered an area of economic and political freedom, subject to enlargement as Germans begin to find their way. But we have already seen that area of freedom cannot be isolated from area of control, as, for example restrictions on shipbuilding and steelmaking give rise to or prevent solution of problem of unemployment. Likewise we have seen that area of freedom itself can be a source of difficulty, particularly when it is used by Germans to bargain for concessions in area of control. Our critical need is not for permanently handicapped Germany kept powerless by foreign occupation, but for cooperative effective Germany made useful by strength of her own democratic institutions. The first priority, therefore, must be our positive role of guiding and strengthening that democratic development, with a less theoretical and more practical interpretation of our powers in German domestic political affairs. But at same time, we must not handicap that progress by unreal and outmoded security controls.
We know that World War II came not only because Germany rearmed nor even because Allies failed to intervene to prevent rearming. It came because German democracy bore the taint of defeat and because it lacked vigor and prestige to ride out bad times—people turned against it when going got hard. What German democracy needs and has never had is success in eyes of German people. The elements of this success are clearly a rising standard of living, coupled with a reasonable degree of economic stability, and a respected voice in international affairs. Many Germans agree with us when we argue the need for various internal democratic reforms. Few agree with us that Germany cannot be trusted with ships or with more than 11 million tons of steel. In particular we must recognize the legitimate concern of [Page 635] the West Germans for their own security. We cannot expect any German Government which leaves this question in its present unsatisfactory state to gain the support of its people.
Once it is agreed that such a revaluation is called for, the next thing is a timetable. Certainly it would be untimely now to press for German rearmament, or for re-establishment of an armaments industry. It may be very long indeed before this issue becomes urgent, and when it does it may well rise from our need rather than from German demand. But it is not untimely to press for a lifting of restrictions currently in force on production for peaceful purposes. Nor is it untimely to begin thinking about the industrial contribution which Germany can make to Western European (and her own) defense. Likewise the time may soon be ripe to make explicit the responsibility of the free nations of the West for the security of Germany (a responsibility which will progressively merge into cooperation as Germany attains full partnership in the Western concert). But the timetable, however painful to some non-Germans, must decisively exhibit the trend—away from present concept of Ruhr Authority as an agency imposed on Germany (perhaps towards an international authority for control of all Western European coal and steel), away from MSB (and towards full membership in NATO). Thus Germany will begin to resume her logical place in civilized world; and Germans will begin to see promise in a future by the side of Western democracies—as against East.
This course is obviously full of risks. But we have been in Germany a long time now and we must evaluate our problem and its risks realistically. As at the Congress of Vienna we must correct false preoccupation with the fallen giant and direct attention to new threat which again is from East. What we must work towards to this end is a new Europe, united as never before in face of an overwhelming danger. We must treat Germany as an asset and vital to success of any effort to readjust permanently lost European balance.