Executive Secretariat Files

Note by the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Souers) to the Council

NSC 37/9

Possible United States Military Action Toward Taiwan not Involving Major Military Forces

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject are circulated herewith for the information of the National Security Council and for the use of the Council in its discussion of “The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia” (NSC 48/181) at the meeting scheduled for Thursday, December 29, 1949.

Sidney W. Souers
[Annex]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)

Subject: Possible United States Military Action Toward Taiwan not Involving Major Military Forces

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have assessed the military measures, short of the dispatch of a major military force, which might be undertaken [Page 461] with respect to Taiwan in furtherance of United States political, economic and psychological measures now under way.

The following are the major conclusions arrived at as result of their study:

a.
A modest, well-directed, and closely-supervised program of military aid to the anti-communist government in Taiwan would be in the security interest of the United States; and
b.
A modest program of military aid to the Chinese Government in Taiwan should be integrated with a stepped-up political, economic, and psychological program pursued energetically in extension of present United States programs there.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff will, subject to your concurrence:

a.
Direct the Commander in Chief, Far East, with the assistance of the Commander, 7th Task Fleet, to make an immediate survey of the nature and extent of the military assistance required in Formosa in order to hold Formosa against attack; and
b.
Based on the results of the survey, make recommendations to you as to the military program.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to point out that the recommended action with respect to Formosa is a part of the overall problem of resisting the spread of Communist domination in East Asia. It is recognized that this is a piecemeal approach, as is their recommendation with respect to assistance to Indonesia forwarded to you on 22 December 1949,82 but it is likewise a matter of urgency. These separate but related projects point up the necessity of early determination of an overall program for the solution of the major problem.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. Text in United States Department of Defense, United States-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, 12 volumes (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1971), vol. 8, p. 225.
  2. Not printed.