Paper Prepared by Mr. Henry B. Cox of the Office of German Political Affairs 2
German Unity and East-West Political Relations Within Germany
problem
In pursuance of our policy directed at the eventual political and economic reunification of Germany we are faced at the moment with a two-fold problem:
- 1.
- to seize the initiative from the Soviets on the question of German unity by pursuing a more dynamic propaganda compaign designed to point up the fraudulent nature of the “democratic unity” offered by the Soviets—as opposed to the program which we advocate—and,
- 2.
- to take effective measures—indirect and direct—to combat the influence of certain West German groups who desire unity at any cost.
discussion
The United States has always favored political and economic unity for Germany on the basis of free, unfettered all-German elections. The position of the United Kingdom on this question has closely paralleled our own. On the other hand, the French have shown a definite reluctance to initiate any action in this direction, since they see in German reunification an even greater political and economic threat to France. Despite this reluctance, however, it would be difficult for them not to support US–UK efforts to realize German unity provided sufficient security guarantees were included. The U.S.S.R. seeks German unity which would assure Communist domination.
The understandable desire of the German people for the reunification of their country has been and is being exploited by various pressure groups in both West Germany and East Germany as a means for achieving their own selfish objectives. These groups are discussed in some detail below.
From the establishment of the Soviet-sponsored “German Peoples Congress for the Unity of Germany and a Just Peace” in December 1947 to the current intensive propaganda campaign of the Communist-dominated “National Front”, the Soviets and their communist stooges have been attempting—and with some success—to convince the German People that the U.S.S.R. and the communist parties in East and West Germany are the only true proponents of German unification, the conclusion of a peace treaty and the withdrawal of occupation forces. Through the persistent efforts of the “National Front” committees and the Soviet and Communist controlled German press in both East and West Germany, the Soviets have sought to keep the initiative on German unity, although the arrival in West Germany of political refugees from the Soviet zone and prisoners of war has somewhat vitiated the effect of their propaganda. For the moment, the Western Allies have regained the initiative as a result of the recent McCloy statement of February 28 attacking the travesty represented by the East zone elections scheduled for October and indicating our readiness “to assist the German people to achieve unity, based on true democratic principles and reflecting the aspirations of the entire German nation.”
The Soviets have sought to gain popular support through appeals which follow the traditional lines of the policy of German-Russian friendship of Bismarck, Gustav Stresemann’s idea of Germany as a bridge between East and West, and attempts at German-Russian cooperation during the Weimar Republic. Ever since the Treaty of Rapallo this influential trend in German politics has been based on the assumption that communism must not be an argument against a Russo-German alignment, since, because of the U.S.S.R.’s vast markets [Page 610] and economic and political resources such an alignment provides the best chance for Germany’s revival as a great power.
The growing sentiment for German unification is by no means confined to the Soviet-Communist group, although they have supplied the tactical brains for the campaign. One of the largest non-Communist groups with a vital stake in German unification is the German Protestant Church, since the largest areas of Protestant strength are presently under Soviet control in East Germany. In order to insure its continued existence, and preclude Communist interference in its activities, the Protestant Church has tended to adopt a conciliatory attitude toward the Communist-dominated East German Government, although recent developments seem to reflect a firmer attitude.
Another group which has actively supported the unity idea and, in addition, rapprochement with the U.S.S.R. is composed of certain West German industrialists, and businessmen who see in the reunification of the country a means of access to their prewar markets in Eastern Europe. This group has consistently resisted Allied attempts to orient West German trade in certain strategic items away from Eastern Europe. In this connection, a HICOG economist recently estimated that up to $700,000,000 worth of goods per year is being smuggled out of Germany. Most of this goes to the East and most of it consists of strategic items.
Allied with the group is the professional soldier class in West Germany, which while basically anti-Communist, has no compunctions about cooperating with the Soviet Union. Moreover, this group, now inactive, sees in the reunification of Germany an opportunity again to ply their trade and regain their social and economic status in the German community.
In addition to groups already mentioned, a number of small ultra-nationalistic political associations and parties such as the Nadolny-Hermes Circle, together with several organizations formed by ethnic German expellees and refugees, are also campaigning actively for the reunification of the country. These groups are not only interested in the unity of East and West Germany but include in their statements of political goals the revision of the Oder-Neisse line and the return of the “lost territories” in the East. The latter objectives are, of course, common to most Germans. In this connection one of the principal reasons for the strong Adenauer protest against the Franco-Saar agreement is the feeling of the Bonn Government that any settlement of West German frontiers prior to a final peace settlement would prejudice future chances of obtaining a revision of Germany’s eastern frontiers. The failure of the Adenauer Government to take effective measures to integrate the German expellee and refugee population into the economy of West Germany is often attributed to their belief that the presence in West Germany of a large number of refugees [Page 611] will someday be a potent argument in favor of the return to German sovereignty of the territories from which the refugees came.
It should not be deduced from the foregoing discussion that the bulk of the West German population is represented in the aforementioned groups; such is not the case. However, in order to minimize the unfavorable influence of these groups we intend to pursue a two-fold course of action: (1) we will carry on an increasingly active propaganda campaign designed to reveal the fraudulent character of Soviet-Communist claims of interest in German unity, and to expose those individuals and groups seeking unity at any price; (2) we shall endeavor to convince both the Adenauer Government and the SPD opposition (which has consistently opposed German unity on Soviet terms) that they should develop a constructive program designed to back up the McCloy statement and give a clear indication of active West German interest in the problem of German unity.
There is no doubt but that reunification of Germany is a powerful political magnet to Germans, East and West, and that we must weigh this factor properly in formulating our over-all policy for Germany.
- The CFM Files are a consolidated master collection of the records of conferences of Heads of State, Council of Foreign Ministers and ancillary bodies, North Atlantic Council, other meetings of the Secretary of State with the Foreign Ministers of European powers, and materials on the Austrian and German peace settlements for the years 1943–1955 prepared by the Department of State Records Service Center.↩
- The source text was attached to a cover sheet which indicated that it and two other papers on Berlin and the German refugee problem were documents prepared for the Rome Ambassadors meeting scheduled for March 22–24. The composite of the three documents was numbered RAM–6 and dated March 15. For the text of the paper on Berlin, see p. 829; the paper on refugees is not printed. For further documentation on the Ambassadors meeting, see vol. iii, pp. 795 ff.↩