762A.00/2–950
Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John W. Auchincloss of the Bureau of German Affairs
| Participants: | Mr. John J. McCloy, U.S. High Commissioner for Germany |
| Lt. Col. H. A. Gerhardt1 | |
| EUR—Mr. George Perkins | |
| EUR—Mr. L. E. Thompson | |
| S/P—Mr. Paul Nitze | |
| L/P—Mr. John Raymond | |
| GER—Colonel H. A. Byroade | |
| —Colonel R. Cheseldine | |
| —Mr. Geoffrey Lewis | |
| —Mr. Perry Laukhuff | |
| —Mr. J. J. Reinstein | |
| —Mr. H. J. Kellerman | |
| —Mr. Arthur Kimball | |
| —Mr. John W. Auchincloss |
A meeting was held at 4:00 p. m. on February 1 in Colonel Byroade’s office to consider certain general problems regarding Germany. Colonel Byroade stated that he hoped the discussion of these questions might indicate the basic line of approach to be taken on German policy for the year.
Integration of Western Europe
Mr. McCloy said that the concept of an integrated western Europe has a great deal of attraction for the German Government, and that the Germans would respond favorably to developments in this direction. The question has become more urgent because of the increase in Soviet propaganda and influence since recent developments in Asia. European integration is connected with our policy in Asia, for Soviet success in the East would make the Allied position in Europe untenable. The key to European integration is the United Kingdom, but the recent British attitude has been discouraging, and Mr. McCloy hopes that Mr. Bevin will be more world-minded on his return to London. General Robertson2 is not presenting the urgent need of integration to his government, but Mr. McCloy is not sure how much pressure can be put on the British to move in this direction.
Mr. McCloy believes that it is essential to build up the strength, including the military strength, of western Europe, but at the same [Page 592] time he is deeply opposed to the idea of a foreign legion, or contingent of German troops, among the Allied forces. He feels that this is a defeatist idea, in its implication that we cannot defend ourselves without the Germans, and it would have the effect of making the Germans believe we are dependent on them. There is no pressure for such a measure in Germany that is of any consequence at all.
A first step to the integration of Germany into western Europe, although perhaps a feeble one, is the admission of Germany to the Council of Europe. After that it will be necessary to convince the Germans that the West is not reluctant to see a revival of the German economy and is not taking steps which are intended to be at the expense of the German economy. After the admission of Germans to the Council of Europe, Mr. McCloy would like to see meetings between the Germans and representatives of other Western countries on an equal basis to work out their problems together and to create an impression in Germany of a spirit of helpfulness on the part of the West. Mr. McCloy is not sure what can be done in the economic field as an earnest of our desire to help the Germans find markets for their trade, but he emphasized that there is a need of tangible developments, in both the military and economic fields, to support the idea of integration.
Mr. Nitze agreed that the British are the key to European integration. They are held back, however, by problems which are partly domestic and partly connected with the sterling area. We should help the British with their sterling difficulties, so that they can do more on behalf of European integration, but Mr. Nitze was not optimistic about what could, in fact, be done in the matter of the Kashmir dispute and sterling balances.
Mr. Thompson observed that an additional problem is the reluctance of the French to move forward. He felt that it might make relations easier if we were to raise matters with them while still under consideration, rather than after we had hit upon a solution, and that they should, of course, do the same with us. They ought, for example, to have raised the question of the Saar earlier than they did.3
Mr. Perkins remarked that one way into European integration might be through the German problem. He felt that the Benelux countries are realistic about the Germans, and that it would be well to get them and other Europeans to thinking in terms of Germany and its relation to Europe.
Mr. McCloy said that unfortunately the British and French think of German recovery as a responsibility of the United States rather than themselves, but that unity between the three countries is important and he considers the record on unity in the Council to be a good one. The Saar is the first major problem on which there has been disagreement.
[Page 593]Colonel Byroade raised the question whether the Secretary should discuss these matters with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman, but Mr. Perkins stated that the proposed Conference of Foreign Ministers was very much up in the air, and that a lot of preparation would be needed before it could be usefully held. Mr. McCloy agreed that it would be well for at least a part of the discussion between the Foreign Ministers to be concerned with general matters, rather than with specific problems requiring immediate action.
Termination or State of War
Colonel Byroade stated that no views have yet been exchanged between the three occupying powers on this subject, as had been contemplated at the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers.4 The Attorney General is of the opinion that no action can be taken on this subject by Congress during its present session. The Legal Adviser’s office believes that there are ways to terminate the state of war without a treaty if it is considered an important thing to do. Colonel Byroade supposed that if an answer were given on the question now it would be that the state of war should not be terminated. There should, perhaps, be a meeting of the three powers in April, but this would be on a working basis and for the exchange of legal opinions.
There is a question whether we should not clear up matters which depend ultimately on the peace settlement and the solution of which has been deferred until then; at the same time we should not devote our energy to questions of this sort which do not matter. The question of claims was mentioned as an especially difficult one, and Mr. Reinstein observed that some of the questions which have been deferred to the peace settlement are interfering with normal relations now.
