S/PNSC Files: Lot 61 D 167: NSC 66 Series1

Note by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)2

secret
NSC 66

Support for the Voice of America in the Fields of Intelligence and of Research and Development

At the request of the Secretary of State the enclosed report on the above subject, prepared by the Department of State, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission.

The Secretary of State, in transmitting the enclosure, stated that the most urgent need is to provide means whereby a sufficiently high priority is established for securing research and intelligence necessary [Page 286] to overcome Soviet jamming of the Voice of America. He suggested that a special staff group might be constituted for this purpose with representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Federal Communications Commission, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies of the Government which have technical competence in this field.3

In accordance with the suggestion in the above paragraph, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence are being requested in advance to designate representatives to prepare a report for consideration by the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, in the event that the recommendations in the enclosure are approved.4

James S. Lay, Jr.
[Enclosure]

Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State5

secret

Support for the Voice of America in the Fields of Intelligence and of research and development

the problem

1. To determine the means at our disposal to penetrate Soviet jamming of the Voice of America, and to establish the appropriate priorities to provide support for the Voice of America in the fields of intelligence and of research and development.

discussion

2. The Effect of Soviet Jamming of the Voice of America.

a.
Considerable evidence is available that prior to the Soviet jamming, the Voice of America had become an effective means of supplying information of the free world to the peoples of the Soviet Union and its Satellites.
b.
Present trends in our relations with the Satellite governments (i.e., the suspension of relations with Bulgaria, the closing of our information offices in Rumania, etc.), indicate that the Voice of America may shortly be the only overt means now in use by which we can attempt to reach the peoples of those countries; and while jamming has been limited to date to VOA and BBC Russian-language broadcasts, interference with programs to the Satellite areas is possible and probable.
c.
The history of Soviet jamming activity, since it became an all-out operation in April, 1949, is one of thorough and systematic organization and application of steadily increasing resources, indicating a major effort on the part of the USSR. It has been successful to the point where, notwithstanding the greatly increased effort of the Voice of America, a much reduced percentage of the former audience is being reached. If carried to a conclusion, the Soviet jamming effort could virtually disrupt all forms of international radio communications.
d.
Recent information indicates that Soviet development of a new technique of jamming which, now in limited use, holds the potential of even more effectively blocking the information addressed to the people of the USSR and nearby countries through the VOA. This new technique, if backed by transmitters of sufficient power (now being built, according to our intelligence sources), could deny the reception by almost all European home receivers of any program other than that originating in the USSR.
e.
The USSR and its Satellites, in addition to their jamming efforts, are taking advantage of post-war frequency negotiations to silence VOA relay broadcasting facilities located outside the United States and its territories. The priority of the mission of the VOA and its resultant requirement for frequency allocation has not clearly been established to the satisfaction of all agencies of this Government.

3. The Effort to Counteract Soviet Jamming.

a.
The Department of State is presently undertaking a comprehensive facility program which seeks to enable VOA to break through Soviet jamming. However, no comparable research effort has yet been established pointed at the problem of achieving an understandable signal under all conditions in existing receiving sets of foreign populations which, not being under our control, cannot be modified or replaced. Although the Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense has been cooperating with this Department, its planned research in this field is pointed almost wholly toward counter-jamming (retaliatory jamming of electronic devices and communications of any potential enemy), and anti-jamming (protection of our electronic devices and military communications from jamming).
b.
While no attempt at retaliatory jamming of Soviet broadcasts or the control signals of their jamming network has been made by the VOA, serious consideration has been given to this as a possible Pleasure to force the USSR to desist.
c.
The Department has not received sufficient intelligence on Soviet jamming to guide its efforts in attempting to penetrate Soviet jamming. The present surveillance of the radio spectrum by U.S. intelligence and monitoring agencies is insufficient to provide necessary data or to assure that the USSR is not even now developing and testing more effective jamming techniques.

4. Requirements of the VOA in the Fields of Communications Research and Development.

a.
The basic means to meet the research requirements of the VOA exists at present in the Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense. However, the lack of a clearly recognized priority for the VOA requirements will hamper the effective utilization of research and development facilities as presently organized.
b.
At present there exists no authoritative interdepartmental mechanism through which a definitive priority for the required research effort can be established.

