893.00/9–649: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 7—9:12 a. m.]
[Cantel] 1072. Re telCan 620, August 25. Office of President Li on September 2 provided Embassy with “outline of plan of warfare prepared by senior officers of Central Chinese Military Government office August 31” and a chart listing by areas resistance forces behind Communist lines and number weapons possessed by each.
Foreword states Central Chinese Military Government has jurisdiction over Hunan, Anhwei, Hupeh, Kiangsi, Hunan, Kwangsi, East Szechuan and South Kweichow, of which first four appear to have fallen completely into Communist hands. “However, except for important lines of communication and large cities, remaining majority of villages and towns are still held by our armed farm population and guerrilla forces.”
Plan in brief apparently considers South Kwangsi as main base and sources of supplies. Favorable terrain in West Hupeh, West Hunan, South Hunan and South Kiangsi, with their mountains and long rivers, forms outer defense line. Main body to concentrate east and west of Hengyang. Strong guerrilla bases to be maintained these areas with regular troops operating with local militia, and all operations to be supported by guerrilla units already active in Hunan, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Hupeh. Any large scale Communist attack would bring into action Nationalist forces in Szechuan, Kweichow, Kwangsi and Kwangtung.
Propaganda material to be air dropped in hope of causing defections from Communist forces.
[Page 547]Use guerrilla bases to form universal intelligence network.
Prepare for large scale counter-offensive by forming 10 new armies within next 6 months and coordinating all forces in Nationalist areas with guerrillas. As Nationalist forces advance they will in recaptured areas “strengthen popular organizations, root out Communist elements, organize local militia and establish strong local governments”. Counter-offensive plan has series of objectives carrying it to Lunghai railway.
Plan includes several maps and charts showing present military situation south China, proposed counter-offensive, organization of Pai’s command, and organization of guerrillas.
Claim total 500,000 men in guerrilla units either behind Communist lines now or moving into Communist areas. Main groups: SE area 50,000; Shantung 20,000; Hunan 90,000; Chahar 30,000; Anhwei 85,000; Hupeh 50,000; Chekiang area 40,000; West Suiyuan 50,000; and lesser forces in Liaoning, Hupeh, Fukien, Shansi, Kiangsu, Hunan and Kiangsi. About one-third are said to be armed.
Comment on “outline of plan”: It was obviously hastily put together; omits vital features such as estimated requirements, sources and levels of supply, communications, means of coordination, methods of operations, probable effects of complete break between Generalissimo and Li–Pai groups, etc.; and in general is further demonstration of the unrealistic thinking which has always prevailed in Nationalist circles.
Outline as handed Embassy is labelled “part 1” but no mention was made of additional parts to follow. Embassy intends point out deficiencies and inutility of this document and inquire whether further, more practical staff work is being or is to be done on problem. If not, there seems to be little point in carrying matter further at this time.
Only favorable feature of plan is that it does not ask US for anything. However, would be useful in connection with any logistics section of plan to include statement as to what portion of estimated supplies required must come from outside sources. In anticipation of a complete break with Generalissimo, full consideration needed as to means of receiving outside help without Generalissimo interference. If Pakhoi and Liuchow peninsula are to be only coastal areas open to Pai, he must consider how he is to obtain foreign supplies, without use of (and perhaps even having to evade) Generalissimo navy or air force, what staging areas available, what ships to be used. Then comes problem of how supplies are to reach interior guerrilla areas without air force. Rifles, ammo and silver coins to pay forces are probably major items needed, plus replacement radio parts.
Reference effectiveness of resistance by Pai’s forces and guerrillas and time factors involved, Embassy believes any unified action by [Page 548] various groups not possible. Poor communications, historic individualism and regionalism, and competition among local leaders engineered by rivalry of Generalissimo and Pai groups will probably fragmentize opposition groups. Communists ultimately will be able to concentrate forces against each group adequate to liquidate or disperse them.
On other hand, rear area unrest will continue to slow Communist advance into unconquered areas in conjunction with difficult terrain, long supply lines, etc.
If Pai and other major guerrilla forces are adequately supplied and if Pai adopts guerrilla tactics before coming into major battle with superior Communist forces, we question whether Communists capable of mopping up resistance in one year in spite of possible fragmentization of anti-Communist forces. Supply is the main limiting factor. Without it Nanking’s estimate of one year, as stated in its telegram 1922, August 28 to Department, could well prove correct. With adequate supplies effective resistance may well continue much longer. If outside aid granted, problem will be to keep it out of Generalissimo’s hands as well as to distribute it.
Embassy believes that further and solid planning President Li and Pai is essential in addition to demonstration of firm will to resist. We also feel that they should be given opportunity to lay realistic plans of long range nature on basis of which US Government can consider question of aid. What they have just provided is of no real value.
Embassy is mailing reference documents with partial translations.13 Further telegraphic report will be forwarded in event further data received.
Sent Department Cantel 1072, repeated Nanking 665.
- Despatch No. 42, September 7, not printed.↩