Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

663.001/1–550: Telegram

The United States Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers (Reber) to the Secretary of State

secret

Paris, January 5, 1950—7 p. m.

68. From Reber. I had long series conversations at Quai D’Orsay this afternoon with Couve de Murville, Seydoux, Rochefort, Schuman’s Chef de Cabinet, and Berthelot.²

There appear to be two reasons for Schuman’s concern in regard to paragraph 5, Article 16,³ first is humanitarian, since he fears Soviet pressure will oblige Austria to return thousands of persons to Soviet control. It was said, however, that his concern might be abated if practical plan for pre-treaty evacuation at least of those who are in greatest danger could be worked out between the three of us. I repeated assurances in Deptel 4656,⁴ that US was prepared to make its full contribution to solution of this problem. This, together with our interpretation that paragraph 5 would not apply to persons entering Austria after entry into force of treaty, was regarded as most helpful. Matter will again be discussed with Schuman before his departure tonight. French anxious to receive plan promised by Department and prepared to cooperate provided France is not called upon to receive excessive numbers. Rochefort stated, at present, nearly 1000 refugees month arriving here.

Schuman is also disturbed by implication that our acceptance of paragraph 5 might contravene undertakings assumed in IRO charter and Assembly resolutions establishing international responsibility for care of displaced persons and refugees. In order to counteract this impression, we discussed possibility of endeavoring to obtain from Soviets declaration that paragraph 5 would be applied in conformity with principles of previous international agreements and IRO charter. Soviets have always insisted that their language was in accordance with these principles. If this fails, tripartite declaration might be made showing it is intention of Western Powers to insist that paragraph 5 be applied in conformity with these principles. France will prepare draft.

If measures along these lines can be taken, French assure me they are prepared to proceed with negotiations for purpose of speedy conclusion of treaty. In answer to specific question, Couve assured me that whereas France had some hesitations regarding treaty as whole, they were committed and ready to go ahead, together with British and ourselves. Couve said, however, as is well-known to all of us, decision whether there is to be treaty or not, was no longer in our hands. He had serious doubts that we would find Soviets any more prepared in London to reach final agreement than they were in New York. He considers that their attitude on Article 48 bis⁵ is only pretext for delaying negotiations and believes it is important to try to clarify their position before discussing Articles 16 or 27,⁶ with which I agreed.

We then discussed what might be done if Soviets either inform us in London that negotiations in Vienna are still underway or use some other obvious pretext for delay.⁷

Although, in those circumstances, he was inclined to favor immediate adjournment of Deputies, leaving it up to Zarubin⁸ to set time of next meeting, he finally agreed that something of more definitive and spectacular nature might be required in order to demonstrate clearly that reasons for suspension were political rather than technical and that it is attitude of Soviet Union only which blocks progress.

We then discussed possibility of tripartite approach to Moscow, nature of which would be determined by Zarubin’s attitude on Monday, but which should take place without delay, probably at close of first week. If we continue to meet indefinitely without making progress, we might be drawn into discussion of Article 16, undesirable at this time and affording Soviets pretext that our position on this article is responsible for adjournment.

In general, French seem prepared to agree to such a course of action, although Couve thought that this approach might be used by Soviets as excuse for further delay if Deputies were obliged to remain in session until answer given. Matter will be given further consideration and Berthelot furnished instructions when he arrives London for tripartite meeting Monday morning, which is now scheduled to precede resumption of Deputies meeting in afternoon.

I plan to proceed London either Friday or Saturday, depending whether French wish further talks here.⁹

Sent Department 68, repeated London 22, Vienna 1, Department pass Moscow 4.

[

Reber

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2. Maurice Couve de Murville, Director General of Political Affairs; François Seydoux, Head of the European Affairs Section; and Marcel Berthelot, Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

3. The text of paragraph 5 of Article 16 (Displaced Persons and Refugees) proposed by the Soviet Union reads as follows:

   “No relief shall be given by Austria to persons who refuse to return to their native countries, if these persons fought on the side of the enemies of the Allied and Associated Powers, or voluntarily collaborated with the enemies of these Powers, or are engaged in hostile activities against their countries of origin, as well as against any of the United Nations, or are members of organizations and groups which encourage Displaced Persons not to return to their countries of origin.” (Unagreed Articles, Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, p. 1131.)

4. Not printed.
5. Article 48 bis dealt with claims by the Occupation Authorities against Austria. These claims had been waived by the three Western Powers.
6. Article 27, Prevention of German Rearmament.
7. In telegram 111 (Delau 382), January 7, from London, not printed, Reber reported that Austrian representatives in Paris and London had informed him “that there had been no progress whatsoever as regards Vienna negotiations”. (663.001/1–750) For further documentation on the Vienna negotiations, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 1146 ff.
8. Georgyi Nikolayevich Zarubin, Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom and Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers.
9. On his return to London, Reber discussed the Austrian Treaty with William I. Mallet, the British Deputy for Austria, who agreed that the Western Deputies should concentrate on Article 48 bis in order to test Soviet intentions. Telegram 112 (Delau 383), January 7, from London, not printed (663.001/1–750).