There is attached a memorandum for the President appraising and commenting on
an undated, unsigned memorandum proposing aid to forces in China still
opposing the Chinese Communists which the President handed to Mr. Webb on
November 14 in your absence. The President requested that the memorandum be
returned to him after it had been studied by the Department.
Although much of the information given in the memorandum which has been
prepared for the President was covered in his discussion with the
consultants and although the basic thesis of the unsigned memorandum has
been further outmoded by recent events (particularly with the Communists now
knocking at the doors of Chungking), it is recommended that you hand the
memorandum to the President when you see him on November 21 in order that he
may study it at his leisure.
[Annex]
Draft of Memorandum for President Truman51
Subject: Proposed Aid to Forces Still Opposing the
Chinese Communists
Reference is made to the attached undated, unsigned memorandum (Tab A)
which you handed to Under Secretary Webb on November 14 in my absence.
In accordance with your request we have studied this memorandum and have
prepared for your information an appraisal of its contents.
The subject memorandum is well-reasoned argument for military assistance
to the remaining organized resistance forces in China. This argument,
however, must be rejected on the ground that it proceeds from an
inadequate appraisal of the relevant facts. Certain questions of detail
aside, the vital defect in the thesis argued is a gross overestimate of
the present and potential strength of Chinese resistance forces relative
to their Communist adversaries. The nature and extent of this
overestimate may be summarized in the following points:
- (1)
- Contrary to the assertion in the subject memorandum, the
strategic position of Nationalist forces on the Chinese mainland
is today markedly worse than that of the Nationalist armies at
the lowest ebb of their fortunes in their war against Japan.
Communist advances beyond the Yellow River bend and into central
Kweichow have overrun vital natural barriers essential to the
defense of Szechwan Province. Japanese forces never penetrated
those barriers.
- (2)
- Mainland areas under non-Communist control, contrary to the
assumption made in the subject memorandum, are economically
self-sufficient only in a technical, arithmetical sense. The
grain surpluses of Szechwan could, it is true, offset the grain
deficiencies in other non-Communist areas. But the recent loss
of Kweiyang to the Communist forces has eliminated all
possibility of transferring the Szechwan surplus to more needy
provinces.
- (3)
- The data presented by the subject memorandum on the strength
of anti-Communist military forces in China do not correspond
with the most recent estimates of CIA. The subject memorandum
contends that a “loyal” fighting force of 1,100,000 men now
oppose the Chinese Communist armies. The most recent CIA
estimate shows a total of only 676,000 of combat effectiveness.
Moreover, many of these troops are ill-trained provincial
levies. CIA, in a recent report concurred in by the other
intelligence agencies, has stated that Nationalist forces are
“characterized by low morale, poor leadership and loss of will
to fight”.
- (4)
- On the question of the leadership of anti-Communist forces in
China, the subject memorandum appears to be especially
over-optimistic. Deficiencies in present leadership are
recognized, but it is argued that U.S. aid can be used as a
means of bringing new and
[Page 592]
more efficient men to posts of
responsibility in the fight against Chinese Communism. The
failure of repeated attempts in the past to achieve precisely
this objective unfortunately argues against the probability that
another such attempt will succeed at the present time. No reason
exists for believing that Chiang Kai-shek is more willing than
formerly to relinquish his position as predominant leader of the
anti-Communist resistance forces in China. Nor is there reason
to believe that the previously impotent and divided liberal
elements in China will at this late date rally and assume
effective control over the remnants of the Nationalist
Government.
- (5)
- The brief treatment accorded the present strength of Chinese
Communist forces in the subject memorandum may perhaps indicate
a reluctance to face the realities of the present unpleasant
situation in China. No convincing evidence can be found to
support the contention that Chinese Communist forces are
overextended or that their combat effectiveness has in any way
been reduced. On the contrary, recent victories in Kwangtung
have freed Communist armies for the conduct of a final offensive
in overwhelming numerical strength against the scattered
Nationalist remnants in southwest China. Because of their great
superiority, moreover, the Chinese Communists are in a position
to accelerate the speed of their conquest of the Chinese
mainland, if U.S. aid to Nationalist remnants were to render
such action necessary. The present disposition and strength of
the opposing forces has been noted on the attached map of the
military situation in China which has been revised to show the
most recent information available (Tab B)52.
The policy recommendations of this subject memorandum must be weighed in
the light of the relevant facts concerning the present situation in
China. The memorandum argues that U.S. aid of a magnitude calculated to
meet the current needs of existing anti-Communist resistance forces in
China will either insure the indefinite survival of those forces or buy
time needed by the U.S. to prevent the further expansion of Communism in
Southeast Asia. Achievement of the first of these two results
unfortunately appears to be entirely out of the question. The
possibility that the aid program proposed in the subject memorandum
would serve the interests of the U.S. by delaying the final Communist
victory in China deserves more attention.
Of the non-Communist areas immediately adjacent to China the timing of a
Chinese Communist victory would appear to be of critical importance only
in the case of Indochina. In Indochina, a year’s respite from Communist
pressure on the area’s northern border would perhaps render feasible
measures to increase the life expectancy of the Bao Dai regime. It must
be emphasized, however, that what is relevant in the case of Indochina
is not the date of final liquidation of the last
[Page 593]
organized resistance in Kwangsi and Yunnan if it
is to achieve its minimum objective of buying time for the prosecution
of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. These two provinces unfortunately are
not suitable bases for large armed forces. As in the war against Japan,
Szechwan is the key to continued resistance. Current successes of
Communist armies in their drive against Szechwan, it must be noted, cast
serious doubts on the feasibility of any program to prolong organized
resistance on the Chinese mainland.
A further and equally valid reason for rejecting the argument in the
subject memorandum is the political and military disunity presently
existing in the Nationalist China. In this connection there is attached
(Tab C) a telegram from our Embassy in Chungking53 which emphasizes
(a) that hope no longer exists that progress
toward political and military unity or reform can be achieved in
southwest China; (b) that the military scene is
one of retreat, defection, uncorrelated commands and mutual distrust;
(c) that there is no prospect of healing the
deep breach between the Generalissimo and the Li-Pai groups; and (d) that disintegration is apparent in all fields
and is likely to increase in geometrical progression.
The general conclusion to be derived from an examination of the thesis
presented in the subject memorandum is, therefore, that a program of
U.S. aid to organized forces resisting the Chinese Communists would not
only be unproductive of the desired results but might react to the
disadvantage of the U.S. by reason of the absence of any valid
assurances that such aid would not eventually fall into the hands of the
Chinese Communists. It is of course obvious that failure of the U.S. in
such a venture as that proposed would inevitably cause the further
lowering of U.S. prestige which has already suffered seriously from the
course of events in China.
