Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 63 Series

Report to the President by the National Security Council¹

top secret
NSC 63/1²

[Washington, February 16, 1950.]

Proposed U.S. Policy in the Event of a Blockade of Vienna for Issuance to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces in Austria³

a. All United States personnel under the command of the Commanding General of the United States Forces in Austria should act with utmost correctness in order to give no pretext to the USSR for imposing a blockade;

b. The United States authorities should make full and frequent use of all existing United States rights in the Soviet Zone of Austria in order to detect the earliest possible evidence of imposition of Soviet restrictions, and in order to preclude any possibility of forfeiture of these rights through disuse. Where such rights are not already being regularly used, they should be resumed by steps in order not to excite special comment or attention;

c. United States authorities in Austria should protest vigorously against any Soviet notification or administrative orders limiting, interrupting, or discontinuing United States traffic or other rights;

d. Traffic between Vienna and the zones of the western powers in Austria should not be limited, interrupted, or halted on a mere administrative order or notification by the Soviets that movements will not be permitted;

e. Vehicles should continue to attempt to transit the corridor and each airport access road. If definitely confronted by a military road block, elements of the Soviet Army, or other evidence of Soviet determination to use force as necessary, they will stop;

f. The United States authorities in Austria should make no threat of force such as mounting an armed convoy on the highway;

g. Prior to acting along the above lines, the situation should be discussed fully with the British and the French military authorities in Austria and implementing action should as far as practicable be coordinated with them; and

h. We have no information here which would indicate that the imposition of a Soviet blockade of Vienna is imminent. However, a blockade could be utilized by the Soviets in the furtherance of their policy as a means of increasing pressure on the Austrian Government or forcing the Western Powers out of Vienna. Caution must be taken in preserving the security of these instructions and no steps should be taken which would lead the Soviet authorities or the Austrian population to believe that we are taking precautionary measures in anticipation of their action, thereby providing a pretext for aggressive or probing measures on their part. This is an interim directive and in any discussions with your British and French colleagues it should be treated as an operational matter. You are requested to report immediately any action which might be interpreted as a progressive restriction on our access to Vienna.⁴

1. Attached to the source text were a cover sheet and a memorandum of transmission by James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, neither printed. In the memorandum of transmission Lay indicated that the Council and the Secretary of the Treasury had concurred in the recommendations of the report and were submitting it to President Truman for approval.
2. NSC 63, “A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of Defense on Policy in the Event of a Blockade of Vienna,” had been submitted for consideration by the Council on February 8. (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 63 Series) Lot 63 D 351 is a serial master file of the National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda for the years 1947–1961, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.
3. The introduction to NSC 63 indicated that it was a Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated January 30, requesting early approval by President Truman.
4. Paragraph h was not included in NSC 63, but was proposed by Secretary Acheson at the 53d meeting of the National Security Council on February 16 and incorporated into NSC 63/1. The report was then transmitted to President Truman, who approved it on February 17. (S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 63 Series)