894A.20/11–1049: Telegram
The Consul General at Taipei (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State
[Received 3:41 p. m.]
690. It is our opinion, as stated in ConGentel 679, Nov. 9, that if it is US intention to comply with Chinese request for military advisers, compliance in initial form should be prompt. However, first public move might best be arranged to come from Chinese, possibly in form of visit by Governor Chen to CinCFE for preliminary consultations, Chou Chih-jou41 to Stratemeyer,42 and Admiral Kuei43 to Admiral Berkey.44 These could then be followed up quickly by visits [Page 420] to Taiwan of somewhat lesser US officers for survey and recommendations.
Service Attachés here unanimously and strongly support our thought that nothing resembling JUSMAG is needed here nor should be considered. A few carefully selected advisers operating out of CinCFE and FEAF and supported by Taipei Attaché offices should be adequate for the immediate future. Greater morale benefit would accrue, we believe, from officers visiting from Japan, Hawaii and Philippines than from a large permanent establishment here. Return visits by Chinese to those areas would also serve good purpose.
Because of the attitude of both sides by the time of disestablishment of JUSMAG,45 American officers identified therewith should not be reappointed in this new effort. This restriction should also apply to military “old China hands”. Emphasis should rather be placed on logistics and operations experience and ability.
It is generally believed in all circles that because of rapidity of receipt of equipment purchased with $125 million aid program, coupled with local confusion and lack of organization and preparation, no true picture exists locally as to what is available or how it can best be used. Without full survey of this, the inevitable later requests for further military equipment cannot be properly appraised.
If the American Government is seriously considering a broader preoccupation with the affairs and well-being of Taiwan than is contemplated by Chen Cheng’s request, much can in our opinion be accomplished from the above recommended small beginnings provided that no opportunity is permitted to recur to Chinese minds that the new advisers are retired officers. A principal adviser of outstanding merit attached to Chen Cheng might be able to obtain the gradual elimination of the currently top-heavy organization here wherein fully discredited “old friends” continue to make their influence felt to the detriment of the defense of the island. This malignant influence extends into local politics and economics as well as into the military picture and could also be corrected as part thereof.
It is our further belief that we should take every precaution to continue the policy at least read into the White Paper and avoid the development of any general thought that our renewed assistance in Taiwan is in support of an eventual triumphant return to the mainland of a rejected Kmt under its present leaders. US interest here is understood by us to be based solely on military strategy. To give the appearance of supporting an unrehabilitated Kmt could well jeopardize our long-term political objectives in China. In denying Taiwan to the Communists, care will be necessary to avoid identifying ourselves [Page 421] with the forces which the Chinese people rejected in favor of communism. Therefore a carefully developed campaign designed to make forceful use of every opportunity to encourage those individuals and groups who are currently working for the elimination of reactionaries and the placement of liberals might succeed in seeing the creation of a resurgent movement in Taiwan which would have that appeal among the people of the mainland necessary to any attempt to pierce the armor of communism and profit by such weaknesses as must inevitably appear there.
If, on the other hand, we thoughtlessly support or even appear to support without reservation the politically as well as militarily rejected Kmt leaders, we run the danger of playing into the hands of Communist propaganda and deserting the basic tenets on which our domestic and foreign policies are supposedly founded.
Although many will argue the point, it is possible that Chinese liberal elements can so regroup themselves about the Generalissimo that his name might regain some of the sweeping national support which he initially obtained and subsequently held until his popular program was taken from him and his high purposes by less honorable Chinese to screen their self-centered operations, thus bringing the reputation of the movement to its present low.
Sent Department 690. Department pass Chungking 218.
- Commander in Chief of the Chinese Air Force.↩
- Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Commanding General, Far East Air Forces (FEAF).↩
- Kwei Yung-ching, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Navy.↩
- Russell S. Berkey, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in the Far East.↩
- By March 1949; see bracketed note, Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. viii, p. 269.↩