894A.20/11–1849: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Taipei (Taipei)
470. Fol are Dept’s views re inquiries, comments, and suggestions contained ur recent tels cited below.
In ur 662 Nov 11 [5] you inquire what Dept’s criteria are by which to measure “improvement in polit and econ well-being people Taiwan” and “how many steps will have to be taken [by Chen] to show that he acting in good faith”. As you aware US policy is endeavor deny Formosa [to] Commies by using polit and econ means. Resources on Island now available Chi appear adequate at this time if resolute steps taken utilize these resources effectively; until these steps taken, any commitment of increased US support wld not contribute to achieving our objective since it wld probably lead to Chi conviction US assuming active role and responsibility and that Chi self-help measures not essential and wld thus in end be costly to US in terms of its prestige as well as resources and very possibly achievement polit objectives on mainland. While these costs are not decisive and might be incurred if sound prospect success were offered thereby, it wld, of course, be foolhardy incur them without such prospect success. As was pointed out in 452 Nov 10, Dept believes Formosa contains all elements in terms admin and technical, civ and mil personnel and resources to enable Chi admin make it going concern and external aid of secondary [Page 429] importance and cld not be effective in absence essential internal measures. Consequently, Dept’s principal criterion by which to measure improvement polit and econ well-being Formosa is that such substantial advances in this and other fields relating Formosan security shall be made as to offer sound prospect that with continuation or expansion of ltd aid which US is currently supplying Island can be successfully denied to Commies. Dept has noted unencouraging appraisal of situation contained ur 446 Sept 6 and 453 Sept 7 and fact that ur present appraisal apparently more optimistic. Since criterion depends upon over-all appraisal situation Formosa, it obviously impossible state in advance how many or what specific steps or measures wld have to be taken to meet it.
This wld depend upon manner in which measures carried out and effectiveness measures themselves in improving situation—factors which cannot be measured in advance. Furthermore, perhaps even more important than any specific measures is need for some kind spiritual regeneration Chinese leaders themselves which wld lead them lay aside self-aggrandizement and internal bickering and devote themselves with determination and patriotism to their cause and which wld revitalize their followers. External aid cannot supply such leadership. In connection this general question Nason51 ECA now in Formosa making survey situation with view submission recommendations re ECA economic aid program for consideration upon his return Washington.
Dept has noted with concern statement K. C. Wu reported ur 664 Nov 6 that he had told Gimo that this his last chance as far as US concerned and “to agree to any terms that might be forthcoming”. Msg to Gimo was not opening gambit to be followed by specific demands or “terms” but was designed to place Gimo clearly on notice that US had no intention of using its armed forces to defend Island and that responsibility for undertaking effective measures with respect internal and external security Formosa rested squarely upon him and Chi auths who were appraised of this notification. Through K. C. Wu, C. K. Yen, and Sun Li-jen you shld do what you can to clear up any possible misunderstanding this point (See Deptel 452 Nov 10).
With reference to ur 678 Nov 9 and 695 Nov 14 re possible change of governorship upon US initiative, US Govt can not place itself in position of advising Chi Govt re polit appointments. To offer such advice is to accept responsibility for developments arising from the acceptance thereof and inferentially to commit US Govt to support of succeeding admin regardless of US interests. You will appreciate that advice such as that now being provided by ECA, JCRR and J. W. [G.] White [Page 430] Engineering Co. is entirely different in import and connotation from advice of essentially polit character such as appointment or discharge of officials.
Similar considerations apply to suggestion contained in ur 679 Nov 9 and 690 Nov 10 respecting providing of US mil personnel to act as advisors to Chi Govt. It is evident that presence of such advisors wld soon become well publicized and widely interpreted as evidence Amer intention to underwrite mil defense of Island. Damage to US prestige wld be very great if notwithstanding presence such advisors, Island’s defenses collapsed for same reasons responsible for collapse on mainland, i.e. failure Govt take steps necessary secure popular support and raise troops morale. Furthermore, Chi wld undoubtedly look upon presence of Amer advisors as channel to exploit for extraction Amer aid rather than addressing their full efforts to the pressing problems which only they can solve. In any case, it wld be unwise to permit attachés on Formosa to become involved in advisory functions which is contrary to our world-wide practice respecting service attachés and wld in this instance place service attachés in Commie areas in jeopardy. Ltd n[umbe]r of private Amer cit[izen]s whose services were contracted directly by Chi Govt without responsibility on part of this Govt wld be as effective as official advisors if Chi sincerely desire advice and this might be accomplished with substantial reduction of risks to this Govt set forth above.
As long ago as last June Admiral Badger transmitted to Navy Admiral Kwei request for ltd nr naval advisors. In reply CNO52 stated “In view of the complete withdrawal of JUSMAG from China, the well-established US policy not to participate in the Chinese fratricidal war, the existing governmental decision that in the initial stages care shld be exercised to minimize the appearance of US officials on Formosa and the belief that this request if granted wld only encourage Kwei to make greater demands for aid, the Chief of Naval Operations does not approve active or retired US Naval officers in an official capacity assisting the Chinese Natlist Navy, but perceives no objection to the Chinese Govt making individual arrangements to employ former Naval officers as advisors in a private and civilian capacity”. Chi Navy has not, insofar as is known, made any effort to obtain advisors on basis outlined this msg.
In reply Chen Cheng’s suggestion (urtels 679 Nov 9 and 662 Nov 5) that “Amer mil advisory group” be sent to Taiwan, you shld refer to Admiral Kwei’s request and Navy reply thereto and add that Dept wld not oppose employment on Chi initiative and responsibility of [Page 431] former officers of other services or other private Amers in private and civilian capacity if this deemed desirable.
Contents this msg intended to assist you in removing any misconceptions re our attitude which may exist on part Chi auths.