893.01/9–1349
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Subject: Conversation with Mr. Bevin on the Far East.
| Participants: | Mr. Bevin |
| Mr. Dening | |
| Mr. Acheson | |
| Mr. McGhee43 | |
| Mr. Butterworth | |
| Ambassador Jessup | |
| Ambassador Douglas | |
| Mr. Satterthwaite44 |
[Here follows a survey of views on Southeast Asia, India, and Japan and discussion of the idea of a Pacific pact. See memorandum of September 16, volume VII, “The policies of the United States with respect to the East Asian-Pacific area …”.]
China. I said that we had prepared a memorandum on the China situation which I thought expressed our views so clearly, that I would read it.
[Here follow paragraphs read from telegram No. 1994, September 3, 1949, from the Counselor of Embassy in China at Nanking, printed in volume VIII, “Political and military situation in China,” chapter VI.]
To reiterate, I said that as far as recognition was concerned, there should be no hasty aid and that nobody should gain any favors from the China Communists by ready recognition or similar moves. We would insist that the Communists recognize international obligations in full as a prerequisite to recognition. We thought the United Nations might pick up the principles of the Nine Power Treaty45 without mentioning it by name, but to reiterate the open door policy and the non-fragmentation of China. We did not think there was any need for recognition until the Communist Government actually does control China and there are many here who point out that they do not as yet. We strongly hope the Atlantic Pact countries will consult [Page 82] fully and carefully and concert policies on recognition of the Chinese Communist Government. We are mindful that Formosa complicates recognition. We don’t feel there is any point in engaging in economic warfare but we think China should pay its way (which it has not been doing for 10 years) and that we should not extend any extra facilities to a Chinese Communist regime. We hope that controls on 1A items will be set up right away and stand-by controls on 1B items be arranged so that they can be enforced immediately. I said we were depressed on chances of doing anything about Formosa. The United Nations Commission doesn’t seem practical.
Returning to China, Bevin said the British were not in a hurry to recognize but that they have big commercial interests in and trade with China and were not in the same position as we were relatively or absolutely. Bevin said the Foreign Office had told the British Community to stick and could not now tell them to leave. Also the British had to keep an eye on Hong Kong. He said that reports indicated that the fact that the British are hanging on is creating a good morale position in China for them. Bevin reported strongly that the British did not want to get out, that they have left their consuls, having in certain areas taken over representation on behalf of the United States, and intend to stay. He said that by staying-he did not think it would complicate the recognition problem any further. Dening said that the only difficulty involved in staying is that the Communists can take the initiative and say to the British either recognize us or get out. Bevin said that if the Communists acted that tough the British would refuse to recognize, but he thought the Communists would be more subtle. If they avoided overt action, the British would stay on without immediately recognizing the government but continue relations with the Chinese Government as best they can anyway. Mr. Butterworth observed that the Communists have stated they intend unilaterally to abrogate the various treaties regardless of the provisions for termination and we regard this as intolerable. It was possible that denunciation of the treaties might include denunciation of those respecting Hong Kong. Mr. Bevin said he could not imagine Russia advising China to abrogate treaties. Russia had always been careful about that but if such proved to be the case, it would be intolerable. He did not think that the Communists will attack Hong Kong directly. I said they might attack Macao, which was the same kind of problem. Mr. Bevin made no effort to field this ball. Mr. Bevin said the British can defend Hong Kong from external attack, economic boycott or internal trouble. I said that who controls China is very important to us as the State Department has to prove that the Communists do control it in the face of many allegations that they do not. What does China say? [Page 83] Have the Communists consulted their own people? Do the Chinese think that the Communist party controls them? Mr. Bevin said he was afraid that by being too obdurate we will drive the Chinese into Russian hands, but that by playing a careful role we can weaken Russia’s grip. I said that we were between two courses, one of which was to conduct against a Communist regime hostile operations between China and the USSR, the other was to play for a split between China and the USSR. If we agree that the split is the wisest course, then how do we do it. We should be careful, but we doubt if recognition is a strong card in keeping China out of Russian hands and they will be there anyway. Also recognition would have a discouraging effect throughout Southeast Asia. Dening said that on trade if others follow, the British would impose 1A but they were not ready to extend it to 1B items or to approach other governments on 1B. The Board of Trade is reluctant to set up controls but might go along with a gentlemen’s agreement, 1A items would be all right. Bevin said he thought they should do one thing at a time; that imposition of controls on 1A items had left a nasty taste in Europe. Mr. Butterworth said that the point is are we going to have China’s trade under control or not. There are quasi-military items on 1B. Mr. Bevin said he would go ahead on 1A items and talk about 1B when he gets back.46
Bevin then took up Hong Kong. He said the question was whether the British should refuse to negotiate under any circumstances, or whether they should negotiate under certain conditions. Hong Kong may come up in the United Nations and at one time it had been suggested that it might become an international port. If this solution were acceptable, why would it not be equally acceptable to give Hong Kong to Communist China? Certain leases expire on the new territories in 1997. While the British might discuss the problem with a friendly China at sometime in the future, they could not do so at present. On the other hand, they would not want to make an issue or publicize the fact that they would not negotiate now. The door is not bolted for all time. If there is aggression, the British will resist and go to the United Nations. Mr. Bevin then read the following statement of British policy, “The conclusion which we reach is therefore that, while we should be prepared to discuss the future of Hong Kong with a friendly and stable Government of a unified China, the conditions under which such discussions could be undertaken do not exist at present and are unlikely to exist in the foreseeable future. Until conditions change, we intend to remain in Hong Kong, and should so inform other Commonwealth Governments and the United States, while refraining in public from pronouncements which exacerbate [Page 84] our relations with China.” I said that seemed sound and reasonable, and Bevin said that our agreement would be encouraging to his Government.