Colonel Byroade stated that if we terminate the state of war with the Bonn Government, we tend to recognize that government as the successor to the former Reich. This may put us in the position of further increasing the division of Germany, according to Mr. McCloy, or it might, according to Mr. Laukhuff, put us in the position of urging the unification of Germany, since we would be treating the Bonn Government as the successor to the former government of all of Germany. Colonel Byroade said there might be a psychological or political advantage to the Germans in the termination of the state of war, but that he could see no substantial advantage to the United States. Furthermore, the small countries are dubious about terminating the state of war, because this will dispose of questions that would otherwise be settled in a peace treaty and thus deprive them of their only bargaining power against the Germans. Mr. McCloy said that he hated [Page 594] to let the Soviets have the advantage of the idea of German unity, and Colonel Byroade added that this was the reason why we could not do anything which would have the appearance of concluding a separate peace treaty.
It was agreed that we must continue to be active in this field, and that we should accordingly proceed with the exchange of legal views between the three occupying powers, although it is not expected that any conclusive action can be taken at an early date.
Review of Occupation Statute
Mr. McCloy feels that nothing has happened yet to justify a change in the Occupation Statute. The Bonn Government has been concerned with foreign affairs, and has not yet functioned as a government in domestic matters. There is no power which the Allied High Commission should surrender now, and the Germans should be allowed to realize that the passing of time will not alone be sufficient to insure a change in the statute. We can respond to any success which the Germans may have in conducting their own affairs, but it is doubtful if anything will happen between now and October to justify revision of the statute.
Colonel Byroade said that a suggestion had been made that the reserved powers be defined in great detail, but he did not think well of the idea, and there was no support for it at the meeting. Mr. Laukhuff agreed that there should be no revision of the statute now, but pointed out the need of doing something for the Germans when the time came for reviewing the statute. Mr. Reinstein suggested that by the end of the year we might at least be able to define for the Germans our requirements for future action on their part. Mr. McCloy thought we should remove the incidental irritations and vexations of the occupation, so that this might help to offset any effect of such a measure as the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He said this matter had not been discussed in the Council and that he might raise it there.
Mr. Thompson raised the question of relations with the Soviet zone of Germany and asked how much pressure should be put on other European countries in regard to their relations with east Germany. Mr. Reinstein said he believed it was understood that we wanted other European countries to withhold recognition from east Germany, but that trade with that area would continue.
Mr. McCloy stated that the assertion of our interest in eastern Germany has been too weak, and that we must get the western Germans more on the offensive against the eastern Germans. Adenauer should make more statements along this line for the benefit of the eastern Germans. He is, however, not interested in the question, and again the French are reluctant to move in this direction.
[Page 595]Defense of Germany
Colonel Byroade pointed out that the area of Germany is not covered by the North Atlantic Pact, but that an attack on the occupation troops would bring the pact into action. He believes that the United States has a definite moral obligation to defend Germany, and he asked if there would be any advantage in our making an open commitment to defend German territory. He felt that this should not be done by the three occupying powers alone, but only after consultation with the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Mr. Nitze felt that we could not and should not make any commitment to defend German territory, and that the presence of our troops; there was in substance a sufficient protection for the Germans.
Mr. McCloy stated that he receives continual pressure from Adenauer on this subject. Adenauer has asked whether it is true that we plan to base our line of defense on the Rhine, and he maintains that in disarming the Germans we incurred an obligation to defend them. Mr. McCloy said he always has to answer this by pointing out that Germany was disarmed because she could not be trusted with arms, but he then adds that the presence of the occupation troops should be a comfort to the Germans. He says that General Roberston believes we should take Adenauer sufficiently into our confidence so that he will not be misled about our defense plans.
Mr. Thompson suggested there was still a state of war with Germany and that the question of a guarantee of protection would not arise until the peace treaty.
Colonel Byroade stated that all we could say to Adenauer now is that it is to our interest to defend Europe as far as possible. Mr. Nitze added that Germany could contribute to defense by cooperating in building up western Europe.
Mr. McCloy wondered whether the United States should spend money in eastern Germany on such projects as hospitals, in order to acquire good will and to create the feeling that east Germany had not been abandoned. Mr. Thompson opposed the idea, but Mr. Nitze thought it might be worth trying.
International Authority for the Ruhr
Mr. Nitze raised the question whether the jurisdiction of the Ruhr Authority might be extended to the industrial areas of other countries. He said that this idea had been considered sometime ago, but that it had been difficult to work out in detail, and that he had never been able to see what a Ruhr Authority would do in Belgium, for example. He asked whether anything had been done with the idea, but there seem to have been no developments along this line.
[Page 596]Mr. McCloy said that a Ruhr Authority with extended jurisdiction would have a great appeal to the Germans, and that he favored it because it might help toward European integration. It was also suggested that an extended Ruhr Authority might be a more suitable project for the Organization for European Economic Cooperation.
Colonel Byroade said that we would look further into the idea.
The meeting closed with a few remarks on the possibility of establishing a small but capable planning staff for Germany. The personnel of such a group would have to be familiar with operations in Germany, but would not take part in them directly. They might, in fact, be located in Washington and make trips to Germany whenever necessary.
- Lt. Col. Harrison A. Gerhardt, Special Assistant to the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany.↩
- Gen. Sir Brian Robertson, British High Commissioner for Germany.↩
- For documentation on the Saar question, see pp. 927 ff.↩
- For documentation on the Paris meeting of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, November 9–11, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 305 ff. and 632 ff.↩