893.24/11–949
Memorandum by the Ambassador to China (Stuart) to the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Subject: Interview with General Cheng Chieh-min40
On the evening of November 8 I spent several hours with him chiefly occupied in attempting to convince him in as kindly but positive a way as I could that any further expectation of military aid to the present Nationalist Government seemed to me to be “fatuous. I told him that no formal decisions had been reached and that I was basing my opinion on the trend which seemed to me quite clear. Also that this indicated no change in our attitude to the Chinese people nor of any change in American anti-Communist determination; I personally had the highest respect for CKS41 in his character and patriotic devotion, as well as for many others in the Nationalist Government and I knew that this was shared by my associates generally. The American Government and people still wanted to find some procedure by which they could help to retard the Communist movement in China. It was therefore purely a matter of what could be done with any hope of success.
He still questioned about the 75 million dollars and I told him that all that I had said above included this. In saying all this to him I told him that I would try to prove my friendship for him and those whom he represented in making this trip and suggested that he talk with you and any others to be sure that he understood the American position. He told me that he had discussed especially with Mr. Wang Shih-chieh the question of some sort of trusteeship for Formosa, I pointed out that if the matter were brought to UN it would certainly involve the abandonment of use of the island as an anti-Communist military base. It took some time to convince him that it could not both be under some sort of UN trusteeship and be maintained as the seat of the Nationalist Government in fighting Communists on the mainland.
We explored the possibilities of removing these features to Hainan or somewhere on the mainland but Cheng felt that Hainan could not sustain this additional influx of people and that there were other difficulties there which apply even more forcibly to any place on the mainland. It also came out that the Government would be very reluctant to lose the income from Formosan products which yield them now about 80 million dollars a year. They had determined to stay on the island and resist Communist invasion as best they could in a final sacrifice unless we could give them contrary advice (and assistance) or an appeal could be made to UN.
[Page 581]He also questioned me about our recognition of the new Government42 and I tried to explain our position as I understand the problem. While cautioning him against reading any more into my statements than I intended, we would not easily or lightly or hastily recognize the new regime, but our action would have to be determined more by facts than by feelings especially in view of the probable course of most of the countries concerned. I also pointed out the anomalies in continuing to recognize a so-called Nationalist Government in retreat to one island which might not be tenable very long and with no satisfactory retreats on Hainan or the mainland. The problem therefore, as I had tried to point out many times when in Nanking, was among themselves rather than in Washington.