Bevin then reiterated that there would be close consultation with us on recognition and that they would proceed with caution. Bevin said that one difficulty was that Britain would be following one, and the United States another course. The British may follow slightly different steps with regard to their consuls and the trade position, but our differences should [not?] be with malice aforethought. I said I thought we should make a clear distinction between policy and situation. The British may hold on longer because of their situation and we less longer because of ours, but division of policy is in error. The Communists would be delighted if they could drive a wedge. We did not want that. Bevin again said that the difference was in tactics and not in objectives and I agreed.
Jessup discussed the probable presentation by the Chinese Government to the U.N. General Assembly of a resolution (1) denouncing the Soviet Government for violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945;47 (2) calling upon the members of the U.N. not to recognize the Communist regime in China; and (3) calling upon them to render support to the Nationalist Government. Jessup stated that we had indicated to the Chinese that the decision rested with them as to whether or not their case should be presented to the G.A. but that they would encounter grave disadvantages in the presentation of a resolution involving the two latter points specified above. We had, however, indicated an inclination to support in principle a resolution based on the first proposition only, but made it clear that the character and degree of our support would depend on whether or not the Chinese case were based on strong evidence. So far this evidence has not been presented to us.
If the Chinese case should be presented to the G.A., Jessup suggested that we might wish to deal with it by introducing a resolution which would reaffirm the doctrine of the “Open Door” and the maintenance of the integrity of China as set forth in the 1922 Treaties. It might also be possible, if the Chinese themselves were prepared so to request, to set up a U.N. commission to supervise developments in Formosa until the status of that territory should be finally settled. We would recognize of course that, however the case were handled, the Russians would use it as an excuse for “mud slinging”. We would continue to keep in touch with the British on this matter and endeavor jointly to keep the Chinese from going too far and from handling the case in a manner which would embarrass all concerned. Bevin said the Chinese had told Strang about what they had told us [Page 85] and that Strang had expressed the same views to the Chinese as we had.48 Bevin asked Dening to take up the problem with Cadogan.49
Bevin then discussed briefly the subject of propaganda. He said we should spread it far and wide that the Soviet should return the things she took from Manchuria. Mr. Butterworth said we had been trying to do this, that, for example, there had been a recent editorial in the most important paper in Shanghai which had sought to justify Russian actions in Manchuria, past and current.50 It was a very ineffectual rationalization and this the Voice of America was now exploiting to the full. Bevin and Ambassador Jessup agreed that pamphlets, especially those labeled “top secret”, were effective in spreading propaganda. Bevin then wound up the discussion on the Far East by reiterating that he would be careful about recognizing; would continue consultation; would put 1A list right; study the B list; that Hong Kong was adequately covered, and that he would keep Ambassador Douglas currently informed.
- George C. McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs.↩
- Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs.↩
- Signed at Washington, February 6, 1922; Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276.↩
- For further correspondence regarding trade controls, see pp. 1002 ff.↩
- Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; United Nations Treaty Series, vol. x, p. 300.↩
- For further correspondence on Chinese appeal to the United Nations, see volume i .↩
- Sir Alexander M. G. Cadogan, British Representative at the United Nations.↩
- See telegram No. 3748, September 9, 5 p. m., from the Consul at Shanghai, vol. viii, “Political and military situation in China”, chapter VI. ↩