Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Central and Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume IV

S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351: NSC 69 Series

The Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

top secret

Washington, 1 November 1950.

Subject: East-West Trade

Reference: NSC Action #347–b.²

The attached statement on East-West Trade was presented by me to the Defense Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty on Tuesday, October 31.³

This statement was prepared and presented to the Defense Committee in conformity with NSC Action #347–b, in which the Council agreed that efforts should also be made through the NATO Defense and Military Committees to reach agreement on a military viewpoint regarding export controls, as a means of influencing Western European nations to adopt policies similar to U.S. policies.

Presentation of this statement elicited only two comments. The Defense Minister⁴ of the United Kingdom indicated that his Government was seeking to adopt measures to assure that no vital materiel would get into the hands of an aggressor. The French Minister of Defense,⁵ while expressing sympathy for the views set forth, indicated his skepticism as to its practical applications. The Defense Committee noted the United States statement.

It is requested that this information and the attached statement be circulated to the members of the National Security Council for their information.

G. C. Marshall

[Enclosure]

Statement by the Secretary of Defense (Marshall) to the Defense Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

top secret

[Washington, October 31, 1950.]

East-West Trade

1. My Government, as you know, has been most concerned with the problem of controlling exports to the Soviet Bloc. I want to ask your most earnest consideration of the military and security aspects of this problem.

2. Most of our respective governments have agreed to the principle of multilateral export controls of strategic commodities to areas under Soviet control. Progress has been made in recent months by means of multilateral negotiations toward mutual agreement as to these controls; progress has been particularly encouraging in the area of machine tools. Nevertheless, agreement to date has been confined principally to the embargo of items of direct military importance to the Soviet war potential. There is, however, in my opinion a significant lack of agreement as to the strategic character of many other items which substantially contribute to the war potential of the Soviet Bloc. I recognize the basis for the present lack of agreement. A basis founded on legitimately differing viewpoints as to the relative importance of military and economic factors in contributing to our mutual and paramount security objectives.

3. Lack of progress among our countries in agreeing to deny specific exports of strategic items to the Soviet Bloc has been of great concern to the people and to the Congress of the U.S. in recent months. I might add that, in addition to their strategic significance, many of these commodities are rapidly coming into short supply, and I believe it important that the essential supply requirements of the Western World be adequately protected.

4. The situation which confronts us, therefore, is increasingly untenable. While agreement has been reached to embargo certain items of the very highest and most obvious strategic significance, some of our countries are at the same time assisting the Soviet Bloc in the further development of war potential through the lack of agreement respecting export controls. While we strengthen our own military position through a collective rearmament effort entailing sacrifice on the part of each of our countries, we are continuing to facilitate an increase in the military strength of the Soviet Bloc by not agreeing to the control of such strategic items as zinc, nickel, certain types of ball and roller bearings, precision instruments, and so forth.

5. Some member nations have trade agreements with the Soviet Bloc nations which commit them to export to the East certain highly strategic items. The export of these items directly increases the ability of the Soviet Bloc to wage war. As it is our common purpose to increase the military strength of our countries relative to that of the Soviet Bloc, I want to ask that you and your governments carefully consider the need to formulate a military viewpoint governing the export of items to the Soviet Bloc, bearing in mind the military and strategic considerations which must be paramount.

6. While I am not at this time suggesting that specific action be taken, I firmly believe that such a common view could be achieved within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and that we should all make clear to our respective Governments the important military aspects of this question in terms of our common security.

1. The source text was circulated to the National Security Council by Executive Secretary Lay under cover of a brief explanatory memorandum of November 1, not printed. The memorandum printed here was considered by the Council at its meeting on November 2; see the Record of Actions, infra.
2. See the Record of Actions of the Council Meeting of August 24, p. 179.
3. The Defense Committee (Ministers of Defense) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Washington, October 28–31, 1950. Documentation on these meetings is printed in vol. iii, pp. 1 ff.
4. Emanuel Shinwell.
5. Jules Moch.