760E.13/9–2950: Despatch
The Minister in Finland (Cabot) to
the Secretary of State
secret
No. 231
Helsinki, September 29,
1950.
Enclosed herewith is a memorandum of conversation which Mr. Ylitalo1 and I held on September 26th with Mr. Taavi
Nikolai
[Page 586]
Vilhula, Minister of
Agriculture, (Agrarian) and Mr. Heikki Albert Kannisto, Minister of
Justice, (Progressive).
The Department will note that on both sides very blunt questions were
asked regarding matters of major moment. Although on both sides the
answers were discreet and vague, I think each side obtained a clearer
conception of the other’s position.
The Department will particularly note the oft repeated story that we have
an agreement with the Russians by which Finland is in the Soviet sphere
of influence. I understand that my predecessor obtained a categorical
denial of this from the Department, but the Legation has been unable to
find the record of this. Should this story be as unfounded as I
understand it is and should the Department be willing to have me
discreetly so brand it, I would appreciate appropriate
instructions.2 There is of course some danger that any
encouragement given to the Finns, for example, by such a denial or by
such statements as I made in my conversation under reference, may
encourage the Finns to adopt too provocative an attitude towards Soviet
Russia. I believe, however, that the present government is if anything
somewhat too inclined to go the other way and that any comments which we
may make to encourage a slightly stiffer position will be beneficial.
The Department is, of course, aware that the two Ministers to whom I
spoke are among the most friendly members of the present Cabinet.
Since returning from my leave3 I
have held a series of talks with Finns prominent in national political
life, one or two at a time, generally at lunch in the Legation. The
conversation reported in this despatch is the most interesting of the
talks I have had.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister in Finland
(Cabot)
secret
Helsinki, September 26,
1950.
| Participants: |
Mr. Taavi Nikolai Vilhula, Minister
of Agriculture |
|
Mr. Heikki Albert Kannisto, Minister
of Justice |
|
John M. Cabot |
|
J. Raymond Ylitalo |
Mr. Ylitalo arranged at my request a meeting with the above gentlemen
at his apartment. He did the translating.
[Page 587]
After very brief preliminaries, Mr. Vilhula asked me what the United
States would do in the event of a Russian attack on Finland. I said
that I could not say, and would certainly not hazard a prediction of
that point. There were, however, certain known facts which bore on
it; for example, our action in Korea, and the friendship and respect
in which Finland is held in the United States.
Mr. Vilhula then asked why we had agreed with Soviet Russia at Yalta
that Finland should be included in the Soviet sphere of influence.
He said that the Finnish Government had had to bear this constantly
in mind and that this explained a number of instances in which it
had seemed to yield to Soviet pressure. I said that I was pretty
certain that we had never had an agreement or understanding of that
nature with the Soviets. I had never heard of such an agreement and
it was contrary to our basic policy. In 1944 we had refused to enter
into an understanding of this type which the British and Soviets had
worked out for the Balkans; and we had based our policy on the
concept of unanimous action by the Big Five while respecting the
sovereign equality of all nations. I said that we of course
appreciated the delicacy of Finland’s position and realized that it
required concessions from time to time to the Russians.
Mr. Vilhula then asked whether we in the United States considered the
Kekkonen Government too conciliatory in its dealings with the
Soviets, and referred again to the position of the United States in
the event of a Russian attack on Finland. He then said that “in the
absence of guarantees”, Finland heretofore had indeed yielded to the
Soviets on various occasions. He congratulated me on American
successes in Korea and said that he, as at least 80% of Finns, felt
that by our action we had saved western culture.
I said that my answer must be divided into several parts. It was not
for me to say whether the Kekkonen Government had been too
conciliatory or not. Its position had been obviously difficult, and
the conciliatory gestures it had made might well have been justified
by considerations of broad policy. We had, however, been
disappointed that the members of the Government had signed the
so-called Stockholm Peace Appeal.
This precipitated voluble personal explanations from both Mr. Vilhula
and Mr. Kannisto, obviously prompted by bad consciences. Mr. Vilhula
explained that he had been buttonholed by a Communist deputy who
already had a number of prominent non-Communist signatures and said
he had not felt in a position to refuse. Mr. Kannisto explained that
he had been called at 11:30 at night with the statement that the
appeal would be published the following morning. Each Minister said
that he would not have signed if he had realized the great
propaganda use the Soviets were later to make of it. Vilhula said
[Page 588]
he did believe that
their signature of it had won them their trade agreement with the
Soviets. I apologetically said that it was of course none of my
business why they had signed the appeal; they had to consider the
matter in the light of Finland’s interests. I had referred to it
only because it did affect Fenno-American relations and had not
helped us in our struggle to maintain the freedom and independence
of other nations.
With regard to what action we would take in the event of a Soviet
attack on Finland, I felt I could perhaps say a bit more. I was
convinced that we would bring such an attack before the UN. He had
doubtless seen the proposals we had just introduced regarding
General Assembly action in the event action in the Security Council
was blocked by a veto. I could not, of course, say what action the
UN might take, regarding an attack on Finland, nor what action we
might take pursuant to any UN action or upon the failure of the UN
to take any action. I could say that it was our general policy to do
what we felt we wisely could to further Finland’s freedom and
independence. During the war we had been the ally of the Soviets
against Hitler, and we had naturally not wished to awaken their
suspicions by particular friendliness to Finland. For a couple of
years after the war we had tried to carry out President Roosevelt’s
great hope of establishing good relations with Soviet Russia. We had
never intended thereby to abandon Finland to the Russians. I did
wish to make it clear, however, that so far as we were concerned no
“guarantees” existed for Finland. I had referred to Korea only
because it was another country which we had not guaranteed. They
appreciated, I was sure, that there were special circumstances in
that case and that there would be special circumstances which we
could not foresee in any case involving Finland. Moreover, Finland
was distant from us and close to Soviet Russia. The attitude of
Finland’s neighbors might be important in determining our
attitude.
I asked whether their question about our attitude in the event of a
Russian attack was prompted by a specific reason to anticipate one,
or merely by the general situation. They said very positively that
only the latter had prompted it.
I then asked what Finland would do if the Soviet Union attacked the
United States and demanded the right to occupy Finland under the
friendship pact. Mr. Vilhula said smilingly that that reminded him
of a story about General Sihvo, who was asked by a Russian General
how fast Finland could mobilize. Sihvo’s reply was “In two days.”
When the Russian expressed surprise, Sihvo explained that every Finn
would join the Forestry Guard. Mr. Kannisto then said that should
such a demand be made the Finns would undoubtedly play for time. He
pointed out that the Friendship Pact contained no clause which would
justify the Russians in making such a demand. I reminded him
[Page 589]
that Finland had had a
pact with the Soviet Union in 1939, too, and asked what the Finns
would do in the event that the Russians should attack them
regardless of their treaty rights and diplomatic maneuvering. The
Ministers looked rather unhappy at this question and in a general
way said that Finnish action would depend upon the precise
circumstances, for example, the wishes of the Finnish people that
was why they had asked their first question.
The conversation lasted two hours and was most friendly at all
times.