5. The Requirements of the VOA in the Intelligence Field.

a.
An adequate intelligence effort in support of the VOA would require a coordinated program, among all intelligence agencies, to collect and associate relevant data from both monitoring and non-monitoring sources. This would involve an allocation of resources among the available monitoring facilities and daily close coordination in the use of these facilities. It would be necessary to arrange direct channels for passage of intelligence to the VOA.
b.
The facilities to meet those requirements do exist at present among the intelligence agencies and monitoring facilities of the Government. The monitoring facilities would include the Federal Communications Commission, Foreign Broadcasting Information Bureau,…
c.
The intelligence effort in support of the VOA has been inadequate largely because of the lack of a priority relative to other intelligence tasks and the absence of a clearly established program to coordinate intelligence activities in this connection.

6. Inter-relationships between VOA and other Communications Counter-Measure Problems.

a.
The inter-relationship of the VOA problem to the total communications problem of the Government is well illustrated by the possibility that the present VOA efforts may be serving as a maneuvering ground for the Soviets in (a) development of their own communications and jamming techniques including the training of large numbers [Page 289] of personnel, and (b) Soviet investigation of our capabilities to take counter-measures. A continuation of the VOA penetration projects may prematurely commit this Government to a counter-jamming war in all governmental and commercial fields of communications.
b.
Because of these factors and the requirements of other communications and intelligence programs, as well as related questions of security and communications policy, the Department of State has encountered reluctance among other agencies and activities to establish a high priority in support of the VOA requirements.

conclusions

7. Soviet jamming of the VOA has become a serious obstacle to our reaching the people of the USSR with information of the free world. Extension of jamming to programs directed at the peoples of the satellite countries is a strong probability and is in line with other measures being taken to reduce the passage of information behind the Iron Curtain.

8. The ever increasing jamming efforts by the USSR and our counter-measure actions could lead not only to the disruption of the free flow of information to all parts of the world, but also to the disruption of all forms of radio communication.

9. Greater support in the fields of intelligence, communication research and development, and frequency assignment must be given this problem if the VOA is effectively to penetrate present and probably future Soviet jamming.

10. Failure to obtain necessary support to the VOA has been due primarily to the lack of an adequate recognized priority for the project throughout the Government.

11. The establishment of a priority in support of the VOA can only be undertaken in the light of the close interrelation of this problem with other problems in the field of intelligence and of communications.

recommendations

12. That the National Security Council establish a special staff group to consider and to recommend to the National Security Council the priorities in the fields of intelligence and of research and development necessary to enable the United States to penetrate Soviet jamming of the Voice of America.

a.
The special staff group shall consider, among other problems related to penetration of jamming, (1) the development of means to penetrate jamming; (2) measures which might induce or compel the USSR to discontinue its jamming of the Voice of America; and (3) the effectiveness and probable consequences of the use of these means and measures.
b.
This special staff group shall consist of a chairman designated by the Secretary of State and members designated by the Secretary of Defense, Federal Communications Commission, the Director of Central Intelligence, and such other departments and agencies of the Government as the Chairman may find to have direct technical competence in this problem.

13. That, upon receipt and review of the recommendations of this special staff group, the National Security Council establish the priorities adjustments required to provide support for the Voice of America in the fields of intelligence and of research and development.

  1. Lot 61 D 167 is a serial file of memoranda relating to National Security Council questions for the years 1950–1961, as maintained by the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State.
  2. This note and the enclosed report were circulated to the National Security Council and to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence, under a cover page entitled “A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on Support for the Voice of America in the Fields of Intelligence and of Research and Development, April 4, 1950”.
  3. This paragraph is a paraphrase of a memorandum of April 3 from the Secretary of State to Executive Secretary Lay, not printed (S/PNSC Files, Lot 61 D 167, NSC 66 Series).
  4. The enclosed report was not considered at a National Security Council meeting. In a memorandum of April 4 for the Council, not printed, Executive Secretary Lay requested that each Council member indicate his action with respect to the report by completing and returning a prepared memorandum form. The Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission were requested separately to indicate their action with respect to the matter. Lay’s memorandum also requested the designation of the representatives mentioned here (S/PNSC Files, Lot 61 D 167, NSC 66 Series).
  5. For an earlier version of portions of this paper, see document UM D–87, March 22, p. 279.