Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

749.00/7–1250

Report Prepared by the Embassy in Czechoslovakia¹

[Extracts] confidential

[Praha, July 12, 1950.]

Political and Economic Developments in Czechoslovakia During May and June 1950

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foreign affairs

Relations with the United States:

Czechoslovak-U.S. relations hovered close to the breaking point during May as a series of retaliatory measures further reducing official US and Czech representation followed the Czech note of April 28² reducing our staff in Czechoslovakia by ⅔. Additional evidence of the Czech government’s desire to destroy the last vestiges of even superficially friendly relations was provided by the particularly vitriolic attacks on the US during the traditional Praha May Day Parade and by the Foreign Office note informing the Embassy that its plans to commemorate the liberation of Western Bohemia by American troops (May 5) were undesirable “in view of the fact that the Czechoslovak Government is organizing celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of the Czechoslovak Republic by the glorious Soviet Army”.³

[Here follows a summary account of exchanges during May between the Embassy and the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry culminating in an 80% reduction of the Embassy’s staff, to the level of the Czechoslovak Embassy staff in Washington, and the closing of the Consulate General in Bratislava and all Czechoslovak consulates in the United States.]

During the first two weeks in June the Embassy continued to be the target of all out attack as the papers and the radio echoed the charges of the prosecutors in the Trial of Thirteen … ,⁴ that the United States bore the greatest guilt of the western nations implicated, specifying 10 former Embassy personnel including Ambassadors Steinhardt⁵ and Jacobs,⁶ and two present members of the Embassy, James K. Penfield, Counsellor; and Carroll C. Parry, Consul; Allen Dulles⁷ and two American newspaper correspondents.

However, with the conclusion of the Trial of Thirteen on June 8, a sudden reversal took place in the attitude toward American and other western representatives in Czechoslovakia. The only follow-up action on the trial was the expulsion of a British Third Secretary and the Belgian Military Attaché, action which was surprisingly mild in itself and was made even more remarkable by the fact that it was not locally publicized, in striking contrast to previous practice. Although the local United Press agency was heavily attacked at the trial, the resident American correspondent⁸ was given almost categorical assurances (another departure from normal procedure) that he would not be expelled and his accreditation, as well as that of all remaining western correspondents, was renewed promptly before it expired at the end of June. An Associated Press correspondent,⁹ whose visa application had been “under consideration” since February when his predecessor had been expelled, was suddenly granted his visa on June 23. Even press attacks against the American and other western missions abruptly ceased in the middle pf June and general anti-American press output was greatly reduced and concentrated on occupation policies in Germany and Japan, the Ku Klux Klan, illiteracy, unemployment and similar old standbys. Towards the end of June intensity was again stepped up and directed particularly to Korea and the alleged Anglo-American inspired invasion of Czechoslovakia by West German potato bugs.¹⁰ These attacks continued however to be directed exclusively against American policy rather than against the Embassy and other American citizens and organizations in Czechoslovakia.

The Embassy has no convincing explanation for this sudden change in tactics but it would seem to indicate primarily that the anti-Western campaign has recently been conducted on the basis of direct and detailed orders from Moscow which dictated the shift for reasons best known to itself. It may also be that the Government was satisfied that it had reduced the Embassy’s activities to an innocuous minimum and was therefore satisfied to let well enough alone for the time being. Another factor which may possibly have had some relevance was the advent of the summer vacation season which traditionally—and this year appears to be no exception—is marked by a decided decrease in activity throughout the government and Party heirarchy.

At this time, it appears quite clear to the Embassy that the decision to maintain relations, despite the blunt invitation for a break and despite the public indignity of a hurried exodus of Embassy personnel “en masse”, was sound and in keeping with our long range objectives in this country. Any loss of prestige we may have suffered has been more than offset by the initiative shown by the United States in Korea; more than ever, the Czech people are looking towards the United States for their liberation, wishfully believing that the Korean War must spread to a general conflict.

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1. The source text, one of a series of monthly reports prepared by the Embassy, was transmitted to the Department of State as an enclosure to despatch 5, July 12, 1950, from Praha, not printed. The Report, which comprised 16 pages in the source text, included a summary, major sections on Czechoslovak foreign and domestic affairs, and a chronology.
2. Ante, p. 551.
3. Regarding the episode under reference here, see footnote 5, p. 562.
4. Thirteen Czechoslovak citizens, accused of planning an armed revolt against the Czechoslovak State and participating in various movements directed by Western diplomats, were tried at Pancrac Prison, Praha, May 31–June 8, 1950. All the accused were convicted, four were executed, and the remainder sentenced to various long terms in prison.
5. Laurence A. Steinhardt, Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, 1945–1948.
6. Joseph E. Jacobs, Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, 1948–1949.
7. Wartime European Director of the Office of Strategic Services.
8. Richard Clark.
9. William N. Oatis.
10. Regarding the American response to allegations by East European regimes that American aircraft were dropping “potato bugs” in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 24, 1950, pp. 134–135.