Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

460.509/12–2950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France ¹

secret   priority

Washington, December 29, 1950—5 p. m.

3478. Excon. Re Embtel 3549 Dec 21, rptd Bern 57, Stockholm 43, London 866;² Deptel 3384 Dec 21;³ Stockholm tel 736 Dec 24, rptd Paris 138, London 149, Bern and Rome unnumbered;⁴ Bern tel 917 Dec 22 and 918 Dec 24, rptd Paris 124.⁵ (Note: Leg Bern pls rpt your 917 to Paris.)

(1) Dept concurs in immed approach to Swedes and Swiss independent of any further action by Fr alone on behalf CG. Agree that past Fr efforts have been fruitless and that impending Swed TA Negots with USSR and Czecho justify immed action as supplement to multilateral approach.

(2) In view this urgency, Emb Stockholm and Leg Bern are requested take action informally as outlined below, subject to concurrence USDel CoCom, which shld first inform UK and Fr Dels CoCom re action US proposes to take and express hope their govts will make parallel approach in Stockholm and Bern in whatever manner seems most appropriate—i.e., approach jointly with US missions, independent démarche, or US Rep acting for all three by agreement. If tripartite or at least bipartite approach not possible by Jan 6 at latest, Emb Stockholm and Leg Bern shld proceed independently make approach that day. This deadline considered necessary in view imminence TA negots and desirability transmit Tri proposals to Swiss same time as Sweds.

(3) Approach to Swedes: Emb Stockholm shld discuss with FonOff, making approach along fol lines and at level you consider most appropriate.

(a) Transmit to Swedes tripartite lists and explain developments leading to their adoption (see UK statement to PCs at Nov 29 CG mtg, CoCom Doc 213⁶). Paris shld confirm to Stockholm and Bern before Jan 6 extent to which tri proposals have been accepted by all PCs.

(b) State that we consider the matter of expanding coverage of Swedish export controls as very urgent problem, especially in view forthcoming Swedish negots with USSR and Czecho. We trust that FonOff will study carefully what PCs are doing, as represented by internatl plus tri lists, in order that we can ascertain at early date what specific steps Sweden is prepared to take toward parallel action with other Western countries in this field. We hope FonOff may be in position to discuss this whole question in more detail before end of Jan.

(c) We know that other PCs are also interested in Swedish intentions, and understand that UK and Fr associate themselves with US approach at this time. (Paris, pls confirm to Stockholm and Bern what may be said on latter point.)

(d) So far as US is concerned, we urge that Swedish Govt reexamine entire problem urgently in light of forthcoming negots with Sovbloc countries, inasmuch as US Govt will have to judge Swedish intentions concerning future export controls by action taken in those negots.

(e) Express interest in bearings as special case previously discussed and state that US as well as other PCs wld like to know as soon as possible whether Sweden will accept tripartite control proposal. If Italian clearance given, explain Ital bearings situation as per Rome’s tel 2707 Dec 22, rptd Stockholm 8, Paris 364.⁷ Arrange for separate follow-up discussion this particular matter at earliest convenience.

(4) Approach to Swiss: (re Bern tels 917 and 918 Dec 22)

(a) Leg shld assure FonOff that no embargo or other drastic action will be taken without warning, but US believes some definite action may be required soon.

(b) You shld transmit copies of Tri proposals( assume Swiss have most recent Internatl List) and explain background as per para 3(a) above. Express desire for mtg by end of Jan to ascertain what steps Swiss will take to adopt controls parallel to those of other Western countries.

(c) You shld state that we regard East-West security export controls as matter of great urgency. While US can comply with request for some additional time nevertheless necessary know soonest how long FonOff expects will take to lay groundwork for invoking Swiss Parliamentary Act of 1939. You shld observe that US interest is to prevent building up of Sov war potential which threatens Switz, rest of WE as well as US.

(5) After Jan 6 démarche and before next mtgs with Sweds and Swiss, Dept desires have views of Embs Paris, Stockholm and Leg Bern re (a) what Swed and Swiss assurances or actions for expansion export controls shld be accepted as giving adequate protection to Western security interest, and (b) what steps US and other CoCom countries might take if assurances or action inadequate. Depts preliminary views expressed in Depgram A–695 Nov 24 which, however, concerned mainly with multilateral approach.

(6) If still seems desirable following Jan 6 approach, Dept has no objection to mtg in Paris or London between US Excon officers concerned this problem but questions need for broader mtg with UK and Fr Excon officers, as suggested Paris tel 3549. Suggest USDel CoCom discuss latter with UK and Fr. In any case, continued close liaison between USDel and UK and Fr Dels CoCom on this problem is essential and offers most efficient means of coordinating US–UK–Fr action, which shld be taken through respective Embs Stockholm and Leg Bern. USDel CoCom shld therefore take initiative, either with UK and Fr Dels or through mtg suggested Paris tel 3549, to obtain Brit and Fr views soon as possible re position to be taken with Sweds and Swiss in proposed mtgs following Jan 6 démarche and their views on questions (a) and (b) para 5 above. Upon receipt views of Paris, Stockholm and Bern, and report on UK and Fr views, Dept will formulate US position on further follow-up action in light of recent NSC decisions, Cannon amendment, etc. Believe no attempt shld be made to develop shortened list for presentation to Swiss or Sweds. Such attempt wld be extremely time-consuming and raise entire question priority individual items. Full lists needed for transit controls. If Sweds or Swiss on own accord suggest shortened list we can consider their proposals when recd.

Acheson

1. This telegram was also sent for action to Stockholm as 483 and to Bern as 833 and was repeated for information to London as 3194.
2. Not printed. It reviewed efforts during December by the French on behalf of the Coordinating Committee to obtain Swedish and Swiss cooperation on export controls, characterized the progress made as inconsequential, and recommended a meeting in London of American, British, and possibly French Representatives to prepare a new joint démarcheto the Swedish and Swiss Governments (460.509/12–2150).
3. Not printed. It observed that the forthcoming Swedish trade agreement negotiations with Czechoslovakia on January 8, 1951, and with the Soviet Union on January 15, 1951, provided added reason for the utmost urgency in an approach to Sweden on the entire question of cooperation in international security export controls (460.509/12–1650).
4. Not printed.
5. Neither printed. They reported that Swiss officials had informed Minister Vincent that Switzerland might act to curtail exports to Eastern Europe under the terms of a parliamentary act of 1939, but that it was imperative that the United States take no action which would look like open pressure and thereby make more difficult the invocation of the 1939 act (400.549/12–2250 and 490.549/12–2450).
6. Not printed. It contained the text of the statement by the British Delegate to the Consultative Group meeting of November 30 (see telegram 3069, November 30, from Paris, p. 246) reviewing the results of the London Tripartite Conversations on Security Export Controls, October 17–November 20.
7. Not printed.