893.01/3–2149

The British Embassy to the Department of State 19

The following are the general views of the Foreign Office on the question of establishing relations with the Chinese Communists.

[Page 12]

The Foreign Office are aware that to refuse to accord any sort of recognition to a government which in fact effectively controls a large proportion of territory is not only objectionable on legal grounds but leads to grave practical difficulties. It would be open to His Majesty’s Government to recognise the Chinese Communist Government as at any rate being a de facto government of that part of China which it controls, and they could of course, at the same time, continue to recognise the Central Government as being the de jure government of the whole of China. By so doing His Majesty’s Government would be adopting an attitude similar to that which they adopted towards General Franco during the Spanish Civil War.

In spite of these arguments the Foreign Office feel that some time must still elapse before His Majesty’s Government will be in a position to consider according any form of recognition to the Communists. The reasons of the Foreign Office for considering that some delay is both inevitable and desirable are:

(a)
The North China Peoples Government must be regarded as an interim regime which is now in process of converting itself into some-thing else. It is not yet known whether it will prove possible to arrange some form of coalition between the present Central Government and the Communists, nor have the Communists yet decided on their capital. The frontiers of Communist-administered territory are still fluid, and it is impossible to foresee whether there will be a period off stalemate, as in the Spanish Civil War, when the two opposing factions will each be in control of a relatively clearly defined area.
(b)
On general grounds, the Foreign Office do not wish to appear unduly precipitate in recognising the Communist regime.
(c)
The Foreign Office are anxious to proceed to recognition only on the basis of full consultation with the other powers concerned.

The observations of the State Department on the foregoing would be appreciated.20

  1. Handed to the Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse) by the First Secretary of the British Embassy (Ford) on March 21.
  2. On March 23, with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Sprouse informed Mr. Ford of “our general agreement with British views on this subject”.