893.01/9–649: Telegram
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 7—11:12 a. m.]
1025. 1. In view wide differences opinion in India re developments China, and varying and frequently conflicting factors responsible for these differences, we are probably guilty of over simplification in endeavoring describe in framework [of] telegram probable effect on Indian public opinion if Western Powers should or should not recognize Communist China (Depcirtel August 19, 5 a. m.).
2. We believe, however, majority present dominating elements in India, including leaders of government and of Congress Party as well as most important government officials, would be more critical of Western Powers if latter should withhold recognition than if recognition [Page 73] was accorded. This majority controls most of press and other-media for influencing public opinion. Criticism of US would probably be even wider and more sharp if it should withhold while UK and France recognized.
Although there is some concern among members this majority lest Communist China eventually join with Russia in drive to communize Asia, this concern is dulled or offset by various factors including belief based in part on widely circulated statements emanating largely from US and UK sources to effect communism in China will prove to be incompatible with Stalinism and after first flames have subsided it will become benign constructive influence which will make China at least fairly comfortable Asian neighbor controlled neither by West or Russia. Extreme nationalists and anti-white groups, as well as those trained to believe white colonialism is world’s chief evil, are inclined to rejoice at Communist victory in China even though Communist triumph may add to prestige and strengthen Communists in Asia. They would be particularly shrill in criticism if Western Powers should refuse “acknowledge their defeat and face realities of situation” by recognizing Communist China. Other members this majority enthusiastically, although vaguely pacifist, believe recognition of Communist China by Western world would strengthen cause of world peace. They would therefore be certain to criticize withholding of recognition.
3. Among dominating elements of India there is, however, minority including most high military officers and even members Congress Party which regards Communists in China, as elsewhere, irreconcilable enemies of non-Communist world; which looks to US and UK as leaders in world struggle against international Communist movement; and which would probably take attitude that Western Powers by establishing diplomatic relations with Communist group that has taken advantage of war torn and fatigued China to conquer it by force are blurring the clarity their cause, are diluting quality their leadership, and for sake trade advantages or because unwillingness frankly face disagreeable international situation are trying hide even from selves true nature of regime which they are strengthening by recognizing. Members this minority would probably also draw conclusion that by applying one yardstick to Western Europe and another to Asia, Western world was betraying fact that its avowed interest in welfare and future of Asia was not over-deep. This minority has limited means of propagating its views; therefore its voice not likely be loud.
4. Communists and fellow travellers, while limited in number, have considerable influence particularly among half-baked and maladjusted [Page 74] “intellectuals”. They will criticize vociferously any course taken by Western powers. Indian Socialists, most of whom have not yet learned that [what] European Socialists now know from bitter experience, will probably be more critical at withholding than at granting of recognition.
5. Even many members majority referred to in paragraph 2 above not likely give much credit or unqualified praise to Western Powers for according recognition. Some will accompany approval with expression hope West, particularly US, has learned it can no longer successfully intervene in Asia; others will suggest Western Powers have sold their so-called principles for trade advantages or for other opportunistic gains; others will merely gloat over “necessity Western Powers at last recognizing their eclipse in Asia.”
6. Overwhelming majority people India have as yet little knowledge or interest foreign affairs. Although surface this vast human sea might be ruffled by breezes of propaganda, its depth not likely be affected by such matters as recognition Communist China by Western Powers. Although future India will eventually be decided by these at present politically illiterate masses, they will have no sentiments to voice re subject this telegram.
7. We believe GOI will be prepared recognize Chinese Communist regime as soon as latter has established firm control of China, and has eliminated all effective organized Nationalist resistance provided that regime indicates readiness to enter into relations with India. GOI will probably consult US, and almost certainly UK and other members Commonwealth, before taking formal steps to recognize. Under pressure from UK and other members Commonwealth it might, with reluctance, delay recognition for short period. GOI hopes Communist China will take more friendly attitude toward Asian powers than it has thus far displayed toward West, and it will probably desire respond fairly promptly to gesture on part Chinese regime made on basis special relationship among Asian peoples. Our impression is that Panikkar, Indian Ambassador to China, hopes obtain special position for self in China, and would like for India assume leadership in matter recognition.
Above our present impressions; developments may, of course, sharply change outlook dominating elements of country as, for example, Chinese Communist activities in Tibet and Burma, hostile attitude towards Indian Govt, or systematically discourteous treatment of Indian representatives.