763.5/1–1350

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State for the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)2

top secret

Subject: Implementation of NSC 38/4.3

1. The following actions have been taken, pursuant to NSC Action No. 260, November 18, 1949, “Future courses of action with respect to Austria”,4 since the submission of the last progress report on December 29, 1949.5 The numerical references are to the paragraphs of the Conclusions as they appear in the basic paper 38/4.

Paragraph 7. Size of Austrian Army.

(a)
A proposed troop basis which may serve as a basis for the programming of equipment has been submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for consideration. This proposal is now pending before the JCS.
(b)
General Keyes has discussed the size and organization of the Austrian army with British and French representatives in Vienna and has submitted to them detailed proposals to implement the program with a view to obtaining a unified tripartite position in making an approach to the Austrian Government. General Keyes will report further upon the receipt by him of British and French comments.

Paragraph 9. Approach to Soviet Government for immediate creation of an Austrian Army.

The French Ambassador again informed the Department of State, on January 10, 1950,6 of the position of his Government that an approach should be made to the Soviets in regard to this matter, either on a governmental level or by the Austrian Treaty Deputies, before an Austrian treaty is signed. It was pointed out to the French Ambassador that it is the understanding of this Government that it was agreed by the Foreign Ministers at their September 15, 1949,7 meeting that an approach would be made to the Soviets after the treaty signature and that any prior approach might lead to a Soviet refusal to sign the treaty. The Ambassador was further informed that this Government prefers that the subject of an Austrian Army not be discussed by the Treaty Deputies as we wish to keep this problem separate and distinct from the treaty negotiations. It was also pointed out that both the British and Austrians have raised certain questions concerning the possible results of an approach to the Soviets, namely either a flat Soviet rejection of any plan to proceed with the formation of an Austrian army or a Soviet acceptance of such a proposal coupled with a Soviet demand that they participate fully in the formation of an Austrian army. The Ambassador was informed that these views are now receiving consideration.

Paragraph 10. Feasible Steps to be Taken to Create an Austrian Army or to Expand the Gendarmerie Training Program without Soviet Approval.

General Keyes was requested to comment on the feasibility of certain proposed steps designed to facilitate the subsequent rapid organization of an Austrian army. An interim reply was received from General Keyes8 and a further reply has been requested.

Paragraph 11.a. Further Efforts to Obtain Agreement by the U.K. and France to Assume their Share of the Mutual Responsibility for the Internal Security of Austria.

(1)
The French Government has informed the American Ambassador in Paris that it is in full agreement with the principle of joint United States, United Kingdom, and French responsibility for the internal security of Austria after the Treaty becomes effective. The French Ambassador informed the Department of State on January 10 that while his Government is prepared in principle to make its contribution to equipping an Austrian Army, payment or replacement must be obtained by France for any equipment turned over to the [Page 475] Austrians. He added that it might be possible for the French occupation forces to leave certain items, particularly light weapons, when they withdraw from Austria, but that any items so left would have to be replaced.
(2)
The American Ambassador in London has been informed by the British Foreign Office that the Government of the United Kingdom is prepared to give formal assurance that it will assume its share of mutual responsibility for the internal security of Austria. The British Government proposed that this assurance take the form of a tri-partite agreement, preferably to be drafted in London by the Western Treaty Deputies.
(3)
This Government has taken the position that it does not envisage a formal agreement on this subject and has informed both the British and French Governments of its preference that discussions in regard to the organization of an Austrian army not be undertaken by the Western Deputies for the Austrian Treaty negotiations.
(4)
It has been proposed that British, French and U.S. representatives meet in Washington with a view to reaching basic understandings as to the particular categories of equipment which the respective Governments may be in a position to furnish. This proposal has been accepted by the French and British Governments, and it is anticipated that conversations on this subject will begin at an early date.
(5)
The American Ambassador in London has been informed by the British Foreign Office that the British Government will provide the air force equipment and ground and supporting materiel necessary for the operation of an Austrian Air Force. The British state that it has not yet been determined whether such equipment and materiel will be furnished on a grant basis or in the form of a loan. The British have assured the American Ambassador that the U.S., and in particular U.S. representatives in Vienna, will be furnished complete and current information concerning U.K. planning for this phase of the Austrian security problem.

Paragraph 11.c. Program Equipment for Austria under MAP.

(1)
The Department of the Army has prepared a tentative equipment list based on the proposed troop basis referred to in Paragraph 7(a) above. This equipment list has been forwarded to General Keyes with a request that any items procurable from Austrian sources be deleted. Availability studies will be undertaken after General Keyes’ comments regarding the equipment list have been received and the JCS have approved the troop basis.
(2)
The JCS have furnished their views on certain aspects of the problem to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (JCS 1868/1539).
(3)
A proposed reprogramming directive covering inter alia the Austrian program has been drafted at the FMACC working level and is currently under consideration.10

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2. The Deputies for the Austrian Treaty negotiations resumed their meetings in London on January 9, with no change in the Soviet position which has blocked further progress until conclusion of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and Austria on the question of payment for supplies and services (Article 48 bis).11

  1. The source text, prepared in the Department of State by Edgar P. Allen of the Office of Western European Affairs, was an attachment to a memorandum from George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to Secretary Acheson, not printed, which asked that the progress report be transmitted to Lay if approved (763.5/1–1350).
  2. Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 1190.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Not printed, but see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, footnote 11, p. 1197.
  5. No record of Ambassador Bonnet’s conversation with Assistant Secretary Perkins concerning Austria on January 10 has been found in Department of State files.
  6. For a memorandum of conversation on this meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 1148.
  7. No copy of this reply has been found in Department of State files.
  8. Not found in Department of State files.
  9. On January 18 an addition to the text of paragraph 11. c. (3) was submitted by William H. Bray, Chief of the program staff of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program for incorporation in the progress report. It reads as follows:

    “Programming of military equipment for Austria is complicated by several factors. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 does not empower the President to take steps to meet the Austrian requirements, although the Executive Branch specifically requested this authority. The equipment required by Austria is directly competitive with the requirements of the North Atlantic Treaty countries. Furthermore the volume of equipment deliveries to these countries in 1950 will be relatively small, and Austrian requirements can be met only by placing on them an over-riding priority.

    The method of dealing with these problems involves advance planning within the framework of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Equipment programmed for the North Atlantic Treaty countries will not be changed. Those items of equipment needed by Austria and which are included in the programs of the North Atlantic Treaty countries will first be shipped to the U.S. forces in Western Germany where the equipment will be in a position for transfer to Austria, provided the Congress specifically authorizes the transfer. Any equipment needed by Austria which has not been programmed for the North Atlantic Treaty countries will have to come from other sources and be financed with other than MDAP funds. If Congress authorizes the transfer and appropriates funds therefor, those funds will be used to replace the equipment in the programs of the North Atlantic Treaty countries. If Congress does not authorize the proposed transfer to Austria, the equipment will be delivered to the countries for which it is programmed. It will be necessary for the State Department, as the agency which will be charged by the President with responsibility for administration of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, to consult with Congressional leaders on those proposals for meeting the Austrian military equipment requirements.” (Memorandum from Bray to Francis T. Williamson, Officer in Charge of Italian-Austrian Affairs, January 18, not printed, 763.5/1–1850)

  10. For documentation on the meetings of the Deputies for Austria, including a telegraphic report on the 247th meeting on January 9, see pp. 430 ff.