894A.20/12–149
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Subject: If Formosa Falls.
For the purposes of this memorandum it is assumed that at some uncertain date in the future Formosa will either be successfully invaded [Page 432] by Communists from the Mainland or that the Island by a deal or otherwise turns over to the Communists.
It is assumed that prior to such event the Congress and the American people will have been prepared for this unhappy event by process of increasingly frank discussion of our policy with respect to Formosa.
Other steps involving strategic and political preparation must also be taken in advance in order to release on D–Day a carefully prepared series of decisions and announcements designed: a) to reassure the American people as to the preparedness and competence of this Government; b) to minimize the psychological repercussions elsewhere in the general area; and c) to repair or neutralize the resultant shift in the strategic balance of our defenses.
Under a) above we should have prepared and cleared in advance statements for the Secretary which could be released on D–Day covering the following subjects:
- 1)
- A calm and reasoned statement of why preventive military action by the U.S. was impossible and stressing our non-predatory tradition;
- 2)
- An announcement that ECA aid had been suspended, and;
- 3)
- A submission to the Security Council of the United Nations of the facts of the case with the statement that we regarded it as a threat to world peace, this latter step being designed not to provoke a military adventure under UN auspices but for the purpose of fully ventilating the facts and placing the Communists in an unfavorable world light.
b. We should also have prepared for despatch telegrams explaining our position to Korea, the Philippines, Siam, USI,54 India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand and the British, French and Dutch.
We should arrange for the prompt release of a statement breathing calm and confidence by General MacArthur in Tokyo.
c. We should also have available for prompt release some significant decision or action in the field of national defense. I have in mind some such step as the announcement of the formation of a Joint U.S.–Philippine Defense Board or, for example, a unilateral assumption of responsibility for the defense of Japan.
Assuming that in the interim some association of Pacific or Asiatic states is maturing, we should shortly after D–Day take some constructive forward step to indicate our interest in or willingness to participate directly in such an association. In this connection, we should bear in mind that the loss of Formosa, meaning the liquidation of the Nationalist Government, would automatically remove the most dangerous and unattractive feature of the original Quirino proposal.55
[Page 433]Finally, I am inclined to think that we should attempt to arrange for a moderate and well-publicized increase in our Far Eastern fleet and soon thereafter arrange for a series of visits of that fleet to Manila, Singapore, Surabaya, Bangkok (if the harbor is open) and possibly Korea.
The important thing, it seems to me, is that we should meet this expected unhappy event with calm, followed by a series of calculated and prepared positive reactions.
If you agree with the foregoing in general outline, I suggest that we discuss it first with Mr. Sprouse56 and Mr. Connors57 and then with Mr. Davies58 with a view to assigning an individual or a group to be responsible for all of the varied and complicated staff work. We should, I believe, start on such a program without loss of time.
- United States of Indonesia.↩
- For President Quirino’s meeting with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in July, see volume VII.↩
- Philip D. Sprouse, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.↩
- W. Bradley Connors, Officer in Charge of Public Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.↩
- John Pa ton Davies, Jr., member of the Policy Planning Staff.↩