894A.00/11–1449: Telegram
The Consul General at Taipei (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 14—9:13 a. m.]
695. During conversation with Military and Air Attachés and me on November 12, K. C. Wu made statement that efforts of Sun Li-jen were being hampered by interference of old generals. In reply to inquiry as to which were worst and who should go, Wu said Governor Chen Cheng. At close of conversation, he answered another direct inquiry with the statement that he would assume governorship if required.
These statements indicate two new points of view by Wu. First, he was originally a staunch supporter of Chen claiming that only a military man of his background could control numerous old generals on island. Second, he consistently stated after arrival in Taiwan that he would assume no new official position in an unregenerated regime.
[Page 424]It can therefore be deduced, perhaps incorrectly, that Wu believes (1) that military problem no longer exists or (2) that Chen has proven himself incapable this respect; and that regeneration has been accomplished.
During earlier conversation Wu reported Generalissimo’s inquiry of Wu and Wang Shih-chieh whether our aide-mémoire included desire remove Chen Cheng and if so tell Chen Cheng. When told possibility, Chen reportedly offered resignation.
Basis above and reported general willingness Generalissimo meet all US desires, stage appears set for selection new governor if suggested.
However, in our opinion, any such change would fail to accomplish its intended purpose unless Wu as civil governor and Sun Li-jen as supreme military commander Taiwan were assured by Generalissimo of elimination of present cumbersome organization here, and complete removal of interfering old generals and politicians. Although such a development would have been out of the question a few months ago, it is possible now but will not be accomplished we believe unless US makes some fairly direct approach, possibly through Chinese Embassy, Washington.
Opinions re the governor differ considerably. Department and ECA officers I believe have for some time had the feeling that best results from American aid are impossible under Chen Cheng. Many local Chinese officials in administrative positions regularly complain of Chen’s obstruction of their efforts because of his economic ignorance and old style administrative systems. He has surrounded himself with old friends whose reactionary opinions influence him in many ways.
At the same time Moyer of JCRR and technical advisers in J. G. White regard him highly and claim splendid cooperation. Many of his moves reflect a sincere interest in the welfare of the Taiwanese and there is every indication that Chen has, within the limitations of his restricted education and experience and the national military demands on Taiwan, tried to do a good job here.
With few exceptions, however, American officials have found him unsympathetic and possibly because of his lack of English stiff and hard to deal with.
Because of the identification of K. C. Wu and Sun Li-jen with American interests, it is probable that the replacement of Chen by Wu and the elimination of Peng Meng-chi in favor of Sun combined with the appearance on the island of visiting American officer advisers would instill new life and hope among the Taiwanese and Chinese here and go far to remove the growing defeatism among both civilians and the military without the immediate addition of other [Page 425] American aid. Such a set-up would also permit a greater separation of island and mainland responsibilities.