663.001/9–1650: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State at New York1
Tosec 21. Attention Perkins. Consideration has been given here to, possible moves which might be made on Aust question in light current world situation and negative results of last Deputies mtg. US policy directives approved by NSC (Tosec 130, May 82) do not take into, account current developments. Our objective of concluding Aust Treaty remains unchanged, altno we recognize difficulties which wld; be added to West defense responsibilities if Aust Settlement were reached and occupation troops withdrawn at this time. Any action, taken by West Powers, however, shld not prejudice ultimate conclusions Treaty, weaken Aust support of West, or provide Sovs with possibility of obtaining initiative and proposing settlement on their own terms.
In order that Aust problem may be considered in light of present situation, as proposed in preliminary views on FonMin conf (Deptel 753, Aug 103) we are considering fol tentative plan which might be discussed with Fr and Brit in general terms.
West Powers shld approach Sovs thru diplomatic channels, either jointly or separate diplomatic notes to propose acceptance in lieu of present draft Treaty those provisions outlined in NSC draft Declaration which with one exception consists of agreed arts in draft Treaty. If proposal rejected or no reply forthcoming, three govts wld then consider as subsequent step tripartite submission question to UNGA at some future time presenting to GA record of Treaty negots and offering some such proposal as GA recommendation that Four Powers requested to take all possible steps to restore Aust sovereignty and [Page 468] independence or that draft declaration be accepted as final settlement. Care shld be taken to avoid impression we are asking GA to negot treaties.
Although US not reached final decision re submission GA, we feel such course wld offer general advantage of bringing pressure world opinion to bear on USSR by demonstrating example repeated West efforts settle problems thru direct negots. It wld further demonstrate willingness West Powers, in seeking all reasonable methods settlement, to rely world judgment by accepting UN recommendation as binding and wld indirectly help counter any Sov peace offensive. On other hand, immediate submission to UNGA could result in Sov maneuver proposing immediate withdrawal occupation forces or create situation in which West powers wld lose control of timing. In this connection see last para Pace’s letter to Matthews Tosec 17. Under existing directives US forces can not be withdrawn until adequate Aust security forces are in being and trained and equipped to maintain internal order. Due to priority requirements at this time stockpiling for Aust program may not be completed until Sept 51. Control wld have to be exercised of ratification of declaration to afford sufficient time to advance date for completion Aust program.
A tentative outline of note to be sent to Moscow fol:
Govts concerned at failure to reach agreement on Aust Treaty after more than three years negots. Govts, US, UK, Fr, and USSR have promised to Aust people freedom and independence. West Govts have done all in their power to keep this promise and consider that after five years occupation Aust people have right to expect that foreign troops be withdrawn their territory and their sovereignty restored. It is therefore with great regret that we note lack of success in Treaty negots in spite of fact that all important issues Aust Treaty have been settled and remaining disagreed arts do not affect principles governing out basic task in Aust.
West Govts feel that the fulfillment our promise to Aust is long overdue. Therefore submit for consideration of Govt of USSR that the Four Powers accept minimum provisions for ending occupation Aust; that Four Powers make declaration that their forces are to be withdrawn from Aust in accordance with these provisions and Aust sovereignty completely restored; that upon ratification this declaration by Four Govts and Aust all allied forces in Aust be withdrawn under conditions and within time limits specified Art 33 draft Treaty; that Austs independence within her frontiers as they existed on Jan 1, 1938 be reestablished and that Four Powers agree to respect this independence; that no reparations be exacted from Aust; that each of occupying powers relinquish to Aust all Ger assets and war booty held or claimed by them in Aust; and that they sponsor admission Aust to UN.
West Govts consider this proposal wld satisfy deeply felt and long unfulfilled desire of Austs for freedom and equal place in family of nations. It is hoped that USSR will give it early and favorable consideration. End outline note.
Text of note wld require careful drafting to strengthen West position in event Aust case is eventually referred to UNGA. As negot position we consider first approach shld contain proposal for relinquishing claims to Ger assets. If Sov refusal to accept constituted only block to agreement we cld offer as final position to accept agreed text Art 35. Time limit for withdrawal same as that proposed under Treaty including ratification period cld be utilized for implementation present plans for establishing adequate Aust security force.
AmLegation Vienna pls comment urgently to Sec in NY on foregoing in light Legtel 458, Sept 13 and Deptel 460, Sept 14.4 Details of foregoing plan shld not repeat not be disclosed to Aust officials at this time. AmEmb Moscow, pls comment in light of present Sov policy.5
- Repeated to Paris as 1362, to Moscow as 193, to London as 1433, to Vienna as niact 490, and to Frankfort for Reber as 2105.↩
- Not printed; it transmitted the text of NSC 38/6. (663.0015–850)↩
- Not printed; it transmitted a tentative list of topics for the September Foreign Ministers meeting. Austria was included under point V, with the suggestion that the Ministers might have to review Western strategy in the negotiations for an Austrian treaty. As part of the review the Department of State was considering placing the Austrian question before the United Nations General Assembly or making a further approach to the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels. (396.1–LO/8–1050)↩
- Neither printed; the farmer reported that Gruber had reacted enthusiastically to the suggestion that the Austrian treaty question be brought before the United Nations; the latter reported a conversation with Kleinwaechter in which the Austrian Minister indicated that Gruber wanted the Austrian treaty to be part of any general discussion of East-West problems by the General Assembly. (663.001/9–1350 and 320/9–1450)↩
- Legation Vienna and Embassy Moscow both supported the course of action outlined in this telegram. Vienna stressed that there were signs of Austrians in the Eastern Zone coming to terms with the Russians, although the local officials were still firm. Moscow speculated that a direct approach “would lead Soviet counterdemand … or perhaps proposal limited to withdrawal troops,” while engaging the United Nations in the solution of the Austrian question would tend to minimize the possibility of Soviet aggression in Austria. (Telegrams 483, September 17, from Vienna, and 730, September 19, from Moscow, neither printed, 763.5/9–4750 and 663.001/9–1950)↩