863.062/10–150: Telegram
The Chargé in Austria (Dowling) to the Secretary of State
583. Legtel 571, September 28.1 Strikes and demonstrations past week in Vienna and Eastern Austria, which represent first tangible success of Communists since food riots of 1947, were marked by two salient factors: Overtness of Soviet instigation and assistance (see USFA report of AC meeting September 292), and lack of effectiveness of Austrian police. (Strike movement in Western Zones influenced by special circumstances reported separately.)
It is true Communist action was favored by public uneasiness re lowering of living standard as result new price-wage agreement, apprehensions re which were increased by secrecy of negotiations and sudden announcement of terms on September 26. It is also true that government and Trade Unions had neglected prepare public opinion for new agreement, and, in fact had given no serious consideration to situation which would prevail when agreement announced, although it could have been anticipated that Communists would as usual stage demonstrations. Finally, it seems evident that Interior Ministry, although warned some 24 hours in advance, badly underestimated potentialities of disturbance.
None of these factors, however, nor combination of them satisfactorily explains why police made such poor showing. Some observers are inclined to see connection with general discouragement and “softening” of morale in Eastern Austria (Legtel 483 September 173). Others stress inadequacy of police arms and morale implications thereof, yet others blame indecisiveness of police orders and shortcomings of senior police officials in disposition of police forces and in technical preparations for handling demonstrators.
Regardless of reason for police performance, it is evident government leaders were alarmed by this showing, have learned a lesson, and are determined to prevent a recurrence (Legtel 582, October 14). Trade Union leaders, also depressed and disturbed on the morning after, are likewise reacting vigorously if belatedly to ensure that Socialist workers resist Communist attempts resume trouble-making, and now appear confident they can hold line.
As to Communist action, it should be emphasized that they could not have achieved measure of success attained without Soviet assistance. Nature of action, however, lends weight to recent Intelligence [Page 407] report that Central Committee of Party had decided concentrate on economic issues, where government is, of course, most vulnerable. This would enable them capitalize on winter unemployment, expected to reach new peak of 200,000 this year. Although Socialist leaders are already concerned at economic prospects next several months, it does not appear this Communist strategy, even if confirmed, would pose threat beyond capabilities of Trade Unionists to control, unless Soviets have in effect taken over management of program themselves and are to continue overt instigation and support so apparent in past week. It may be that Soviet have calculated they can thus intervene in popular economic issues, despite obvious violations of control agreement, with reasonable impunity. If it develops they have decided upon some such course, they can, if not checked, create grave difficulties imposing severe strain on government leadership and resources.