663.001/5–1150: Telegram
The Minister in Austria (Erhardt) to the Acting Secretary of State 1
698. Soviets have made it obvious they do not want treaty, and there seems to us no possibility of obtaining agreement through negotiations on outstanding treaty issues. In other words, we believe we can obtain treaty only through maneuvering Soviets into accepting it.
For this reason, we recommend that at May 22 meeting or shortly thereafter we offer to accept Soviet text of all remaining articles, including 48 bis, provided treaty can be concluded forthwith. It should, of course, be made clear that offer was conditional and would be withdrawn, if not accepted at once. We feel it might be dangerous to accept Soviet articles one at a time, as proposed by Austrians (Legtel 687, May 9, and Audel 263, May 102).
If above offer were rejected by Soviets (as we assume it would), then we would recommend that Western Powers decline to discuss any subject other than Article 48 bis, remind Soviets once again of their previous assurances, and refuse to negotiate further or to schedule next meeting until 48 bis is settled.
This move would, we believe, fix blame firmly on Soviets for treaty failure, whereas continued fruitless negotiations might risk creating false impression of ineffectiveness Western Powers vis-à-vis Soviets. We realize that abandonment of negotiations might lead to charges that treaty had become pawn in East-West struggle, but we are nevertheless of opinion this course leading up to vigorous and continuing campaign designed to press Soviets into acceptance of treaty or at least to terminate occupation, would in end prove best for Austria and Western interests.
As regards Austria, we feel we should not hesitate to say flatly that Soviet attitude had for moment made further treaty negotiations impossible, but we would continue efforts to obtain treaty, and in meantime would utilize every practical means to improve Austria’s domestic situation and enhance her international position. Measures now under consideration by Western Powers would of course acquire even greater importance, and could be utilized fully to demonstrate continued Western support for Austrian independence.
As regards USSR, it seems to us their refusal to conclude Austrian Treaty could be used as exceptionally effective weapon against them [Page 460] if it were followed up as suggested above and in answer to Soviet peace campaign,3 Austria could be pointed to as best opportunity for Soviets to demonstrate their claims. Rather than permit Soviets to utilize Trieste as pretext to delay Austrian Treaty, we could let it be known that Austrian settlement was prerequisite for discussion of matters of interest to USSR. This course would not, we feel, necessarily lead to increase in Soviet pressure on Austria, but would on other hand, firm up and augment Austrian resistance, while at same time focusing world attention on Austrian Treaty as test case of Soviet intentions.
Sent Department 698, repeated London 91, Moscow 23, Paris 78; Department pass Moscow.
- Secretary Acheson was in London attending a meeting of the three Western Foreign Ministers; for documentation on their discussions, see vol. iii, pp. 828 ff.↩
- Neither printed; in the former Erhardt reported on a meeting of the three Western Ministers with Gruber, Figl, and Adolf Schaerf, Austrian Vice Chancellor, in which the Austrian leaders asked that Articles 16, 27, 42, and 48 be settled by the Deputies, thus leaving Article 48 bis as the only unsettled issue; in the latter the Department of State reported a similar approach by Kleinwaechter. (663.001/5–950 and 1050)↩
- For documentation on the Soviet peace campaign, see pp. 261 ff.↩