893.24/5–1149
Transcript of Conversation
| Participants: | Maj. Gen. Claire Lee Chennault |
| Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State | |
| Philip D. Sprouse, Division of Chinese Affairs |
Chennault: I suggest that we consider a policy of continuing communications with China to prevent the spread of communism through Indo-China. There is a long belt of Chinese territory which extends from Outer Mongolia on the north to the Gulf of Tonkin and the Indo-China and Burmese borders on the south. The provinces of Ningsia, Kansu, Tsinghai, Shensi, Szechwan, Kweichow, Yunnan and the west part of Kwangsi are included in this belt. This belt is protected toward the east by deserts and almost impassable mountains so it would be extremely difficult for any invading army to penetrate it. On the north there is a belt 200 miles wide of shifting sands and on the east the Ordos Desert. Toward the south, Szechwan is protected by a barrier of mountains from 200 to 300 miles wide. Farther south Kwangsi and Yunnan are protected by a belt of mountains approximately 200 miles wide. An army of sufficient size to penetrate this belt and conquer the provinces inside would be faced with almost unsolvable supply and transport problems. This is rather a limited objective but I think it would pay off because defense of this belt would contain communism in the remainder of China where it might fall eventually of its own weight. On the other hand, if the communists are able to occupy Yunnan Province, the most westerly province of China, it will then Command the approaches to Indo-China, Siam and Burma. They will be able to extend communism through these areas into Malaya, possibly Indonesia, and the other islands of the Pacific and westward through Burma into India.
Yunnan is the only road from China proper into the remainder of Asia. Another feature of the most western provinces of Tsinghai, Kansu and Ningsia is the fact that they are predominantly Moslem and they have been fighting communists for twenty years. I have talked to the Governors of those three provinces within the last month and they assured me that they can never permit communism to enter their provinces and will fight to their death to prevent it.
A second suggestion is that we do not consider giving aid to the Nationalist Government as such, but that if any plan for aiding resistance to communism in China is adopted that we establish a strong military mission who will be charged with responsibility for procuring such things as given, for distributing it to the provinces where it is most required, training the Chinese military forces in the use of our [Page 521] equipment and for planning the tactics and employment of that equipment. The aid which we have given to China since August 1945 has not been used effectively because we had no such mission. I believe we should guard our aid as carefully as we do the aid given to Turkey and to Greece and that we should be sure that every dollar we devote to resisting communism in Asia is spent wisely and that we receive a dollar’s value for it.
There are ports in China still open through which this aid can be distributed to the interior—Canton, Kowloon and Pakhoi. If these ports are eventually closed, I believe it would be easier to arrange cooperation with the French in Indo-China and operate out of the port of Haiphong. From Haiphong it would be necessary to fly military equipment up to Kunming, a distance of 385 miles, or over to Liuchow, about the same distance. From Liuchow and from Kunming military equipment can be moved by truck throughout the length of the zone which I have described.
Rusk: Would you comment on the attitude of the populations in these areas; would we get about the same friendly reception we had?
Chennault: I have discussed American aid with the Governors of the provinces, including this long zone, and I received assurances from all of them that they will cooperate fully with us in any way desired and that their people will fight against the invasion of communist forces. There is adequate area left and a population of approximately 150 million people for resisting the further spread of communism in China.
Sprouse: What is the size of the Moslem armies in the northwest?
Chennault: Approximately 200,000 troops which include one non-Moslem army of three divisions. Kansu has authorized thirty divisions but it actually has only ten of about 10,000 men each. Shensi has 150,000 first-class troops and approximately 50,000 reserves or second-rank troops. Szechwan, the most populous province in China, has approximately 200,000 troops now and has launched a program for seven divisions of 70,000 men. I don’t know what the statistics of the Kweichow military are. Yunnan now has one nationalist army at reduced strength; it could easily recruit 100,000 troops but would require considerable aid in arming and equipping them.
Rusk: What size flight of transport would make a dent on this problem?
