Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

663.001/11–2450

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] November 24, 1950.

Subject: The Austrian Treaty and Four-Power Relations

In the event that Four-Power discussions¹ take place, the obvious problem for the Western powers to raise is the settlement of the Austrian Treaty. This question has been negotiated since 1946 and all major problems in the Treaty affecting East-West differences have been settled.

Any Western proposal on Austria should be designed to obtain the maximum clarification of Soviet intentions in Europe, and should, therefore, be timed in terms of the development of Soviet maneuvers in the German question as well as a logical step in the Austrian Treaty negotiations. Western initiative in the Austrian negotiations would provide an effective counter-move to Soviet diplomatic action in Germany. In addition, it would be another attempt to ascertain whether the Soviet Government has any serious intention of concluding the Austrian Treaty. Any clarification which might be obtained would be of fundamental value in determining the exact nature of present East-West relationships.

As far as the Austrian negotiations are concerned a meeting of the Deputies is scheduled in London in mid-December. At the last meeting there was a serious procedural wrangle as well as a Soviet insistence that the Trieste question be made an outstanding issue in the Austrian settlement. The next meeting will be the 258th meeting of the Deputies and it is not likely that the present stalemate can be broken if we follow the standing instructions on which Reber has been operating. On the other hand, in the absence of any move on the part of the Western Powers an opportunity could be given to the Soviets to make some move in Austria to advance their own propaganda aims or any other objective which they may seek in Europe as well as Austria.

Four possible approaches could be utilized to test the Soviet position in Austria, and thereby, obtain clarification on the European situation:

1. To continue to meet at regular intervals without any attempt to break the deadlock. This alternative would preserve the continuity of the Treaty negotiations, but cannot be utilized many more times without destroying the Austrian hope that the Treaty will ultimately be concluded. It would add nothing to our information on Soviet intentions.

2. To inform the Soviets in the December meeting that we would accept their terms on the remaining unagreed articles. This course is not desirable since it would not necessarily lead to the fulfillment of our objective of concluding the Treaty. In all probability the Soviets would insist that their proposed ‘amendment to Article 9 on denazification be discussed, thus forcing the Western Powers to accept concessions above and beyond those called for to conclude the remaining unagreed articles. Unless this move secured the conclusion of the Treaty it would constitute a piecemeal approach to the general European problem.

3. Submission of the Treaty to the UNGA for discussion and possible settlement. This step has been widely discussed but is premature until the issues have been simplified and clarified to such an extent that the Western Powers can call on the GA for a resolution demanding the withdrawal of occupation forces and the affixing of signatures to the final settlement. There are too many complicated problems both of procedure and content involved in the Treaty to permit any discussion in the GA. The GA action might be a resolution condemning all of the occupying forces which would not center the blame on the Soviet Union. For these reasons this course of action is not desirable.

4. Proposal to the Soviets that a Four-Power Declaration consisting of selected agreed articles from the Treaty constitute an Austrian settlement in lieu of a Treaty, as discussed in NSC 38/6. The U.S. security position would not be affected by such a proposal since it would include provision for ratification and for the 90–day period before the withdrawal of troops thus providing sufficient time to carry out tripartite plans for training and equipping the Austrian army. This Declaration has been under consideration in the Department for some time. It is the best course of action open at the present in the Austrian question. It would provide a simplification of the complex issues in the Treaty and put the Soviet Government in a position of either accepting or rejecting an Austrian settlement.

This course of action would be desirable in presenting the Soviets with a simple and clear problem, the answer to which would determine not only our future course of action in Austria but also would clarify existing relationships with the Soviet Union and offset any propaganda or diplomatic advantage which the Soviet policy may have obtained in the German question.

Recommended Action:

It is recommended that the proposal outlined in paragraph 4 above be discussed with the British and French, as well as with the Austrian Government, as a possible topic to be raised in any preliminary talks which may be held with the Soviet representatives for a possible CFM. If these preliminary talks are not held, the proposal outlined above could then be made by the Three Western Powers through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Government.²

Approved_____________

Date______________³

1. For documentation on the Soviet proposal for a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, including the text of the Soviet note of November 3 and the reply of the three Western Powers on December 22, see pp. 902 ff.
2. In a similar memorandum to Secretary Acheson on December 6, not printed, Perkins recommended “that British and French concurrence be sought to include the draft Austrian Treaty in any possible Four-Power negotiations.” (663.001/12–650)
3. There is no indication on the source text of Secretary Acheson’s approval or disapproval of the recommended action.