Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

663.001/2–2350

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State

top secret

[Washington,] February 23, 1950.

Subject: The appointment of Civilian High Commissioners in Austria.

In response to your request, the arguments for the appointment of civilian High Commissioners may be summarized as follows:

1. The appointment of civilian High Commissioners would mark a progressive step in the solution of the Austrian problem.

Military occupation has existed since 1945 in Austria. Article 9 of the Control Machinery Agreement provides that the High Commissioner may be either military or civilian. The article further provides that “A High Commissioner may be assisted in the Allied Council by a political adviser and/or a military adviser who may be respectively the diplomatic or political representative of his Government in Vienna or Commander-in-Chief of the forces in Austria of his Government”. Appointment of civilians would indicate that the Western Powers are attempting to fulfill those parts of the Control Machinery Agreement which look towards the ultimate termination of military occupation even if agreement can not be reached on the Treaty.

2. The appointment of civilian High Commissioners would have a profound psychological effect in Austria.

This action on our part would be a demonstration of confidence in the Austrian Government and would be hailed by the dominant political parties as a progressive step, counteracting somewhat the delay in the conclusion of the Treaty. It would be a fulfillment of Article 3 of the Control Agreement which provides that one of the primary tasks of the Allied Council shall be “to assist the freely elected Government of Austria to assume as quickly as possible full control of the affairs of state in Austria”.

3. The appointment of a civilian High Commissioner is expected in Austria and would be supported by the political parties.

The Austrian press has discussed the possibility of civilians supplanting the present military Commanders in the Allied Council and uniformly expects that such action will be taken if quick agreement is not reached on the Treaty. Such action would be welcomed by both parties in the Government coalition. The key factor in the maintenance of social stability in Austria is the Socialist Party due to the extent of party control over the trade unions. The unions have maintained excellent discipline under the occupation and strike disorder and any popular move to the left have been avoided. The Socialist Party and trade union leadership is violently opposed to military control and, in the light of the political maturity of the Austrian people, resents the political “guidance” which is given by the Western military Commanders. The People’s Party leadership, on the other hand, accepts the military control as an established fact but recognizes that acceptance of it opens the Government to criticism not only in the Party, but also from the Socialists. Both parties would support the change in form of Four-Power control by the appointment of civilian High Commissioners, provided the Western troops were maintained in Austria until the conclusion of the Treaty and the withdrawal of the Soviet forces.

4. The appointment of a civilian High Commissioner would emphasize that the objectives of Four-Power military occupation have been achieved.

The original purposes of military occupation were the separation of Austria from Germany, the establishment of a central Government and early elections, denazification, disarmament and demilitarization. These objectives were attained in the early days of occupation. The Austrian Government is recognized by the Four Powers and participates in many international bodies. The continued existence of full fledged military occupation is an anomaly which has no basis in the Austrian scene except from the point of view of security. U.S. or Austrian security interests would not be affected since the appointment of a civilian High Commissioner would not entail the reduction of U.S. military forces in Austria. The military forces should be devoted to security duties rather than to the supervision of Austrian governmental activities.

5. The appointment of a civilian High Commissioner would establish a unified U.S. representation in Vienna.

As matters stand now, the High Commissioner receives instructions from the JCS, while the U.S. Minister, who is also Political Adviser to the High Commissioner, is instructed by the Department of State. Considerable difficulties have been encountered in the coordination of activities, particularly in the important and sometimes delicate function of representing the U.S. position with the Austrian Government. The Austrian question is basically a political problem and should be treated as such. We have no occupation objectives as such in Austria except the maintenance of Four Power organization until the conclusion of the Treaty. Therefore, in the interest of unified action in Austria it would be desirable to have unified representation which can deal on a diplomatic level with the Austrian Government and with the other powers in the Allied Council.

The arguments raised against the appointment of civilian High Commissioners and the replies thereto may be summarized as follows:

1. The appointment of civilian High Commissioners would endanger the existing Four Power machinery.

A change in status of the High Commissioners would not alter the structure of the Allied Council. The High Commissioners are of equal rank and their authority derives from the Control Agreement. This authority is the same regardless of the military or civilian status of the High Commissioners. The Four-Power machinery would remain intact and continue to function as it does at the present time.

2. The appointment of a civilian High Commissioner would weaken the authority or power of the U.S. in Austria.

The argument has been raised that a U.S. civilian High Commissioner would be at a disadvantage in dealing with the Soviets since the Soviet High Commissioner can take action in his zone as Commander of the Soviet forces. A U.S. civilian High Commissioner would not be at a disadvantage since there would also be a Commander of U.S. forces in Austria who could take any required action in the U.S. zone. There would be no decrease in U.S. authority or effectiveness, particularly if the Commander of U.S. forces was Deputy High Commissioner and subject to the authority of the high Commissioner.

A balance of the foregoing arguments indicates that the appointment of civilian High Commissioners would be a significant development in the Austrian question and would be an advantage to the Western Powers by strengthening the Western position in Austria.