Chennault: C–46. Three airlines, CNAC, CATC and CAT,87 have approximately 90 transports in operation now. I believe these three airlines could provide the necessary transport for the movement of all [Page 522] the military equipment that would be required under this plan.
Rusk: Would the remnants of the nationalist air force give us any assistance?
Chennault: No, I think not. I wouldn’t depend on them. If air support is required, I would recommend a full unit with Chinese mechanics, guards, laborers and American pilots. We would need liaison planes and full air support.
Rusk: Would you need to supply food to those people?
Chennault: Szechwan and Yunnan produce food surpluses. Kweichow, Tsinghai and Ningsia might require some food. If we draw up a plan we should continue ECA aid, fertilizers, agricultural instructions, etc., in order to increase food production in all provinces. ECA should be continued along with military aid.
Rusk: What about the lake areas?
Chennault: No. Assuming that we have done nothing constructive so far, we will lose all that country. I don’t think we could hold it except at enormous expense. I suggest we consider giving aid to General Hsueh Yueh, the Governor of Kwangtung Province, who could defend the northern Kwangtung borders in the mountainous regions. Have I emphasized enough about this protective barrier?
Rusk: Yes, that is clear. What would you think of the Americans dealing with five, six or seven provincial governors, or of a single Chinese coordinating authority in that area?
Chennault: I would much rather plan on dealing with a central authority. There would be considerable danger in dealing with provincial governors; they might not follow a unified plan after they got troops, planes, etc.; you can keep a central authority lined up. I would much rather the Chinese take care of domestic political problems and we take all steps to keep the plan together at the top.
Rusk: What individuals could carry the plan at the top?
Chennault: Only one man—Chiang Kai-shek; maybe Li Tsung-jen, Pai Chung-hsi, or Chang Chun. Most of them could do it if Chiang Kai-shek gets out of China. Only as a last resort would I consider dealing directly with provincial governors and leaders.
Rusk: Does Li Tsung-jen have stature to do this?
Chennault: He was very good during the war along the Huai River; we gave him full air support for the first time in the war.
Rusk: How much time do we have in China?
Chennault: There is no way to estimate how fast communists will spread south and southeast; a rough estimate is that we probably have six months to defend this western zone; three months to aid the defense of Kwangtung.
Rusk: Could some of this be moved in?
Chennault: If we send a military mission in, yes, and talk to Chiang Kai-shek. He thinks he can hold the strong fortress he already [Page 523] has on Formosa. Communists will send in trained men and they will work on the native population which is anti-Chinese.
Rusk: If you get these governors together and ask them to select a chairman of the board, whom would they select?
Chennault: Chiang Kai-shek, if he is still in China, will certainly be first nomination. He has learned a lot during the past year and would be far more responsive than six months ago.
Rusk: Can you leave Tibet out?
Chennault: Yes, they are not good soldiers; they want to be left alone.
Rusk: Would you have American military mission people with units in the field or just to assure supplies?
Chennault: I would do like Wedemeyer and maintain top-level staff with the government and supervise operation of all transport or quartermaster, food, clothing, medical supplies, communications. He had American personnel all the way down through the company level. He watched everything that was done with our equipment and planned all fighting. That is the way I recommend again; American personnel right down to the company. It won’t take a great many men because of the relative small size of the area. As long as we adopt a limited objective, there is no real danger of getting further involved. We don’t have to take the offensive and we could limit it to that zone only; don’t consider grand offensive of all of China.
Rusk: That is an interesting line of thought. What are your plans now?
Chennault: I’m going to Louisiana and will be back about the end of this month.
Rusk: Will you talk to some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Chennault: Yes. This is really a novel idea, to start with Outer Mongolia and work down south. They will fight; there is plenty of room to do it. This area remained loyal during the war with Japan.
Rusk: We greatly appreciate your coming in and we will give this some close thought and hope to see you later this month.
- China National Aviation Corporation, Central Air Transport Corporation, and Civil Air Transport, respectively.↩