663.001/4–2450
The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Franks)
My Dear Mr. Ambassador: I have received Mr. Bevin’s memorandum which was left with Mr. Thompson on April 6, 1950. I fully share Mr. Bevin’s concern about the Austrian situation and his conviction of the desirability of obtaining a Soviet withdrawal from Austria in the interest both of European pacification and of the maintenance of Austria’s will and capacity to survive as an independent state. In order to break the current deadlock in the Treaty negotiations, I have requested the United States Deputy to discuss our negotiating tactics with his British and French colleagues in the light of Mr. Bevin’s suggestions for the settlement of the remaining unagreed articles. I hope that a tripartite position can be adopted which will permit conclusion of the Treaty on the lines which I discussed with Mr. Bevin and Mr. Schuman last September.
The United States Deputy will suggest that an effort be made to resolve the disagreement on the economic articles by a proposal involving Article 42 on United Nations’ property, Article 48 on Austria’s pre-war indebtedness, and Article 48 bis on claims against Austria. In the event Mr. Bevin can accept the Soviet addition to Article 48, I should be prepared to accept the Soviet drafts for the various paragraphs of Article 42, since clarification has been received from the Austrian Government on their intent. Such an offer could be made to the Soviet Deputy as a quid pro quo for the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations involving Article 48 bis. I believe that an effort of this type could break the current deadlock if the Soviet Government desired to conclude the Treaty. At least it would destroy the [Page 454] Communist propaganda position that the Soviet Union is protecting Austria against unlimited claims by the Western Powers.
I do not believe that we should concede to the Soviets any single unagreed article without concession on their part, or that we should press Article 16 on Displaced Persons or Article 27 on Foreign Technicians at this time. Our effort should be to test the Soviet intention to conclude the Treaty by concentrating on the immediate problem of the economic articles which block the negotiations. While I should be prepared to accept paragraph 5 of Article 16 to obtain conclusion of the Treaty, I consider that we should first concert our efforts to secure the removal from Austria of persons affected by its provisions. Furthermore, I believe that we should make full negotiating use of the repeated Soviet assurances that Article 27 will present no difficulties if the other articles are agreed.1
A more detailed reply to Mr. Bevin’s suggestions can be made after the meeting of the Deputies on April 26. I hope that we can discuss this question in the light of the results of the Deputies meeting and agree on a plan which will obtain early conclusion of the Austrian Treaty.
Sincerely yours,
- Detailed instructions along these lines had been sent to Reber on April 19, and Dr. Ludwig Kleinwaechter, Austrian Minister in the United States, had been informed on April 21 that this was the position which the United States Deputy would take at the 252d meeting on April 26. (Telegram 1765 (Audel 248), April 19, to London, and memorandum of conversation between Kleinwaechter and Francis T. Williamson, Chief of the Division of Austrian Affairs, April 21, 663.001/4–1950 and 2150)↩